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- ◆ MAJOR ECONOMIC NEWS IN THE LAST TWO MONTHS

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EDITORIAL

It is now seven months since the conflict between Ethiopia and Eritrea started following the forced occupation of Ethiopian territory by Eritrean forces. The problem seems to have eluded any kind of solution to the satisfaction of both parties. All the various peace initiatives starting with the U.S.-Rwanda proposal up until the recent OAU peace formula has been accepted by the Ethiopian side while being automatically rejected by Eritrea. Save for the Lake "shuttle diplomacy", whose content is the best kept secret in contemporary diplomacy, there is nothing in the horizon by way of peace initiative that would make us hope that the conflict could be resolved without resorting to full scale war. In the mean time citizens are anxiously awaiting the outcome hoping to quickly get back to their normal life that has been disturbed by the mindless adventurism of Eritrean rulers.

As Ethiopians and Ethiopian economists, this is an issue we care about very deeply concerned because we realize the potential damage that war could cause to our economy and society. Last July in volume I, no. 4, of *Economic Focus*, the editorial stated "As economists we strongly feel that the economies of both countries cannot afford another round of regional conflicts although we believe the effect will be worse on Eritrea than Ethiopia. The effect of war on national economies, especially in countries that have no armament industry and have to use scarce foreign currency to acquire them, is not limited to the actual loss of life and destruction of property that directly ensue from it. The psychological effect that war has on domestic and foreign investors, on foreign tourists and the tourism industry in general, the general sense of instability it creates are very serious, with enduring effect on poor economies." The Ethiopian Economic Association, in its last general assembly essentially endorsed this statement and called for a peaceful solution to the conflict to avoid the serious economic costs that would naturally ensue from the conflict escalating to a full-scale war.

To look at this issue more closely, the EEA organized its last round table on "the economics of the Ethio-Eritrean conflict." Three papers were presented on this round table. It is around these papers that this issue of *Economic Focus* is organized. We have printed all the three papers in full here. Brook Debebe argues that although the conflict has disrupted some of our economic activities and created some uncertainties, the fundamentals of the Ethiopian economy are still sound. He is confident that the government will pursue its development program along with protecting the sovereignty of the country adequately. Berhane Mewa sees an opportunity in this conflict that the government should cease for good use. The unity observed among Ethiopians of various ethnic identities and political affiliations owing to Eritrean aggression, he believes, would further strengthen the reconciliation and national unity of Ethiopians. Berhanu Nega suggests that the current stalemate could be economically more costly if it continued indefinitely than getting into a military conflict with Eritrea and win decisively. There are enough controversial points raised in these papers. We hope these issues will provoke animated debate among our readers.

In our last *Economic Focus*, we presented a short Amharic article on the performance of the Ethiopian macroeconomy. One of our readers reminded us that we have assumed that all our readers are equally conversant on economic issues and that we should first present the basic methodology employed in generating the national income data that was presented in that article. We thus have included in this issue Getachew Adem's Amharic presentation of the basic concepts involved in national income accounting and the methodology used by Ethiopian authorities to generate the data. We have also included two articles one by Andrew Danino on the process of privatization and its uses based on IFC's experiences elsewhere. Another article by Berhanu Nega visits the issue of the size of firms and international competition in relation to history of economic ideas and as it relates to current Ethiopian conditions. This issue of *Economic Focus* also includes our regular features of letter to the editor and Economic NEWS and issues. ■

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ከስዲድ ኑሩ

በአለፈው "የልሳነ-ኢኮኖሚክስ" አትም (ትጽ.1 ቱ. 4) "የማክሮ ኢኮኖሚ አፈጻጸም በኢትዮጵያ" በሚል ርእስ አጭር ጽሁፍ ማስነበቢ ይታወሳል። ነገር ግን ጽሁፉ ዘግይቶ በመውጣቱ ምክንያት ከዚያ ወዲህ በጽሁፉ የተካተቱት መረጃዎች መጠነኛ መስተካከል ተደርጎባቸዋል። እንደገና ተጨማሪ መረጃዎች በተገኙ

ጊዜ፣ በኢኮኖሚ ልማትና ትብብር ሚኒስቴር በኩል ተጠናቅቆ የሚወጣው የአገር ሀብት ውጤት (National Income account) ማጠቃለያ ማስተካከያ እንደሚደረግበት በቀዳሚው ጽሁፊ ማስገንዘቢ አይዘነጋም። "ከልሳነ-ኢኮኖሚክስ" ዓላማዎች አንዱ በተቻለ መጠን አዳዲስ ም

ጣኔ-ሀብታዊ መረጃዎች ለታዳሚዎች እንዲደርሱ ማድረግ እንደመሆኑ መጠን በአለፈው ጽሁፍ ላይ ለተረዱት መረጃዎች ማስተካከያ ይሆን ዘንድ ያለሰፊና ጥልቅ ትንተና ዋና ዋና ምጣኔ-ሀብታዊ እመልካችን እንደሚከተለው አቀርባለሁ።

ሀ. ያልተጣራ የአገር ውስጥ ምርትና የክፍለ-ኢኮኖሚዎች አስተዋጽኦ

ዓመት	የአውነተኛ ያልተጣራ የአገር ውስጥ ምርት ስድገት ምጣኔ	ግብርና		ኢንዱስትሪ		የስርዓት አገልግሎት ክፍለ ኢኮኖሚ		ሌሎች የአገልግሎት ክፍለ ኢኮኖሚ		ያልተጣራ የነፍስ ወከፍ የአገር ውስጥ ምርት ስድገት ምጣኔ
		ካልተጣራ የአገር ውስጥ ምርት በመቶኛ	የስድገት ምጣኔ	ካልተጣራ የአገር ውስጥ ምርት በመቶኛ	የስድገት ምጣኔ	ካልተጣራ የአገር ውስጥ ምርት በመቶኛ	የስድገት ምጣኔ	ካልተጣራ የአገር ውስጥ ምርት በመቶኛ	የስድገት ምጣኔ	
1973	-	58.1	-	10.9	-	14.0	-	17.0	-	-
1974	0.51	55.7	-3.6	11.8	8.5	14.5	-4.3	18.0	6.3	-2.4
1975	10.1	57.5	13.6	11.3	5.9	13.5	2.8	17.6	7.8	6.9
1976	-6.3	53.7	-12.5	12.8	5.7	14.5	0.3	19.0	1.1	-9.0
1977	-9.7	47.0	-20.9	14.8	4.5	16.2	0.9	22.0	4.4	-12.4
1978	9.9	49.6	16.0	13.3	-1.2	15.2	3.5	20.8	3.8	6.4
1979	14.0	51.7	18.8	13.6	16.5	15.4	15.1	19.3	6.2	10.4
1980	-0.1	50.3	-2.8	13.1	-3.8	15.9	3.4	20.7	7.1	-3
1981	0.3	50.6	1.0	12.2	-6.6	15.0	-5.5	22.2	7.5	-2.7
1982	4.1	51.2	5.3	11.2	-4.7	15.0	4.4	22.6	5.8	0.9
1983	-4.2	56.3	5.2	9.4	-19.1	12.0	-23.5	22.3	-5.5	-7.2
አማካይ	1.9	52.9	2.0	12.2	0.57	14.7	0.57	20.1	4.5	-1.2
1984	-3.7	56.8	-2.7	9.1	-7.1	12.8	-2.5	22.0	-5.1	-6.9
1985	12.0	53.8	6.1	10.4	28.4	13.3	22.2	22.5	14.7	9.0
1986	1.6	51.0	-3.7	11.0	7.0	13.9	6.2	24.1	8.9	-1.6
1987	6.2	49.7	3.4	11.2	8.1	14.0	6.4	25.2	11.0	2.9
1988	10.7	51.5	14.7	10.7	5.6	13.7	9.0	24.1	5.9	7.4
1989	5.6	50.5	3.4	10.9	7.9	14.2	9.4	24.5	6.9	2.4
1990*	0.5	46.4	-7.6	12.0	10.9	15.3	8.3	26.3	7.9	-2.6
አማካይ	4.7	51.4	1.9	10.8	8.74	13.9	8.4	24.1	7.2	1.6

*ግምት

ምንጭ: የኢኮኖሚ ልማትና ትብብር ሚኒስቴር የአገር ሀብት ውጤት ማጠቃለያ

ለ. ያልተጣራ የአገር ውስጥ ቁጠባ፡ ኢንቨስትመንት፡ የሀብት ክፍተትና ፍጆታ (ካልተጣራ የአገር ውስጥ ምርት በመቶኛ)

ዓመት	ያልተጣራ የአገር ውስጥ ቁጠባ	ያልተጣራ ኢንቨስትመንት	የሀብት ክፍተት	የመንግስት ፍጆታ	የገላ ፍጆታ	አጠቃላይ ፍጆታ	የውጭ ዕዳ (ካልተጣራ የአገር ውስጥ ምርት በመቶኛ)
1973	7.6	13.6	-6	14.2	78.3	92.6	-
1974	5.9	13.7	-7.8	15.3	78.7	94.0	25.6
1975	5.5	12.2	-6.7	16.8	77.8	94.6	27.6
1976	8.1	16.8	-8.7	17.3	74.6	91.9	31.7
1977	2.8	10.7	-7.9	15.3	81.8	97.1	33.8
1978	8.6	16.4	-7.8	15.8	75.6	91.4	36.1
1979	7.6	15.6	-8.0	15.7	76.7	92.4	37.4
1980	12.5	20.4	-8.0	18.1	69.4	87.5	41.3
1981	8.9	14.4	-5.5	19.4	71.7	91.1	41.2
1982	7.9	12.5	-4.5	19.2	72.9	92.1	43.1
1983	3.4	10.4	-7.0	16.5	80.1	96.6	39.1
አማካይ	7.2	14.3	-7.1	16.7	76.2	92.8	35.7
1984	3.0	9.2	-6.2	10.5	86.9	97.4	31.5
1985	5.6	14.2	-8.6	11.2	83.8	95.0	30.4
1986	5.0	15.2	-10.1	11.7	83.8	95.5	30.8
1987	6.7	16.4	-9.7	11.6	82.5	94.1	31.8
1988	6.6	19.1	-12.5	11.7	82.5	94.2	31.4
1989	8.3	19.1	-10.8	12.1	80.7	92.8	
1990*	9.0	20.2	-11.2	12.4	79.7	92.1	
አማካይ	6.3	16.2	-9.9	11.6	82.8	93.4	

* ግምት

ምንጭ፡ የኢኮኖሚ ልማትና ትብብር ሚኒስቴር የአገር ሀብት ውጤት ማጠቃለያ፣ የኢትዮጵያ ብሔራዊ ባንክ ዓመታዊ መጽሔት

ዓመት	የይስሙላ ያልተጣራ የአገር ውስጥ ምርት	የአውነተኛ የአገር ውስጥ ምርት	የገንዘብ እትርቦት (M1)	የገንዘብ መጠን (M2)	የዋጋ ግሽበት	
					ከትርጉም (የመሸ መቻ) ዋጋ የተሰላ	ካልተጣራ የአገር ውስጥ ምርት ውስጥ ዋጋ ማስተካከያ የተሰላ
1975	10.7	10.1	15.2	15	3.8	2.9
1976	-6.7	-6.3	9.1	11.3	-0.5	-3.9
1977	18.6	-9.7	13.2	13.6	18.4	34.0
1978	4.2	9.9	18.1	15.6	4.6	-5.5
1979	6.0	14	12.1	8.1	-9.5	-7.1
1980	4.0	-0.1	9.7	8.9	2.2	3.6
1981	5.1	0.3	6.7	8.9	9.6	5.2
1982	6.9	4.1	19.5	17.6	5.2	3.7
1983	14.1	-4.2	22.9	18.7	20.9	19.7
አማካይ	6.99	2.01	14.06	13.08	6.08	5.84
1984	8.3	-3.7	11.6	13.2	21.0	14.9
1985	28.3	12.0	12.7	16.8	10.0	13.1
1986	6.2	1.6	8.6	10.2	1.2	2.5
1987	19.6	6.2	18.3	20.7	13.4	0.6
1988	12.0	10.7	0.10	11.8	0.9	-0.3
1989	9.3	5.6	0.63	5.5	-6.4	2.9
1990	9.0	0.5	መላ	10.2	መላ	መላ
አማካይ	13.2	4.7	8.7	12.6	6.68	5.62

መላ፡ መረጃ አልተገኘለትም

THE ECONOMICS OF THE ETHIO-ERITREAN WAR

By
Brook Debebe
Vice Minister of Trade and Industry

Paper presented at a Panel Discussion organized by the Ethiopian Economic Association

In 1991, at the demise of the Derge Government, the Transitional Governments both in Addis Ababa and Asmara inherited what can technically be defined as a single economy. The two countries had:

- An integrated (inter-linked) socio-economic structure,
- Similar fiscal policies, and most of all,
- A currency common to both.

The two governments concluded, logically as it were, that the only good thing to do was to work together to bring about more economic and social integration by reinforcing the positive conditions that existed and by removing drawbacks.

It was the hope of many in both countries that the factors that remained uniting would be maintained, nurtured and expanded by both governments to lead to the unity of the two brotherly people. A prolonged state of tolerance of a situation, which benefited the Eritrean side more than Ethiopia, followed. However, Eritrea reverted to the introduction of a new Eritrean currency. They did that on their own free will, wishing to follow independent and different fiscal and monetary policies. The Ethiopian Government, accepting the decision of the Eritreans, devised a new policy governing trade ties with Eritrea. The Eritreans on the other hand wanted to impose their version of policies on Ethiopia, maintaining that the two countries should use both currencies to

conduct their trade. This was not acceptable to the Ethiopian Government.

Some of the conditions, which existed before the Eritreans invaded and occupied Ethiopian territory, can be viewed in two phases. The first phase was between May 1991 to October 1997, and the second November 1997 to May 1998.

Prior to the introduction of the Eritrean currency, the two countries agreed to use the same currency, the Birr, and to allow free movement of goods and services except exportables and imports from third countries. Frequent exchange of delegations to deliberate and discuss specific economic issues had been conducted within this framework.

While attempts were being made to streamline matters, differences started to surface. Here are some examples that occurred some four years back.

- The charges for the use of the refinery at Assab increased to such high levels that it became obvious that the situation was disadvantageous to Ethiopia. The Eritreans refused to look into this and other related problems. Ethiopia opted to import refined petroleum products at cheaper cost and the refinery had to be closed.

- Port authorities continuously tampered with the agreement on the utilization of the Assab Port. The unilateral increases in tariffs eventually made the port one of the most expensive in the world in

addition to the bureaucratic and at times difficult procedures and restrictions imposed. The condition prompted many importers and exporters to revert to the use of the Port of Djibouti. The Djibouti government grabbed the opportunity and streamlined the port procedures and reduced service charges. This resulted in the further avoidance of the Assab Port by Ethiopian businessmen. As a result Eritrea lost revenue.

- Ethiopia also took other measures which curtailed Eritrea's benefits over Ethiopia. Eritrean trucks which were operating in Ethiopia outside the agreed route were forced to abide by the agreement. The sale of logs to Eritrea was stopped when it was discovered that the Eritreans exported them to third countries.

- In spite of the Eritrean Government's subtle but more and more obvious schemes to use the Ethiopian market as a supplier of raw materials and labour and an exclusive area for their manufactured products, the Ethiopian economy started to show strong signs of growth and stability. Sectors such as textiles, leather garments, pharmaceuticals, etc., which the Eritreans assumed were their comparative advantage areas, proved to be otherwise. After the introduction of the Nakfa in November 1997, economic relations between the two countries further deteriorated. The position of the Eritrean government was that Nakfa and the Birr be on a one to one (parity) exchange rate and be used in both countries. On the other

hand, the Ethiopian position was, given differences in monetary and fiscal policies, trade between the two countries should be undertaken in acceptable convertible currencies as was the case is with other neighboring countries. Thus, no agreement was reached as the Eritreans refused to accept the Ethiopian position. The impact of this on both countries was the following:

- Trade in commodities, except salt, literally stopped between the two countries,
- Ethiopia was paying in hard currency to Eritrea for services at the Assab port, and
- Currency transfers to Eritrea by Eritreans residing in Ethiopia and smuggling were curtailed.

The negative impact of these conditions on the Eritrean economy could be greater than on the Ethiopian economy. Many scholars and political scientists conclude that this is the reason that prompted the Eritrean government to invade Ethiopia.

The situation after Eritrea invaded Ethiopia can be summarized as follows:

- The standing army of Ethiopia was small compared to many African countries. To enhance the defense of the country, the government had to recruit new ones and call for volunteers. This had and will continue to have budgetary effects, although the deficit did not so far exceed the target for the year.
- Goods imported by the government and the private sector were impounded at Assab port by Eritrean authorities irrespective of the existence of international agreements prohibiting such action.

- The shift to the port of Djibouti was rather smooth and cost effective but Eritrea lost hard currency earnings as a result of Ethiopia's move.

- The last five months import and export levels have been conducted efficiently and cost effectively. Investment both domestic and foreign has not been as bad as most expected. Inflation is still quite low.

- Ethiopians forcefully evicted from Eritrea and from the border areas have to be taken care off. This has additional cost to the country.

For economic development, peace and security are a prerequisite at national, sub-regional and even at regional levels. Although peace and stability are still firmly prevailing, the fact that the Eritreans continue to occupy Ethiopian territory by force creates a negative view on the sub-region.

In a world where the attraction of investment is becoming very competitive, such uncertainty in the sub-region is by no means helpful and will prove damaging to all countries unless resolved quickly.

The situation between Ethiopia and Eritrea for about five months is no peace, no war. This has created a sense of uncertainty both on domestic and foreign businessmen. Military preparedness has a cost and is difficult to maintain over a longer period without sacrificing economic development. Unless the Eritrean government accepts the peace proposal and withdraws from Ethiopian territory, Ethiopia will be forced to take the unwanted, but necessary step to remove the Eritrean forces from its territory.

Such a belligerent situation has economic implications whether the stalemate continues or fighting is resumed. The economic effect of

both is the same but differs in intensity. Military budget will inevitably be higher in times of war as compared to peacetime. This will result in strained budgetary conditions for infrastructure such as health, education, roads, etc. In order to minimize the harm, the Government of Ethiopia may introduce temporarily some measures both fiscal and otherwise. In the long list of possibilities, such measures as introduction of new taxes on non-basic products, borrowing from banks, reducing or down-scaling or postponing development programs could be included. One logical and possible option would be to increase the revenue collection capacity of the concerned offices. This effort, coupled with increased economic activities to bring about more taxable revenue in the private and parastatal sectors, can contribute significantly. It is also true that some resources could be salvaged from stringent control of expenditure and proper utilization of project funds.

The experience so far has shown that the Ethiopian public is in the most certain and real fall back position. With a more coordinated and publicized approach, considerable resources can be raised from the public.

As noted "undertaking a war is a full time job. Tackling development issues is also a full time job. Undertaking both at the same time, if not impossible is challenging. The government is committed to implement its economic program at a higher rate than last years even if war breaks out. We all know war is an expensive exercise but encroachment by a foreign country on our national integrity and security does not lend itself only to economic cost-benefit analysis. ■

This is the last issue of the first volume of *Economic Focus*. While we are proud to have successfully completed our first year, we hope your support and contributions will continue to make *Focus* an even better magazine. So please write to us about what you think about our magazine and where it needs improvement.

THE ECONOMICS OF THE ETHIO-ERITREAN CONFLICT

By
Dr. Berhanu Nega

Paper presented at a Panel Discussion organized by the Ethiopian Economic Association

1. Economic Relations between Ethiopia and Eritrea before the conflict

The economic relationship between Ethiopia and Eritrea before the introduction of the new Eritrean currency *Nacfa* was very close and not inimical to the interest of Eritrea. The various agreements between the two countries include a trade agreement, an agreement on the use of the ports, transport and communications, investment and banking and the use of a common currency. In the area of trade where detailed agreements were in force, commodities produced in one country can be transported to and sold in the other country without any customs duty. (With the exception of commodities that are known to be important foreign exchange earners to each country such as coffee, hides and skins...etc. for Ethiopia.)

The agreement also stipulated that the former Ethiopian birr would serve as the medium of exchange for the trade between the two countries. It was also agreed that commodities that are imported from a third country could pass to its final destination in transit through either one of the countries without paying duty. For all practical purposes the combined effect of these agreements for Eritrea was that it provided Eritrea with the needed political independence while at the same time providing the economic benefits of being part of a larger economic entity. For Ethiopia, access to the sea was guaranteed from this agreement in

addition to ensuring a friendly neighbor in the North.

These agreements seemed to have served both governments well until the introduction of the *Nacfa*. Whatever disagreement existed in the negotiating table, we have not heard any official complaint from either party about the unfairness of the relationship that existed between them. If there was any complaint about these economic arrangements they seem to have come from Ethiopian traders who seem to feel that they were being undersold by Eritrean traders who were believed to have dumped imported products in the Ethiopian market for which they have not paid taxes. Other Ethiopian nationalists also opposed the "semi-official" parallel market trade of the birr to the dollar by official Eritrean agencies in Eritrea and abroad. They also opposed the buying of known exportable products by Eritreans from Ethiopia in birr for re-export from Eritrea against the above official agreement. On the part of the Eritrean public not much complaint has been heard about the economic arrangement as such. There are strong hints heard from some Eritrean quarters indicating some kind of displeasure with the investment activities that was taking place in Tigray. In particular, Eritreans seem to feel that the expected division of labor (based on presumed comparative advantage) between Eritrea and Ethiopia was being destabilized by industry based investment activities in Tigray which they felt was a replication of industrial production in Eritrea and thus

undermining Eritrea's potential exports to Ethiopia.

So much was clearly stated by Asmerom Legesse, in his recent interview with the Amharic service of the Voice of America. The Eritrean president has also indicated this clearly in an interview he gave to a Tigrigna Magazine "Assure." The degree to which this issue has influenced Eritrean decision-makers (if indeed this is a wide spread view among Eritreans) is very difficult to say. But, it certainly is not a very plausible argument to hold to explain the root cause of the conflict.

What is clear to every observer of the region is that the official harmonious relationship between the two countries started to crack following the decision of the Eritrean authorities to print their own currency. With the introduction of the *Nacfa*, at least for the Ethiopian government, the rational behind some of the basic elements of the economic agreements mentioned above --from the use of the refinery and the ports to the free trade arrangement-- was lost. These agreements were replaced by an "understanding" that each country will mend its way, economically speaking, and the only exemption made in the relationship as a reminder of a once closer economic tie was the birr 2000 allowance for border trade using the two countries' currency. Even that was grudgingly accepted by Eritreans who made their displeasure abundantly clear with the new arrangement. The difficulties in practically implementing this

agreement made it essentially ineffective in easing the economic tensions that resulted from the new understanding. Clearly the relationship between the two countries has deteriorated rather rapidly since the failure to come up with a mutually agreeable economic arrangement after *Nacfa*. Eritrea's wish to continue the former economic arrangement, (save the use of the birr as the common currency) with a mutually acceptable one to one exchange ratio between the two currencies was not accepted by the Ethiopian government who deemed it in its national interest to economically deal with Eritrea just as any other independent neighboring country.

Could these economic issues have caused the military invasion by Eritrea? This is a very difficult question to answer for certain especially since official Eritrean position never raised this as a factor in its decision making and thus largely rests in plausible speculation. In any case, the commonly accepted affirmative response to this question largely rests on four interrelated arguments:

1. That Eritrea has vehemently opposed the new arrangement and clearly showed its resentment against the Ethiopian government since then;
2. That Eritrea has lost a lot of economic benefit from the new arrangement;
3. That the new economic arrangement and the various investments that took place in Tigray and other regions of Ethiopia in the last several years have seriously undermined the broad economic strategy of Eritrea to be the supplier of industrial products to Ethiopia; and
4. The official claim that Ethiopia dragged its feet in settling the border issue (by postponing the meeting of the committee set up to settle the problem by two months) and hence Eritrea's military measure, seem to be too flimsy an argument to start such a potentially disastrous conflict.

I must admit that these arguments have stronger rational appeal than those provided by official Eritrean sources as the main cause of the conflict. What is hard to believe, after accepting this to be the cause, is the process through which a military conflict would ensure that these lost economic benefits will be regained. For these benefits to accrue to Eritrea, Ethiopia must agree to accept an economic arrangement that it believed to be against its interest on a permanent basis. For this to happen by force, Eritrea needs to sort of colonize Ethiopia. And I do not see how Eritrean military strategists could believe that that is a viable military option unless otherwise as some suggest, they are completely blinded by the arrogance of their past victory.

2. What would be the estimated cost of the conflict to Ethiopia?

No matter what motivated Eritrean aggression, the main issue before us is assessing the cost of the war and finding a way to minimize it as much as possible. Before I go to the latter, let me briefly talk about what I think will be the cost of this conflict. Although economists are largely comfortable to speak with data at hand, the nature of this discussion will not allow such a luxury. Since we are dealing with a war that has not yet taken place, it is very difficult to speak with any degree of accuracy on monetary terms. What I chose to do here, therefore, is to kind of rank the potential cost of the conflict given the various possible scenarios emerging out of the conflict.

Given the short time available for me, I am forced to use a very simplified and thus broadly indicative version of a methodology that, I believe, can be elaborated more carefully to achieve a stronger analytical consistency and a higher precision than that is provided here.

In a nutshell the following exercise involves a) identification of possible outcomes for the resolution of the conflict b) making an inventory of the possible costs relative to the different possible outcomes, and c) quantifying these

to give an indicative measure of the costs.

There are five possible scenarios for the conclusion of the conflict that must be evaluated to identify the least cost and viable way out of this conflict for Ethiopia. While in theory all these are the possible outcomes of the conflict, the probability of each of these outcomes occurring differs because of a number of political, diplomatic, the behavior of the belligerent parties, and other such considerations. For purposes of this exercise, however, I attach probabilities based on my understanding of the factors that will determine the final outcome to indicate what I think will happen. The table below lists these scenarios and their probabilities.

Related to these possible outcomes, there are at least ten possible cost items that could be incurred with wide ranging values in relation to their contribution to the total cost of the conflict. These cost items are:

- a) The direct cost for instruments of war
- b) The direct cost of the destruction of infrastructure
- c) The economic cost of the human life lost
- d) The direct cost of taking care of the displaced people and the output lost by the displacement of people
- e) The opportunity cost of the time and energy lost in mobilizing for the war
- f) The effect on investment in the short run
- g) The effect on investment and overall economic activity in the long run
- h) The effect on hotels and the tourism industry in the short-run
- i) The effect on hotels and the tourism industry in the long-run and
- j) The psychological effect of war on the population in general and the business community in particular.

Scenarios	Probability
1. The war is avoided by Eritrea accepting Ethiopian terms	0.1
2. We go to a full scale war and decisively defeat the aggressor	0.5
3. The current stalemate continues indefinitely	0.2
4. We go to a full scale war and be defeated by Eritrea or reach some kind of military stalemate	0.1
5. Avoid the war by accepting Eritrean terms	0.1

It should also be noted that the contribution of each scenario towards the cost build-up also varies for which purpose different weights are assigned to each. For example, the direct cost of the instruments of war is high compared with the effect of the conflict on the tourism industry as a result of which higher weight is given to the latter than the former. Accordingly the value assigned to each cost item in relation to the total cost will vary; the former being higher than the latter. On the other hand, the value of the direct cost of the instruments of war to the total cost will be lower in the case where Ethiopia avoids the war by accepting the Eritrean terms compared with if it goes to war and win.

The first analytical challenge is to assign weights to each cost item in relation to the total. For simplicity of calculation, I have taken the total weight to add to 125 and assigned values between 0 and 20 for each cost item. The value given depends upon the presumed contribution of that cost item to the total cost, 20 being the highest value given. From this value, a particular value between zero and one is assigned to the particular scenario depending upon the degree to which that particular cost item is effected when that particular scenario occurs. The value one is assigned, for example to the cost of instruments of war under scenario four. Accordingly, the value 20 in

column IV row I indicate that the cost of buying instruments of war is very high (thus assigned the maximum points of 20) where this cost will be fully effected if there is a full-scale war (thus assigned the maximum value of one). The results of this exercise are provided at the last row of the table below.

What need to be clarified now are the reasons for assigning those particular values to the various cost items and to the scenarios. In what follows I will try to briefly explain the reasons behind those values.

a) The direct cost for instruments of war and personnel; Obviously this is one of the major costs of any military conflict especially in modern warfare. For countries such as Ethiopia, the cost of buying the military hardware (Guns, planes, tanks, ammunitions, salaries..etc.) is not only the amount of money spent in relation to what this money could have done if it was used for productive purposes, but the fact that we are not producers of these items and have to acquire them using scarce foreign currency resources makes this cost rather high. So I assigned this item the maximum value of 20.

b) The direct cost of the destruction of infrastructure: military conflict usually entails the destruction of infrastructure (roads, bridges, power plants etc.) and in some cases even direct economic structures such as factories could

be targets. The value of these items could be quite high depending upon the degree to which air power and missiles are used and the penetration of the opposing armies in the other's territory. Given this specific conflict my sense is that there will be some destruction of infrastructure but its cost will be significantly smaller than the cost of the instruments of war. A value of 10 is given for this item.

c) The economic cost of the human life lost: This, of course, is the most difficult to put a value on. For the purpose of this exercise a very high value is put on human life not only on economic grounds but also because of moral and ethical considerations. A value of 20 is given for this item.

d) The output lost by the displacement of people: Here there are two kinds of costs involved. The first one is the direct cost involved in taking care of the displaced people materially and morally. The second cost is the output foregone by this displacement which is equal to the output these people could have produced under normal circumstances. The combined cost of this could be very high depending on the duration of the conflict, the number of people displaced, and the productive potential of the people involved. A value of 15 is given for this.

e) The opportunity cost of the time and energy lost in mobilizing for the

war: What we have seen since the beginning of the conflict with Eritrea is that the very idea of an impending war has led to massive realignment of priorities in the country. Several government institutions and personnel who were engaged in other developmental activities are now engaged in mobilization. Further to the activities of the government is the national drive on the part of the population to mobilize resources in one form or another to support the war effort. This is an important cost of conflict although less than the previous ones to which a value of 5 is assigned.

f) The effect on investment in the short run: This deals with the obvious issue of investors particularly foreign investors shying away from investing in countries that are engaged in military conflict. Most of this cost will be recovered if the conflict is short and stability returns soon. Still some investment might be lost forever. A value of 5 is assigned to it.

g) The effect on investment and overall economic activity in the long run: This deals with the effect on investment if the conflict is seen as long lasting and the region and the country are considered to be a very unstable and volatile region. Under such circumstances, most investors, and more so foreign investors, will not even look at the

region as a possible area of investment and not only will new investment in the country dry up but also existing investors might even leave the region. The potential cost of such an event might be extremely high. Thus a high value of 20 is assigned to this item.

h) The effect on the hotels and tourism industry in the short run: One of the early victims of a conflict in any region is the hotels and tourism industry. Tourists are known to be extremely risk averse and any sign of apparent conflict would result in a reduction in their inflow leading to a loss of market to the industry and foreign exchange earning to the whole economy. The total effect of this depends on the size of the industry and the country's dependence on the industry for foreign exchange earning. In our case because of the relatively small size of the industry, (although with a high potential) a value of 5 is given.

i) The effect on the hotels and tourism industry in the long run: For a country such as Ethiopia, a prolonged war would have a bigger effect on this industry in relation to the potential of the industry. Considering the high growth rate of the industry compared to other sectors, a prolonged war could have a more serious effect on the industry. A value of 10 is given to this cost item.

j) The psychological effect of war on the population in general and the business community in particular: This could be a very serious cost if the war occurs and is indefinitely prolonged. Such scenarios usually generate a psychological atmosphere that leads to short-termism in investment, reduced work ethic, and the like and could even seriously erode the moral fiber of the society. In many cases a prolonged war could implant and inculcate the tradition of militarism and conflict in the youth and sow the seed for future instability. This has a very high economic cost in the long run. I assign a value of 15 to this point.

Based on these considerations, I derived the results shown in the table below. As can be seen from the table, values between zero and one are assigned to each scenario considering the degree to which that cost is effected under that scenario. The product of this value and the value given for each cost item then gives the actual cost for that cost item and for that scenario. The raw indicating the total cost in the table provides the sum of the costs for each column, which also gives the final cost of the scenario out of a total value of 125. The percentage values in the last row shows the value of the cost of that scenario as a percent of the maximum possible cost.

The next EEA round table will focus on "The relevance of the East Asian experience to Ethiopia." The speakers include, H.E. Mr. Takehisa Nogami, Japanese Ambassador to Ethiopia, Dr. Mulatu Teshome, Vice Minister of the Ministry of Economic Development and Cooperation, Mr. Nigel Roberts, World Bank resident representative and Dr. Befekadu Degefe of ECA. Economic Focus invites our readers to participate in this discussion by sending us articles and commentaries on the topic.

	SCENARIO I. PCETT	SCENARIO II. WETV	SCENARIO III. CSTA	SCENARIO IV. WERV	SCENARIO V. PCERT
Direct cost of instruments of war	$20 \cdot 0.5 = 10$	$20 \cdot 0.8 = 16$	$20 \cdot 0.5 = 10$	$20 \cdot 1 = 20$	$20 \cdot 0.5 = 10$
Direct cost of destruction of infrastructure	$10 \cdot 0.1 = 1$	$10 \cdot 0.5 = 5$	$10 \cdot 0.2 = 2$	$10 \cdot 1 = 10$	$10 \cdot 0 = 0$
The economic cost of the human life lost	$20 \cdot 0.1 = 2$	$20 \cdot 0.5 = 10$	$20 \cdot 0.1 = 2$	$20 \cdot 1 = 20$	$20 \cdot 0.1 = 2$
Output lost by displacement of people: Direct and opp.cost	$15 \cdot 0.2 = 3$	$15 \cdot 0.4 = 6$	$15 \cdot 0.4 = 6$	$15 \cdot 1 = 15$	$15 \cdot 0.6 = 9$
Opportunity cost of mobilization for war	$5 \cdot 0.2 = 1$	$5 \cdot 0.4 = 2$	$5 \cdot 0.6 = 3$	$5 \cdot 1 = 5$	$5 \cdot 0.8 = 4$
S.R. effect on investment and other econ. activity	$5 \cdot 0.2 = 1$	$5 \cdot 0.4 = 2$	$5 \cdot 0.8 = 4$	$5 \cdot 1 = 5$	$5 \cdot 1 = 5$
L.R. effect on investment and post war eco. arrangement	$20 \cdot 0.2 = 4$	$20 \cdot 0.3 = 6$	$20 \cdot 0.8 = 16$	$20 \cdot 1 = 20$	$20 \cdot 1 = 20$
Effects on the hotel and tourism sector in the S.R.	$5 \cdot 0.4 = 2$	$5 \cdot 0.5 = 2.5$	$5 \cdot 0.8 = 4$	$5 \cdot 1 = 5$	$5 \cdot 0.6 = 3$
Effects on the H&T sector in the L.R	$10 \cdot 0.2 = 2$	$10 \cdot 0.3 = 3$	$10 \cdot 0.6 = 6$	$10 \cdot 1 = 10$	$10 \cdot 1 = 10$
The psychological effect of war on economic actors and the economy	$15 \cdot 0.1 = 1.5$	$15 \cdot 0.2 = 3$	$15 \cdot 1 = 15$	$15 \cdot 1 = 15$	$15 \cdot 1 = 15$
Total economic cost	27.5	55.5	68	125	78
Percent of the highest cost	22%	44.4%	54.4%	100%	62.4%

According to the results shown in the table above, the first scenario is of course the best possible solution for Ethiopia with a very low value of 27.5 out of a possible cost of 125 which translates roughly to 22% of the total cost. This is an indicator of the cost that is already incurred up to this point. The logic behind the low cost for this scenario is that we will achieve our objective of regaining the territory lost by the aggression and the reinstatement of the displaced people with out going to a costly war while at the same time affirming a crucial principle that could ensure an enduring peace in the region.

Unfortunately, as the low probability assigned for this outcome in the first table indicates, this does not seem to be a likely solution given the current belligerent position of Eritrean authorities and equally unfortunately, given the inability of the international community to assert its most fundamental principle that governs the relationship between nations, i.e., the illegitimacy of trying to resolve border disputes between nations by force.

The latter is even more striking and hopeless when one hears the views of travelling western diplomats who insist that there should be no war between the two countries under any circumstances. The argument is that these two countries are too poor and cannot afford to fight. It is better, even for the wounded party, to exercise restraint or even accept terms that might be clearly against its national interest to avoid going to war because the cost of such a war is too high compared with accepting even an unjust peace. It is the mark of the sheer arrogance of these countries and the double standard they exercise with impunity in international relations that these same countries had to travel thousands of miles to fight Iraq in the Gulf war or Argentina in the Folkland war in the name of protecting international law no matter what the cost. Even forgetting the issue of principle, one of the factors that forced me to think about this issue in the way I did is to see and compare the

potential cost of war and that of peace.

The second scenario is getting to a full-scale war with a possibility of a quick and decisive victory in Ethiopia's favor. The total cost of this scenario as can be seen from the last row of the second column is 55.5 which is roughly 44% of the cost of the worst scenario. In this scenario the economic costs are rather obvious in the short-run and are not cheap. However, the long run benefits of achieving stability in the region and eliminating the possibility of another confrontation in the near future has its economic benefits. In this analysis, it is the second best solution for Ethiopia and the most likely outcome.

The third scenario is the continuations of the current no war no peace stalemate indefinitely. This has the advantage of avoiding the loss of life and destruction of property that would naturally occur if the conflict goes to full-scale war. However, as the high value of 68 at the bottom of the third column clearly indicate, it has a number of serious costs in the long-run since the continued existence of war clouds in the region has a potential to seriously and negatively affect foreign investment in the long run and has a negative psychological atmosphere hampering long term investment even among local investors. In terms of the above exercise, this outcome is more expensive in the long run than the first two scenarios.

For obvious reasons, the worst and most disastrous scenario for Ethiopia is the fourth one. It is where all the high costs of the conflict are concentrated with the maximum value of 125 and a 100% of the economic cost. Accordingly, it is a scenario that has to be avoided by all means and that Ethiopian policy makers have to make sure not to begin an offensive before being certain that this outcome will not occur. The possibility of this outcome occurring, however, is extremely unlikely as the low probability in the table indicates.

Finally, accepting peace on Eritrean terms is the second worst scenario for Ethiopia according to this analysis with a high value of 78 containing some 62.4% of the maximum possible cost. The presumption here is that such a peace will be temporary in that the conditions attached to such an outcome is likely to postpone and not eliminate the possibility of war. Furthermore, such a victorious outcome for Eritrea may well inculcate it with a feeling of being a regional super power and create the strong possibility of meddling in the internal affairs of the countries of the region. Especially if the argument that the cause of the conflict is economic has any merit, which I think it does, peace with Eritrea on their terms could mean accepting conditions that are potentially damaging to the long term development prospects of Ethiopia. Although this scenario minimizes the short-term and direct cost of the conflict, the long term cost to the Ethiopian economy could be rather high. That is one of the reasons why this scenario is identified as the second worst scenario among the five possible outcomes.

Conclusion

The conclusion that emerges from this analysis is clear. War is not a cheap enterprise. It is something that should be avoided whenever possible. However, looking for peace irrespective of the terms and conditions it is obtained, might look like a least cost option in the short-run but could be more costly in the long run. There are conditions where it would be cheaper to fight now than to live with a permanent cloud of war hovering around a country. This might in deed be the case in the current conflict between Ethiopia and Eritrea even without considering the issues of pride, national sovereignty and the like which could be as important, if not more important, as the economic reasons in deciding when and how to enter the war. ■

THE ECONOMICS OF THE ETHIO-ERITREAN WAR

By

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Paper presented at a Panel Discussion organized by the Ethiopian Economic Association

Background

Before discussing on the economic effects of the "WAR", one has to look into and understand the very background of the relation of the two countries; the historical development of their similarity and differences. However, this forum being limited on time and scope, we shall provide only a brief outline.

Until the early 18th Century, the Tigrigna speaking people living both in the northern and southern side of the Mereb river never regarded themselves as separate people.

In course of time, within the Tigrigna speaking people of northern Ethiopia, local cultural and dialectical variations developed naturally which consequently resulted in two smaller political units. The northern part was ruled by Bahire Negash (Ruler of the Sea) and the Southern part by Tigre Mekonen (Land of Tigray) resulting into historically evolved administrative boundaries and not necessarily a boundary among ethnically different people.

As the interest of warlords reflected repeated attempts to take over one another, the neighbours started looking into each other with some degree of skepticism.

Later on, the petty rulers and military leaders of the Northern part considered the Italians as counter weight against the south.

The attempt of the Italians to further extend their power to the South

failed as a result of the celebrated battle of Adwa. In this battle the Italians are sided by some Northern Tigrigna speaking people while the Southern Tigrigna speaking people collaborated with different Ethiopian nationalities and stopped the Italians from proceeding to the South.

Strengthening their holdings of the present Eritrea, the Northern Tigrigna speaking people integrated into a different socio-economic and cultural setting of "Colonial Economy and Social Effect." This greatly intensified the differences between Tigrigna speakers of both sides of Mereb.

As time goes by, the Eritreans developed steadily a tendency of looking into the southern people as less developed and treat them as inferior neighbours.

As the money economy develops, their participation in the colonial factories, plantation and construction works and as an auxiliary troops in the colonial army became high. This assisted them to be materially advanced and also exposed themselves to unequal treatment and racism.

Their service as auxiliary army to the colonial force was extended to other parts of Ethiopia during the 2nd Ethio-Italian War. After the Italians left, Eritrea remained relatively better developed economically compared to the other parts of Ethiopia

However, the psychological effect of considering themselves as civilized and taking others as "Poor

and Backward Relatives" remained intact.

Thereafter, a series of historical events occurred. Most of them during the EPLF-TPLF struggle with the Derge which we will not be dealing with now.

What this presentation would like to underscore is that the psychological making of the Eritrean nationalists have contributed to the present flare up of tension between the two countries.

Assumptions made by the two countries

During the struggle to overthrow Mengistu's regime, the relation between TPLF (EPRDF) and EPLF has been subjected to various ups and downs, confrontations and tolerances.

However, after the overthrow of Mengistu, and as Eritrea emerged as a new independent nation, several assumptions on both countries were made.

From the EPRDF (Ethiopian Government) side

The War in the Northern front has ended for good. As a result of the friendship between the two ruling parties, economic development was their common priority.

Confrontation between the two is not likely to come. Therefore, for Ethiopia, no armed force is required in the Northern border.

From the EPLF (Eritrean Government) side

- Ethiopia has become militarily paralyzed.
- Ethiopia is in a potentially dangerous ethnic tension which could explode to disintegrate the nation.
- EPRDF & Meles are not popular and ethnic forces could easily be organized against them. The hatred of the other nationalities, political groups and the press against EPRDF and Tigray is real and high that any action opposing the latter will be supported by the former.
- The alliance of EPRDF with Eritrean leadership is of a matter of convenience to the Ethiopian government and it could not afford to go into conflict with Eritrea.

Of course not many political analysts expected to see conflict erupting between the two nations. (Thus, the assumption remained pending.)

On the other hand, as time goes on, the two groups acted as independent nations. Besides the political differences their economic policies were incompatible which resulted in inducing inconveniences in their relationship.

However, in the eyes of the Eritrean leadership, the position of the Ethiopian government is fragile and could be at the mercy of their support for its existence. This resulted in overconfidence and miscalculation in designing their economic policies. They neglected the effects of possible backlash that they believed could be controlled by pressuring the Ethiopian government to accept their conditions lest it would face political problems owing to its unpopularity.

If so why War?

This is why we have to refer to the above points.

- The undermining and considering of Ethiopians as

backward people.

- That the above assumptions are arrogantly accepted.
- That the internal pressure and wrong political and economic policies in Eritrea are strong, that an excuse has to be manufactured.

And above all, this quotation from a release of Eritrean Network Information Center clearly indicates Eritrean attitude about the conflict.

"...Ethiopia's problem is that it is a land locked state... The most dangerous dimension of the current war, if expanded, is that Eritrea would preserve its independence due to many social and political factors, while Ethiopia will confront the danger of the 'Somalization' or 'Balkanization' as the Ethiopian State is composed of racial and tribalist formation brought together in a new federation susceptible to wars if the Eritrean-Ethiopian war continued. The situation may result and lead to endless wars within the Ethiopian State....President Clinton's continued message to President Isaias Afewerki is demanding him to stop the war for safeguarding friend Meles Zenawi's position in Ethiopia...."

That is why WAR IS THE ULTIMATE GUN to be pointed on EPRDF, the Ethiopian government and the Ethiopian people to force them to subscribe to the economic conditions of the Eritrean Government. The border conflict is just a cover.

On the other side, the Ethiopian government undermined the pressure from Eritrea and continued on its economic reform program and development agenda.

This happened to contradict with the interest of the Eritrean government's economic policies and measures. Two major activities should be considered here.

1. At this juncture, it is wise to mention that the Eritrean economy enjoyed the benefit of exporting Ethiopian agricultural products as Eritrean products to the international market. And unrestricted importation of agricultural and industrial products to Eritrea. Formation of EPLF supported economic entities to operate in Ethiopia, operation of money laundering activities,

importation of goods from other countries destined to reach Eritrea through Ethiopia but distributed in Ethiopia without paying duties like other imports by Ethiopians. These are only some of the various economic benefits that Eritreans were enjoying.

With subsequent measures, especially after the currency divorce into Birr & Nakfa, the outcome could not be as considered by the Eritrean leadership. And its pressure on the government could not be effective.

2. As was clearly outlined in the master economic agenda on the Eritrean side during a conference in Baltimore, USA, in 1991:

"Eritrea, as it is advanced in its industrial experience and infrastructure than other parts of Ethiopia, the Eritrean economic strategy shall be to have Eritrea as an industrial nation which could be compared to the Asian Tigers with the efforts of its civilized people. Ethiopia shall be its primary market and obviously Tigray shall be the labor resource."

However, things didn't go as expected. Ethiopia was more advanced in industry. Tigray was not as expected a source of labour but rather an industrializing region with heavy investments compared to the ones existing in Eritrea. Thus, the Master Economic Agenda was not practical.

Why War?

The border dispute, I believe, is no more than a pretext for the real cause I discussed above since we know that their long and friendly relation should have easily led to a negotiated settlement.

In the modern civilized world, such misunderstandings like border disputes are so physical that they are easily settled and a series of negotiations if necessary, involving a third party, could have been involved even if the two parties could not settle it by themselves.

The Economic Cost of War

In order to see this subject, one has to have a clear perspective. I believe the effect should be

measured on its totality and at a national level. It is obvious that war or any other social activity will have social costs. The costs could have negative or positive effect. It is only on balancing the two that one has to conclude on the results.

To mention some of the economic effects which should be balanced:

- Materials confiscated at the Eritrean ports belonging to the Ethiopian government and people.
- Agricultural commodities remaining in Ethiopia adding to Ethiopian Export (hide, oil seed, coffee...etc.) that could have been re-exported by Eritrea.
- Slowness of sales of some industrial goods from Ethiopian factories.
- Availability of these some goods in the market under priced by Eritrean sellers.
- Increase in the sales of textile products.

- Decrease income in the tourism industry
- Decreased competition in the market from Eritrea government sponsored businesses.
- The ban of Eritrean commodities which were having tax advantage over similar Ethiopian products.
- Some degree of shortage in some products.
- Some degree of surplus in some products.
- Increase of mobility in transportation.

In general we can conclude that there are some sectors and individuals that are affected negatively and on the other hand there are sectors and individuals that have benefited. But if one could quantify the above list and try to balance, I am optimistic that the net effect will be zero if not positive for Ethiopia.

On the other side, we should see the potential advantage of this confrontation which is believed to be a "JUST - War" from the Ethiopian people's side.

It will give the Ethiopian people and government the guarantee not to be provoked and diverted from their developmental efforts as and when required by their neighbors which arrogantly may wish to be hindrance to our progress.

And also the response from the general public and the different political groups for the position of the Ethiopian government is so encouraging that the government and the ruling party should take advantage of the situation by revising their various policies which could further strengthen the reconciliation, unity and national interest of the country. We believe the international community will side the Ethiopian position if it seriously stands for peace and democracy in our world. ■



PRIVATIZATION AND ITS EFFECT ON DOMESTIC ENTREPRENEURIAL CAPACITY FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF IFC'S OWN EXPERIENCE

By
Andrew Danino

Presented for the Round Table Discussion on
"Privatization" organized by the Ethiopian Economic Association

Introduction

I am very pleased to have been invited to this round table this evening. I'm grateful for the opportunity to talk about privatization and its effect on domestic entrepreneurial capacity from the perspective of IFC's own experience. Let me outline what I am going to cover.

First a brief word about the world Bank Group and where IFC fits as I'm sure that all of you have heard that the World Bank and IFC are linked. Then I will talk about privatization beginning with a working definition and moving on to the benefits that IFC has seen from its experience in privatization over more than a decade.

I will then talk about the roles the World Bank and IFC play in privatization. To conclude I will give examples of some privatization transactions in which IFC has been involved.

World Bank Group

I often find that many people are not clear about what exactly IFC does and how this differs from or complements that of the World Bank. Let me start with the World Bank itself, which is the largest and oldest part of the World Bank Group, which

also includes IFC and MIGA. The three institutions have essentially the same shareholders, the same president but different mandates. The World Bank itself is the oldest institution and was established 50 years ago and deals with governments. As well as giving advice, it makes loans for projects such as roads, health, energy, education, agriculture all of which must be repaid by governments whether or not a project is successful or not. MIGA, the youngest and smallest institution, was set up less than 10 years ago to provide political risk insurance.

IFC was set up 40 years ago to promote private sector development through investments in private sector companies. As I will explain later, IFC is also active in privatization, which enhances private sector development and general economic development. Its investment activities differ from those of the World Bank in two ways:

First it can make equity investments as well as giving loans. Second, it can only invest in private sector companies and cannot take government guarantees.

The return of IFC's money depends only on the success of the projects and companies we finance. If the project fails we lose our money; it is as simple as that. As a result we are

very careful to try to ensure that as far as possible projects that we invest in do not fail.

Privatization

Turning now to privatization, it is, I think, useful to start with a working definition of what privatization actually is. Privatization may be defined as the transfer of ownership or control from government or state hands into private hands. This transfer should be enough to give private operators or owners substantive independent power, i.e., the Government can no longer call the shots.

Privatization is always political in the sense that governments have aims that are non economic, for example, seeking wide shareholder bases for privatized enterprises, targeting certain classes of buyers (domestic entrepreneurs, management and workers, domestic investors), seeking guarantees to maintain employment levels, and assurance on investment levels. Given its political nature, it is therefore vital that the privatization process be seen as transparent. Governments do not want to be accused of selling the crown jewels too cheaply or being vulnerable to charges that their friends and supporters are unfairly benefitting.

A sale of an enterprise can in itself be considered a success in that private investors have been found who will risk their own money in an enterprise that they believe can perform better under their ownership than under the state's. How successful an enterprise in post privatization depends in part on the conditions imposed on the buyer by the selling government. Generally speaking, the more freedom the buyer has, that is, the fewer conditions placed on the buyer by the selling government, the greater likelihood of major improvements in the enterprise's performance. Another factor affecting the post privatization success is how the actual sale or divestment process has been handled. Is there a clear understanding in the form of a definitive agreement between the selling government and the purchaser over what is expected post privatization? It is a mistake to leave contentious issues such as the post privatization management of the enterprise to be resolved later. It almost always leads to problems. Another general rule is that the longer enterprises have been up for sale the worse its financial and commercial condition becomes. A form of paralysis often sets in when there is uncertainty and the management of an SOE becomes aware that it is up for sale, motivation to run the business may disappear as people start to fear for their jobs and speculate about what is going to happen to them. Protracted sale periods should therefore be avoided if possible.

So what are the benefits of privatization? What has IFC's experience been?

The main benefits we have seen are:

- Improved enterprise efficiency and performance in around 70% of cases with very few instances where performance has actually deteriorated.
- Improvements in the competitive environment resulting in consumers and customers getting better and often cheaper products

and services. This is particularly evident in privatized utilities such as telephone, electricity and water companies, even where they have remained monopolies.

- New funding sources, including capital markets, open up to privatized companies. Instead of having to queue up with the government for money to invest, a privatized company with a good project can raise the finance on the strength of its own balance sheet and management.

- Privatization can be a significant source of foreign investment in a country.

- Corporate governance is improved, i.e. the private owners focus on the economic aspects of enterprises.

- Domestic capital markets are broadened and deepened by privatization. This is particularly evident in stock markets in developing countries, which are often small and illiquid. The privatization of a large profitable, well known SOE often boosts the market and brings to it small investors who normally would not go near it. In a number of countries, privatization have doubled the size of the local stock markets.

- Last, but not least, privatization can be a major source of revenue for governments. Successful privatizations maximize the price that an SOE can be sold for.

To illustrate these benefits, let me share with you the main findings of a survey IFC carried out of the owners of 1,000 small enterprises in Russia one year after they had been privatized. IFC itself has been heavily involved in mass privatization programs in Russia involving tens of thousands of industrial, commercial and farming enterprises. The survey revealed that:

- Two thirds had carried out repairs to their businesses;

- In 90% of the cases employees were working more efficiently;
- 86% said that they plan to grow their businesses;
- 80% said that privatization had been good for them and that they would do it again.

The survey is, therefore, a strong endorsement of how domestic entrepreneurs see privatization in a country where there had been virtually no history of private sector activity. IFC's own experience as an investor in privatized companies tells the same story. For example, the proportion of privatized companies that have good levels of profitability increased from about 30% after the time of privatization to over 60% after years.

The lessons for a country like Ethiopia are, I think, clear. Privatization is the way forward, particularly in the industrial and commercial sectors. What is probably needed in many enterprises is a combination of local investors and foreign strategic partners with technology and management skills.

WBG Involvement in Privatization

Having given a brief summary of the benefits of privatization, it is perhaps useful to say a few words

about the roles the World Bank and IFC can play in privatization.

The WB's role is to build commitment to privatization by dialogue with governments at the policy level. Here in Ethiopia the WB has been providing technical assistance to the EPA to improve its capability to carry out its mandate.

IFC's role on the other hand is at the transaction level. It does this in two ways:

1. As an adviser to a government on the privatization of a specific enterprise. Its involvement can be

very inception in the carrying out of a strategic review, to preparing an enterprise for sale, marketing it to potential buyers and finally evaluating the bids and advising governments on the pros and cons of the various proposals.

2. As an investor/financier of privatized enterprise. IFC helps fund the actual privatization process. I should stress though that IFC does not back particular bidders in an open auction privatization. Instead it may indicate to all bidders that which ever is successful may approach for finance. Also IFC cannot be both an IFC and an investor since there would be a conflict of interest.

Example of IFC Privatization Transaction

Rather than stay at the theoretical level, it's useful to describe some IFC transactions in Africa in which IFC was involved, both as an adviser to a government and as an investor.

Kenya Airways

KA was the first privatization of an African airline. It is a model for transforming a loss making 100% public corporation into a sound commercial enterprise under private ownership. IFC's involvement derived from the complexity of the deal and from the high political profile. At the outset there was a lot of resistance in Kenya to selling what many people considered to be a national symbol. The transaction took IFC two years to complete, between 1994 and 1996, and involved the following stages.

1. A strategic review was undertaken by IFC to identify the operational problems and come up with a turn around strategy. The outcome was the involvement of an airline consultancy, which brought in an outside MD who was given the authority to implement wide ranging reforms to restore the airline to profitability.
2. Second, IFC undertook a search for a strategic partner. As a result KLM, the Dutch airline became a shareholder with 26% stake.
3. Finally, there was a share offering arranged by Citibank in both Kenya and on international markets. As a result, KA is now owned about 34% by local investors, 26% by KLM, 23% by the Government, 14% by foreign investors and 3% by the employees. KA has more than 100,000 shareholders the majority of which subscribed for the minimum \$200 of shares. The airline is now profitable, much stronger and more competitive.

Tanzania Breweries

This is an example of a transaction where IFC was an investor in a privatization transaction. TBL was a loss making 100% state owned enterprise. In 1994 IFC took a small equity stake, about 9% and approved a loan for the

privatization and rehabilitation of this enterprise in which South African Breweries took a 50% stake and management control, the balance of 40% staying with the Government. This was the first major investment by a South African company in Tanzania. Since 1994, TBL has been turned in to a very profitable business and capacity expanded with the addition of a third brewery. Very recently, the Government announced the sale of about a quarter of its shares, a 10% stake, to local investors on the recently launched stock market in Dar Es Salaam. TBL is now one of the blue chip companies in Tanzania that is offering a wider range of higher quality products.

Societe d'Energie et d'Eau du Gabon (SEEG)

IFC was retained in 1996 as the lead adviser to privatize water and electricity services in Gabon that were a monopoly of SEEG, that provides 40% of the population with water and 60% with electricity, mainly in urban areas. IFC's role was:

1. A technical and strategic review of the power and water sectors and the preparation of a financial restructuring of SEEG;
2. Identifying suitable potential investors, supervising the bidding process and assistance in drafting a new concession agreement;
3. Acting as financial advisor to the government in evaluating bids and selecting the winning bid, Compagnie Generale Des Eaux of France and Electricity Supply Board of Ireland.

This was Gabon's first privatization. Interesting features included:

- The transaction did not involve the transfer of assets but instead a concession to use and develop them.
- The holder of the concession committed to new investment of \$600m over 20 years in electricity and water.

Given the need to have time for discussion here this evening I think that is all I would like to say for the moment. Thank you.

**THOSE OF YOU WHO STARTED
YOUR SUBSCRIPTIONS WITH
THE FIRST ISSUE, PLEASE
RENEW YOUR SUBSCRIPYONS**

PREVENTION OF MONOPOLISTIC TENDENCIES IN THE BUSINESS ARENA: IS IT DESIRABLE IN COUNTRIES SUCH AS ETHIOPIA?

By
Dr. Berhanu Nega

A paper presented at a workshop organized by Ethiopian Chamber of Commerce entitled "How to Design a Market Economic Policy to Ensure that Social Concerns are Taken into Account". May 21, 1998.

I. Introduction:

Giving a presentation on the potential problems of monopoly to an academic community or to professional economists (if I were an expert on the particular field, which I am not), I guess will not be a complicated and too difficult a task. Based on certain simplifying assumptions about the economy, I will paint what the ideal type is. That is, I will first define what the optimal allocation of scarce resources will be. I will then present what conditions need to be fulfilled to achieve this level of optimality and move to the effects on the economy of departure from these ideal conditions and leave the practical problems of how to fulfill the optimal conditions or what to do about cases of departure from these conditions to policy makers and those affected by it. In other words, I will comfortably engage in the realm of positive economics and indignantly leave the normative side to politicians and businessmen. I am sure that is not expected of me here.

When I was asked to give a talk on this topic to the Ethiopian business community without much clarification about what it was that they want their audience to get from the talk, I guessed that there was a real practical problem or at least a fear of a potential problem that the business community was trying to get a handle on. This requires, above all, a thorough knowledge of

the existing conditions in the business community, which I cannot claim to fully possess and I am sure there are a lot of able people in the business community that can authoritatively speak on this topic better than I.

My guess is that the organizers of this workshop asked me to give this presentation knowing full well that I wear two hats - my professional interest as an economist and my gainful employment managing business projects and my association with the business community because of that. If my guess is right, then what seems to be expected from my presentation is a cross between the theoretical and the practical. The first part of this will contain a theoretical presentation about the supposed social welfare benefits that accrue from an economy organized along competitive market principles and the effects that departures from such market structures will have on society's well-being. This includes the kind of policies that governments adopt to protect society from such outcomes. The practical aspect will contain whether or not such a danger exists in Ethiopia and if so what should be done about it. Although a discussion on the latter aspect of the problem will necessarily be *ad hoc* and deserve a more complete treatment in its own right, I will organize my remarks accordingly giving more emphasis to the former.

II. What are the theoretical presumptions of neoclassical theory about the functioning of a capitalist economy?

Economics as a systematic study of society started with the development of capitalism. The economic relationship between people in pre-capitalist societies was simply part of the political and legal structure of the society. Who owns the means of production (such as land), what is to be produced, who labors on this means of production and who gets what from the output of this labor were clearly defined relationships established by the all powerful monarchy. Under such circumstances there was nothing opaque that theory can clarify. In other words, there was no need for theorizing about the economy.

The emergence of capitalism brought a number of new elements that complicated the economic relationship between people. It was no more possible to have a clear understanding of the economy by looking at the transparent laws. These changes include:

- The separation of economic activity from politics and other primordial relationships;
- The incredible dynamism of the economy to the point where within

a historically short span of time (about two centuries) output increased much more than all the output of humanity before it combined.

All this dynamism and prosperity was occurring without any identifiable guidance from any superior authority such as the state and without any clearly defined rules of the game.

It was this mystery of economic order and dynamism without transparent rules that triggered the curiosity of thinkers and led to the systematic inquiry into the nature, source, and distribution of wealth that was called political economy.

As you well know, the first detailed and systematic treatment of a capitalist economy or as Smith would have it "an economy under the system of natural liberty" was done by Adam Smith in his "An Inquiry Into The Nature And Causes Of The Wealth Of Nations" published in 1776. Smith and the classical school identified several key elements of capitalism based on their observation of a flourishing private enterprise economy. Among these, the most important were minimal government involvement (that the best government governs the least,) self-interested economic behavior (that self-interested behavior was basic to human nature,) harmony of interest (that by pursuing their own individual interests, people served the best interests of society,) and the existence of what they called economic theories or "laws" that govern economic behavior and relationships (such as the law of value, the law of diminishing returns...etc.)

Based on these general principles and several theories about specific economic issues, the classical school determined that competitive capitalism, with all its problems, is the best economic arrangement capable of providing efficiency in production, distribution, economic growth and generalized prosperity. Accordingly, they advocated unrestricted trade and economic activity led by private enterprise.

Since the kind of economic activity they were observing at the time was small-scale, they did not deal with the issue of the emergence of large scale enterprises with a potential to dominate markets and hinder the social benefits of a competitive market economy.

This basic conclusion was later derived with sophisticated analytical techniques by what we now collectively call neoclassical economics. In relation to the social welfare benefits of capitalism, this school presented a much more detailed and analytically complete system which includes a precise definition of maximum social welfare and the conditions that are needed to be fulfilled to ensure its existence. Vilfredo Pareto, the Italian-born economist whose name we now commonly use to identify maximum social welfare (Pareto optimality) identified maximum social welfare with a situation "where there are no longer any changes that will make someone better off while making no one worse off. This implies that society cannot rearrange the allocation of resources or the distribution of goods and services in such a way that it aids someone without harming someone else."¹ This condition has three implications:

1. **An optimal distribution of goods among consumers.** This is a distribution that will maximize consumer welfare. This will be achieved where the marginal rates of substitution for various commodities between consumers are equal.

2. **An optimal technical allocation of resources.** This implies that goods and services are produced in the economy in such a way that the various factors used for the production of these goods are used in the best way possible. The requirement to satisfy this condition is that the marginal rates of technical substitution between the various factors (say labor and

capital) for the production of different commodities is equal. And finally,

3. **Optimal quantities of output.** To ensure that there is no wasted output or that the goods that are produced in the economy are those that the consumers want, the output produced must neither exceed nor be short of society's demand. The condition necessary to fulfill this is where the marginal rates of substitution for the different commodities are equal to the marginal rates of transformation. Thus, for the individual profit-maximizing firm, it is the point where the price of the product is equal to its marginal cost.

Given this definition of optimal welfare and the conditions necessary to achieve it, various neoclassical economists spent a lot of time and effort to prove that a free and perfectly competitive market structure (defined as a situation where economic agents, producers or consumers, are price-takers or that they are so small and numerous that no one would have any influence on the market) would indeed lead to such an optimal social welfare. In other words, the economic well-being of society in general is better served under a system of competitive capitalism than any other alternative.

III. The Development of Large Companies and Their Effect on NC Theory and Policy

While the assumptions and conclusions of the theory might be right as a depiction of capitalism in 18th century Europe, business conditions were quickly changing in this dynamic system called capitalism. Towards the latter part of the 19th century, it was no more possible to describe the dominant sector of the capitalist economy, particularly in industry, as characterized by "infinite number of infinitesimally small economic agents." The trend was the

¹Oser and Brue, "The Evolution of Economic Thought." New York: Harcourt Brace, 1988, p. 389.

emergence of large companies in a number of industries with significant influence on the market. The formation of joint stock companies, the buying out of small producers by large competitors, the emergence of advertising as the main form of competition between giant companies for market share (with it, the loss of consumer sovereignty) as opposed to competition through prices significantly changed the nature of the game. With it the validity of the neoclassical assumptions of pure competition as a basic characteristic of capitalism was severely undermined.

Economic thinkers looking at these changing realities started to raise a number of questions about these new conditions which include the economic reasons for the emergence of these large firms and their effect on social welfare.

It was another Italian immigrant to Cambridge U.K. who started the discussion on these emerging new conditions by claiming that the emergence of large firms with extensive market power was the natural result of capitalist competition. In a 1926 article in the *Economic Journal*, Piero Sraffa pointed out that unit costs of production may decrease because of internal economies or because of distribution of overhead costs as output expands. The falling unit costs are incompatible with pure competition, possibly leading to natural monopolies. If the firm grows more efficient as its size increases, there will be fewer firms and less competition. Thus it is necessary to abandon the path of pure competition.²

If the movement towards monopoly and oligopoly is inherent in capitalism the issue then is to evaluate its effect on social welfare. In other words, it is to see whether the Pareto optimality criteria discussed above could be fulfilled under these market structures. The

American, Edward Hastings Chamberlain, Joan Robinson of England, and Heinrich von Staklberg from Germany, pioneered this analysis independently and simultaneously in the early 1930s.³

These analysts showed that monopolies can raise prices above the competitive equilibrium level to yield economic profits over the long run (i.e. profits above the normal level). Even in the absence of power to realize a monopoly profit, under monopolistic competition prices are likely to be higher and output lower than under pure competition. Furthermore, under conditions of monopolistic competition and monopsony, factors of production (such as labor) do not receive a value equivalent to their marginal contributions leading to what Robinson called labor exploitation. *In other words, a private enterprise system does not necessarily result in the best allocation of resources or pay all factors appropriately or that social welfare cannot be maximized under these conditions.*

Various conclusions were drawn from this analysis. Most neoclassical economists including Chamberlain and Robinson accepted the validity of the analysis and used it to argue for the importance of government antitrust policies and government regulation of the profits of utility monopolies. Von Staklberg lost all hope for economic order under capitalism except as directed by the state, which led him to fully embrace Fascism. Still others used this development of "monopoly capitalism" as a signal of its decadence and its eventual demise. In terms of economic policy, most capitalist economies accepted the neoclassical recommendations and instituted vigorous antitrust policies and regulated natural monopolies. In

most cases the government agencies responsible for antitrust laws vigorously prosecuted those that violated laws prohibiting unfair business practices that include collusion behavior for price fixing, predatory pricing or dumping, vertical and horizontal mergers.

An interesting exception to this assessment of the emergence of large-scale capitalism was the institutionalist school particularly that of Galbraith.⁴ His quarrel was not on the facts. He believed that modern capitalism is dominated by large enterprises and characterized by an abundance of contrived wants that are the product of corporate planning and massive advertising. Producers decide what shall be produced and then manipulate consumers tastes so that they buy these products. Therefore, it does not make any sense to talk about the purpose of production to be to satisfy wants (as is presumed by neoclassical free market theory) if production creates these wants. He charged that under these circumstances, capitalism will under-allocate resources to public goods (schools, clinics... etc.) and over-allocate goods that satisfy artificial wants through advertising. This creates what he calls "the social imbalance" and calls for government action to correct it through sales tax on consumer goods and services.

His disagreement with neoclassical oligopoly theory is in what he considers to be the effect of capitalism dominated by large corporations. Instead of higher prices and lower outputs, he claims that oligopolists fix prices at low levels that permit them a minimum profit and permit expansion of total output and sales. This is because corporate managers are not profit maximizers, as neoclassicals believe. Leaders of these large corporations (he calls them the technostucture) pursue a more

³Edward H. Chamberlain, *The theory of monopolistic Competition*, 5th ed. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1946,) and Joan Robinson, *The Economics of Imperfect Competition* (London: Macmillan, 1933), both of which were first published in 1933.

⁴ John Kenneth Galbraith, *Economics and the Public Purpose* (Boston: Houghton Muffin, 1973).

² Piero Sraffa, *Economic Journal*, December 1926.

complex purpose than profit maximization and these purposes are the protective purposes of survival in the competition (which requires a minimum level of profit to satisfy shareholders) and the equally important affirmative purpose which is corporate growth. Growth of output, sales and revenues produce greater employment security and financial rewards to the members of the technostructure. The policy conclusion of the institutionalist school is that we should not be worried about anti-trust laws that emerge from the fear that monopolies will have higher prices and lower outputs. In fact, large companies tend to have lower prices and much higher outputs and therefore policy makers should encourage small firms to merge and create large firms. Instead, policy makers should find mechanisms to control the technostructure, which is becoming increasingly powerful in every aspect of society. In relation to this Galbraith said:

"Thus the [antitrust] remedy that emerges from the neoclassical model is harmless. It presents no threat to the power or autonomy of the technostructure or to its affirmative interest in growth. And since the remedy is thought to be comprehensive - since competition is considered the remedy for all industrial ills - it directs all complaints into an essentially harmless channel. What might be dangerous agitation for effective regulatory action or for public ownership or socialism comes out safely as a demand that the antitrust law be enforced. . . . Best of all from the standpoint of the technostructure would be immunity from all attack. But the next best thing - and a very good thing - is a system of ideas that diverts all attack into channels that are safely futile."⁵

Another important contribution in relation to monopoly was that of the Austrian school particularly Schumpeter. He goes even further in support of monopoly by arguing that monopoly is good because large companies tend to spend more for research and development, which in turn leads to technological

innovation that is crucial to the dynamism of capitalism.

Maybe because of the influence of the institutionalist school or more likely because of the realities of international competition, capitalist governments in the West no longer pursue their antitrust policies particularly those related to mergers and acquisitions and in fact seem to actively encourage it as a national strategy to gain competitive advantage in the international market. The romantic era of Schumacher's "small is beautiful" seems to be over.

IV. The Development of Capitalism in the Third World and its Nature

It is no longer possible to talk about the nature of capitalist development in the Third World in general and individual countries in the South in particular without locating it within the context of international capitalist competition. And the North and particularly the huge multi-national corporations that dominate the market in many industries, as we all know, dominate this international system. Since a strongly protectionist policy stance is passé, prudent policy requires devising a strategy that enables local industries to be competitive internationally. What does this really mean in relation to the topic at hand?

Since the beginning of development economics as a subdiscipline in economics, economic development is associated with industrialization and industrialization can be achieved following any one or a combination of three strategies. These strategies include producing locally what used to be imported from abroad even if that meant the local producer is not the least cost producer. The main market for such industrialization is considered to be the domestic market and the strategy thus requires some kind of protection of domestic industry from foreign competition. This is the strategy commonly called import substitution industrialization.

The second strategy that was favored by socialists and strongly nationalist countries was industrialization by concentrating in the heavy industry sector (what Marx called department I) at the expense of the consumer goods sector initially. The strategy is expected to provide in a short period of time a domestic capital goods sector that can then supply the necessary machinery for consumer goods industries. Clearly, the strategy requires huge capital expenditures which the local private sector can ill afford in capital poor countries. It therefore relies on the state to carry out such capital expenditures with the local private sector following suit at the second stage. The strategy's strong point is supposed to lie in its ability to make the country self-reliant in the long run as opposed to the ISI strategy which was deemed to increase the technological dependence of the South on the North.

The third strategy known as Export Promotion (EP) strategy aims to use the international market as the target of its domestic production. It hopes to concentrate on its comparative advantage and compete successfully in the international market on those goods and services that it can produce at a lower cost than international competitors. This strategy was considered advantageous in that it will not be limited by the size of the domestic market and is most likely to be more efficient in production since it has to compete with the best producers around the world. The countries of North and South East Asia are supposedly the main beneficiaries of this strategy. Given their clear success in the area of economic development in the last quarter of the century and based on the mistaken belief that the strategy is essentially a market strategy, (with little government intervention) it is the strategy that mainstream economists (including the Bretton Woods Institutions) support and encourage Third World countries to follow.

Under the current international atmosphere, the possibility of successfully implementing the first

⁵ Galbraith, Economics, 121.

two kinds of industrialization strategies, is now seriously questioned. The first one, although many economists still believe that it was the basis upon which the successes of the EP strategy was built and, therefore, Third World countries should not abandon at their early stages of industrialization, have very powerful international opponents with a capacity to make the strategy fail or at least make the cost of implementing it very high. Since the strategy requires strong protection of domestic industries, developing countries will find it very hard to overtly implement such strategy without offending the sensibilities of the rich donor countries and the penalty that follows in the form of drastic reduction in the inflow of foreign resources. The second strategy is simply impractical because of the unavailability of the huge capital it needs, the large domestic market it requires and the absence of the technology to make it work in small developing countries.

So what is left is the third strategy. Even in relation to the third strategy, there is wide disagreement as to what it is that made this strategy successful. One view that is usually associated with neoclassical economics and the international financial institutions that lend it strong institutional support contends that the success of the South East Asian Miracle was a testimony to the validity of its policy prescriptions, particularly that of liberal trade and investment policies. Opponents of this view seriously contend the attribution of the success of the NICs to liberal trade policies. According to them the evidence strongly suggests that their success is attributable to carefully managed industrial policies at least in the North East Asian case and even in the South East Asian case the evidence suggests a much more nuanced approach that provides substantial role to the state. It is not my intention to get into the debate about South East Asia here.

What is relevant to EP in general and the East Asian experience in particular in relation to the question I raised earlier is the issue of the

optimal size of the business firm. Analysts following the East Asian case generally agree that with the possible exception of Taiwan, the experiences of East Asia, particularly that of Japan and South Korea clearly support the contention that the drive behind their rapid growth and international competitiveness was the large business firms.⁶ The large diversified business groups in direct collaboration with the state dominate the business arena in most late industrializing countries. These diversified business groups coordinate their activities with the state in such a way that:

The government inclines growth by using the subsidy to distort relative prices. Then big business implements state policy. The role of small firms varies by industry, but basically the process of industrialization through learning involves the subordination of small firms to large ones in subcontractual relationships (until a turning point is reached when the state begins to support small-scale firms in the hopes of stimulating innovation). Oligopoly at the industry level and high aggregate economic concentration equip leading firms with the market power to survive the hardship of late entry. [The reasons for this concentration are first] Competition tends to be a consequence of growth, not a cause of it. [And second] Growth contains the seeds to increase productivity... and such diversified business groups are found in Japan, Korea, India, Taiwan, Brazil, Turkey, and other late industrializing countries.⁷

So if the relevant strategy for developing countries is the one followed by the East Asian countries and these countries rely for their rapid growth on the large and diversified business groups in a market structure that cannot be characterized by a free market, how would we address the topic of the

need or desirability of a competitive market structure in the Ethiopian context?

V. Capitalism and Free Market in Ethiopia

If the argument concerning the dominance of large corporations in advanced capitalist countries and in late industrialized countries is roughly right and if the proposition that developing countries' future lie in their ability to compete with these large international corporations has some merit, then there is no reason to believe that Ethiopia will be an exception to this general trend.

It is true that just as Ethiopian agriculture is dominated by small peasants, other forms of production in the country, particularly those in the hands of the private sector, are also small or even minuscule compared to the size of the firms that they are trying to compete with in the international arena. Given the smallness of the Ethiopian market, (owing to the small real per capita income) it is very difficult to imagine the local market supporting more than a few medium sized firms in many industries. The implication is that if our objective is to be competitive in the international market in a relatively free environment, we need to be least cost producers not only to penetrate foreign markets but even more importantly to keep our domestic market to local industries. This can only be achieved by increasing productivity which in turn is a function of the skills and motivation of the work force, the technology used in production, the availability of adequate infrastructure and above all, by producing at a large scale to benefit from scale economies, all of which are in short supply in our country.⁸

⁶ For detailed treatment of the Korean experience, see Alice Amsden, *Asia's Next Giant: South Korea and Late Industrialization* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989) Part I.

⁷ Amsden, *op. cit.*, p. 150-151

⁸ I have discussed the determinants of productivity in more detail in my Amharic article "domestic production and international competition" (Economic Focus, vol. 1 No. 3 April 1998).

In other words what I am suggesting is that large-scale production, to benefit from economies of scale, is one of the requirements to be competitive in the international market even if this might lead to the dominance of a number of industries by one or a small number of firms with substantial domestic market power. It might therefore be rational from the perspective of the whole economy and its future to encourage rather than discourage the formation of large firms with potential monopoly power. This is the logical conclusion that would emerge from the above analysis.

Of course, this does not in any way mean that large firms are always more efficient or that they achieved their size through the natural development of market competition. We also have sufficient experience around the world where large firms abuse their market positions and engage in all kinds of "unfair business practices" to prohibit competition and amass monopoly profits at the expense of consumers. In other words the issue is not whether or not there should exist monopolies or oligopolies with substantial market power. It is rather what they do with this market power.

This brings us to the more practical side of this discussion. How could we design a market economic policy that could protect consumers and small operators from the potential abuse of such monopoly power (such as predatory pricing to eliminate competitors) while we at the same time encourage the formation of large firms that can exploit economies of scale and achieve competitiveness in the international market?

Unfortunately, there are no easy answers to this question. Even in more advanced countries with their sophisticated monitoring mechanisms, it is notoriously difficult to prove such behavior for the courts to penalize the perpetrators. In countries such as ours it is virtually impossible. Although proclamation 24/19 (1965)

of the Ethiopian law⁹ prohibits what it calls "unfair business practices" with its very narrow definitions (the most important of which is hoarding), and makes them a criminal offense, no one has yet been successfully prosecuted for this offense.

However, given the low level of business ethics in our country, the dangers for abuse exist and something should be done about it before it gets out of hand. Even under normal circumstances where the competitive advantage of one local business over another (in terms of their capital endowments) is very minor, the rules of the game should be clearly established and equally enforced by an independent arbiter. With the emergence of mega businesses such as MIDROC operating with seemingly no financial constraints, the fear of unfair competition by the local business community should be taken seriously by law-makers and enforcing authorities. The issue of large party affiliated businesses and the possibility of engaging in unfair business practices by them raises a more fundamental question of the independence of the arbiter itself with a potential to spoil the whole business environment without sufficient gain in efficiency and international competitiveness.

But, in relation to the benefits of largeness discussed above, the lesson to the local business community, I believe, is to pull capitals together to form decent sized firms with a capacity to compete rather than limit oneself to traditional, small, and mercantile businesses. The government can support this, for example, by giving priorities to such companies in the privatization program.

⁹ See Consolidated Laws of Ethiopia, Vol. II (Addis Ababa: Faculty of Law, Haile Selassie I University, 1972 pp. 796-800.

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የብሔራዊ ኢኮኖሚ አካውንት ፅንሰ ሃሳብና የአዘገጃጀት ዘዴዎች በኢትዮጵያ

በጌታችው አደም
ኢኮኖሚ ልማትና ትብብር ሚኒስቴር

1. መግቢያ

የአንድ ሀገር ኢኮኖሚና ግንብራዊ ዕድገት በግፋጠን የገዝቡን መሠረታዊ ፍላጎቶች ለማሟላት ይቻላል ዘንድ የፖሊሲ ዉሳኔዎችን ለመስጠትና አፈጻጸማቸውንም ለመገምገም የአንድን የተወሰነ ወቅት /ዓመታዊ/ ኢኮኖሚያዊ እንቅስቃሴ የሚጠቀም አጠቃላይ አገላለጽ መለኪያ መኖር ወሳኝነት አለው። ይህም አጠቃላይ አገላለጽ መለኪያ በኢኮኖሚ ጠብብቶች አጠራር ጠቅላላ የሀገር ዉስጥ ምርት መጠን (GDP) በመባል የሚታወቅ ሲሆን ይኸውም በዓመት ዉስጥ የተመረቱ ዕቃዎችንና አገልግሎቶችን ዋጋ ያጠቃልላል። በዓይነትም ሆነ በመጠን በርካታ የሆኑ የአንድ ሀገር የተወሰነ ወቅት የኢኮኖሚ እንቅስቃሴዎችን በአንድ አጠቃላይ አገዛዝ ለመገለጽ የኢኮኖሚ ጠብብቶችና የስታትስቲክስ ባለሙያዎች ለዘመናት ሙከራ ያደረጉ ሲሆን የመወሰኛውን መልክ የያዘውና ዓለም አቀፍ እውቅናን ያገኘዉ እ.ኤ.አ. በ1953 ለመጀመሪያ ጊዜ ተዘጋጅቶ የቀረበው የተባበሩት መንግሥታት አንድ ወጥ የሆነ የብሔራዊ ኢኮኖሚ አካውንት አዘጋጃጀት ሙሉም (UN System of National Accounts-UNSNA) ነው። ይህ ሲስተም በ1993 በእጅጉ ተሻሽሎ ቀርቧል።

ኢትዮጵያም ይህንን የአሠራር ስልት ከሚከተሉት ሀገሮች አንዷ በመሆና ላለፉት 45 ዓመታት በዚህ መሠረት የብሔራዊ ኢኮኖሚ አካውንት ሥራን በማካከል ላይ ትገኛለች።

ይህ አጭር ጽሁፍ የብሔራዊ ኢኮኖሚ አካውንት ማለት ምን ማለት እንደሆነ፣ የብሔራዊ ኢኮኖሚ አካውንት አዘገጃጀት መነሻ መሠረታዊ ፅንሰ ሃሳቦችን፣ የብሔራዊ ኢኮኖሚ አካውንት አዘገጃጀት ሥራ

በኢትዮጵያ፣ የብሔራዊ ኢኮኖሚ አካውንት መረጃዎችና ጥቅማቸው እንዲሁም የእነዚህ መለኪያዎች ዋና ዋና ድክመቶች፣ በኢትዮጵያ የብሔራዊ ኢኮኖሚ አካውንት ሥራ ላይ ያጋጠሙ ችግሮችና የተጠቆሙ የመፍትሄ ሃሳቦችን ለመዳሰስ ይጥክራል።

2. ብሔራዊ የኢኮኖሚ አካውንት ምንድን ነው?

የብሔራዊ የኢኮኖሚ አካውንት ሲባል በተለምዶ የእንግሊዝኛው "ንግድና ኮንትራት ስርዓት" የቃል በቃል ፍቺ ተደርጎ ተወስኗል። ከሂሳብ መዝገብ አያያዝ (Accounting) ፅንሰ ሃሳቦች ለመረዳት እንደሚቻለው "አካውንት" የአንድን አምራች ወይም አገልግሎት ሰጪ ድርጅት የአንድ የተወሰነ ወቅት (ዕለታዊ፣ ማምንታዊ፣ ወርግዊ፣ ወዘተ...) የገቢና የወጪ እንቅስቃሴን የሚያሳይ የሂሳብ መዝገብ ማለት ነው። ብሔራዊ የሚለው ቃል ቀጥታ ትርጉሙ ሀገራዊ ወይም አጠቃላይ የሚለውን ሃሳብ የሚያመለክት ነው። ስለዚህ ብሔራዊ የኢኮኖሚ አካውንት ስንል የጠቅላላ ኢኮኖሚው የሂሳብ መዝገብ ማለትን ያመለክታል። ከዚህም ሃሳብ መረዳት እንደሚቻለው በተናጠል ለአያያዝ አምራችና አገልግሎት ሰጪ ድርጅት የወጪና ገቢ መዝገብ መያዝ እንደሚቻል ሁሉ ለአጠቃላይ ኢኮኖሚው ተመሳሳይ መዝገብ መያዝ የሚቻል መሆኑን ያስገነዝባል። ይህም ሥራ የብሔራዊ አካውንት አዘገጃጀት (National Economic Accounting) ሥራ ይባላል።

የአያያዝ አምራች ወይም አገልግሎት ሰጪ ድርጅት ወጪ የምንላቸው ለደመወዝ፣ ለካፒታል

መጠቀሚያ (ወለድ) ለግብዓት (ቁሳቁሶችና አገልግሎቶች) የሚደረጉ ወጪዎች የሚያመለክት ሲሆን ገቢው ደግሞ በሌላ ጎን ላበረከቱት የጉልበት ወይም የካፒታል አቅርቦት አገልግሎት ለምርት ግብዓቶች የሚከፈል ዋጋን ያመለክታል። ስለዚህ የብሔራዊ ኢኮኖሚ አካውንት ሥራ ከላይ የተጠቀሱትን ገቢና ወጪዎችን በመከታተል መመዝገብና በአገር አቀፍ ደረጃ ግጠናከር ነው።

ሆኖም የአያያዝ ለትርፍ የቆመ አምራችና አገልግሎት ሰጪ ድርጅት የወጪና የገቢ መዝገብ አያያዝ በአገር ደረጃ ከሚዘጋጅ የኢኮኖሚ አካውንት ጋር ተመሳሳይነት ቢኖረውም በወጪ ግምድ የሚመዘገቡት ወጪዎች በድርጅትና በአገር ደረጃ ሲታዩ የፅንሰ ሃሳብ ልዩነት አላቸው። ለምሳሌ ለአንድ አምራች ድርጅት የምንጻ ደመወዝና ክፍያ (Wages and Salaries) ወጪ ተብሎ ሲመዘገብ በአገር ደረጃ ግን የተወሰነ ለሴት (Value Added) አካል ነው።

3. የብሔራዊ ኢኮኖሚ አካውንት ፅንሰ ሃሳብና አዘጋጃጀት ዘዴዎች

የኢኮኖሚና ግንብራዊ እንቅስቃሴዎችን የሚዘክሩ አገላለጻዊ መረጃዎች በበቂና በለስተማማኝ ሁኔታ መገኘት ለብሔራዊ ኢኮኖሚ አካውንት ሥራ መፋጠንና ለሚገኘዉ ዉጤት ተአማኒነት ወሳኝ ነው። ይህም መሠረታዊ ሁኔታ ከተማላ ቀደም ሲል በመግቢያው ላይ የተጠቀሰው አጠቃላይ የኢኮኖሚ እንቅስቃሴ መለኪያ (GDP) ላይ ለመድረስ ሦስት ዓይነት ዘዴዎችን መከተል ይቻላል።

የመጀመሪያው የግመታ ዘዴ ተጨማሪ እሴትን (Value Added) የመለካት ዘዴ (Production Method) ይባላል። ይህ ዘዴ በአንድ አገር የጂኦግራፊ ክልል በሚገኙ የኢኮኖሚ ዘርፎች ወይም አምራች ድርጅቶች ማለትም በእርሻ፣ በኢንጽብት፣ በንግድ፣ በትራንስፖርትና መገናኛ ወዘተ... የተገኘ ተጨማሪ እሴትን በመደመር ከአጠቃላይ መለኪያ ላይ መድረስ መቻልን ያሳያል። ይህም ሲባል ጠቅላላ ኢኮኖሚው በማይጠላለፉ (Non-Overlapping) አምራችና አገልግሎት ሰጪ ድርጅቶች እንደሚከፋፈሉና የእነዚህም ተጨማሪ እሴት ድምር የጠቅላላውን የአገር ውስጥ ተጨማሪ እሴት እንደሚሰጥ ያመለክታል። ለዚህም አሠራር አመቺ መንገድ መፍጠር ይቻል ዘንድ አንድ ወጥ የሆነ ዓለም አቀፋዊ የአምራችና አገልግሎት ሰጪ ድርጅቶች (International Standard Industrial Classification - ISIC) አከፋፈል እ.ኤ.አ. በ1971 ተዘጋጅቶ አገሮች በዚህ መሠረት የብሔራዊ ኢኮኖሚ አካውንት ሥራን ያከናውናሉ። ይህም የአሠራር ዘዴ ዓለም አቀፋዊ የኢኮኖሚና የማገበራዊ ዕድገት አመልካቾችን በተመለከተ ወጥነት ያለው ንጽጽር ለማድረግ ይረዳል።

ቀደም ብሎ እንደተጠቀሰው ጠቅላላ የአገር ውስጥ ምርት በመነጨበት ክፍለ ኢኮኖሚ ላይ ለመድረስ በየአምራችና አገልግሎት ሰጪ ድርጅቶች የተፈጠሩ ተጨማሪ እሴቶችን መደመር አስፈላጊ ነው ተብሏል። ተጨማሪ እሴት ምንድን ነው? ተጨማሪ እሴት የሚለውን ዕንሰ ሃሳብ ለመረዳት መጀመሪያ የምርት ሂደትን ለመከወን ምን ያስፈልጋል የሚለውን መረዳት ያሻል። የምርት ውጤትን ለማስገኘት አምራች ድርጅቱ ከሰው ጉልበትና ከግምረቻ መሣሪያዎች ሌላ ቁሳዊ ግብዓቶች (Raw materials) ያስፈልጉታል። እነዚህ ቁሳዊ ግብዓቶች ደግሞ የሌላ አምራች ድርጅት የምርት ውጤቶች በመሆናቸው ከአጠቃላይ ኢኮኖሚው አንፃር የምርት ቆጠራ ድግግሞሽ እንዳይኖር ከአያንዳንዱ አምራች ድርጅት ጠቅላላ የምርት ውጤት ላይ ከሌላ አምራች ድርጅት የገዟቸውን ቁሳዊ ግብዓቶች በመቀነስ የየአምራች ድርጅቶች ተጨማሪ እሴት ላይ ለመድረስ ይቻላል። እነዚህን ተጨማሪ እሴቶች ለየኢኮኖሚ ዘርፎች ወይም አምራች ድርጅቶች አንድ ወጥ በሆነው የአምራች ድርጅቶች አከፋፈል (ISC) መሠረት በማጠቃለል

ቀደም ብሎ እንደተጠቀሰው ጠቅላላ የአገር ውስጥ ምርትን በመነጨበት ክፍለ ኢኮኖሚ ላይ ማሰላት ይቻላል። ሁለተኛው አማራጭ መንገድ ደግሞ በተለያዩ የምርትና አገልግሎት መስጠት ሥራ እንቅስቃሴ ላይ የተሰማሩ የምርት ማስገኛዎች (Factors of Production) የሚያገኙቸውን እንደ ደመወዝ፣ ወለድ፣ የመራት ኪራይ የመሳሰሉትን ገቢዎች በመደመር ከጠቅላላ የአገር ውስጥ ምርት ወይም ጠቅላላ ገቢ ላይ መድረስ እንደሚቻል ያሳያል። በመጀመሪያው መንገድ የተሰላው ጠቅላላ የአገር ውስጥ ምርት በመነጨበት ከ/ኢኮኖሚ የአምራች ድርጅቶች ውጤት በመሆኑና አምራች ድርጅቶችም ይህንን ምርት ለማስገኘት የሰው ጉልበት እንዲሁም የግምረቻ ዕቃዎች መጠቀም ስለሌለባቸው እነዚህ የምርት ውጤቶች በሌላ መልክ ሲታይ ለምርት ማስገኛዎች የሚሰጡ ክፍያዎች (factor payments) እንደሆኑ መረዳት ይቻላል። እዚህ ላይ አንድ መረዳት የሚገባን መሠረታዊ ዕንሰ ሃሳብ ቢኖር አምራች ድርጅቶችና ገቢ ተከፋዮች የአንድ ሣንቲም ሁለት ገጽታዎች መሆናቸውን ነው፤ አንድም ሁለትም ናቸውና። ስለዚህ ለሰው ጉልበት የተከፈለውን ምንጭ፣ ደመወዝ፣ ጥቅማ ጥቅምና እንዲሁም ማካካሻ (ውለገዠሰኝ ስለአለፈጸገሰኝ ስጠገሰገሰ መገኘት ለነደ Compensation) የካፒታል ወጪን እና የመራት ኪራይ (Rent on Land) በአጠቃላይ ኢኮኖሚ ደረጃ በማጠቃለል ከጠቅላላ የአገር ውስጥ ገቢ ላይ መድረስ ይቻላል። ከምጣኔ ሀብታዊ ንደፊ ሃሳብ አንፃር ላልተመረቀ ምርት የገቢ ክፍያ ሊኖር ስለማይችል ከዚህ ላይ ያወጣ የመጀመሪያውን ዘዴና የሁለተኛውን ዘዴ እንደነት መረዳት ይቻላል። ጠቅላላ የአገር ውስጥ ምርትና ጠቅላላ የአገር ውስጥ ገቢ የአንድ ሣንቲም ሁለት ገጽታዎች ናቸው ያልነውም ለዚህ ነው።

የመጨረሻውን ሃሳብ ለማራዎት መንገድ (ዘዴ) ደግሞ ለአያንዳንዱ የመጨረሻ ተጠቃሚ (Final User) የመጨረሻ ጠቀሚታ ወጪዎችን (Final Expenditures) በማጠቃለል የሚገኘው ነው። እዚህ ላይ "የመጨረሻ ጠቀሚታ" የሚለውን ዕንሰ ሃሳብ መረዳት አስፈላጊ ይሆናል። የመጨረሻ ጠቀሚታ ሲባል የምርት ውጤቶችን ለማስገኘት በምርት ሂደት

ወቅት የምንጠቀምባቸውን ቁሳቁሶችና አገልግሎቶች የማይወጡ መሆኑን ለማመልከት ነው። ሆኖም ዋጋቸው በመጨረሻ ጠቀሚታ፣ ዕቃዎችና አገልግሎቶች ዋጋ ላይ እንደሚንፀባረቅ መረዳት ያሻል። ይህም ለፍጅታ፣ ተጨማሪ የማምረት አቅም ለማጸበር የሚውሉ የካፒታል ዕቃዎችን፣ በወጪ ገበያ የተሸጡ ዕቃዎችን (Export) እና የኢንቬንቶሪ ክምችትን (Stock) ያጠቃልላል። የመጨረሻ ተጠቃሚ የሚባሉት ማዕከላዊ መንግሥት እና ሌሎች በተዋረድ የሚገኙ የመንግሥት አካላትን (Regional and Local Governments)፣ መንግሥታዊ የሆኑ አምራችና አገልግሎት ሰጪ ድርጅቶች እና መንግሥታዊ ያልሆኑ ለትርፍ ያልቆሙ ድርጅቶች ናቸው። የተጠቃሚዎች ፍላጎት በአገር ውስጥ ምርት ብቻ ሊሟላ ስለማይቻል የመጨረሻ ጠቀሚታ የገቢ ንግድ ዕቃዎችንና አገልግሎቶችን (Imported Goods and Non-factor Services) ስለሚወጡ በዚህ ዘዴ አማካይነት "ከጠቅላላ የሀገር ውስጥ ምርት" በመጨረሻ ለመድረስ ጠቅላላ የገቢ ዕቃዎችና አገልግሎቶች ዋጋ መቀነስ ይኖርበታል።

ይህም ከተደረገ በኋላ የሚገኘው አጋዛዊ መለኪያ በአገሪቱ የጂኦግራፊ ክልል በሚገኙ አምራችና አገልግሎት ሰጪ ድርጅቶች (Resident Producing Units) በተመረቱ ዕቃዎችና አገልግሎቶች ላይ የተደረጉ ወጪዎችን ብቻ ያሳያል። የመጨረሻ ተጠቃሚዎች የሚገዙበት ዋጋ ቀጥተኛ ያልሆኑ የተጣሩ ታክሶችን ይወጡራል። እነዚህ ታክሶች በችርቻሮና ጅምላ ንግድ ዕቃዎችና አገልግሎቶች ላይ በመንግሥት የሚጣሉ ናቸው። የእነዚህን ታክሶች መጠንና ዓይነት ማወቅ ሃሳብ ለማውጣት ዘዴ ከቀረጸው ሁለት የመገመቻ ዘዴዎች ጋር ያለውን አንድነትና ልዩነት ለማሳየት ይረዳል። የመጀመሪያውንና የዚህን የሃሳብ ለማውጣት ዘዴ ልዩነት በሚመለከት በመጀመሪያው ዘዴ መሠረት የተመዘረቱት ምርቶችና አገልግሎቶች የተተመኑት በማምረቻ ዋጋ (Producer's price) ሲሆን በሃሳብ ለማውጣት ዘዴ ዕቃዎችና አገልግሎቶች የተተመኑት በተጠቃሚዎች የመግዣ ዋጋ (Market price) ነው። ስለዚህ በሃሳብ ለማውጣት ዘዴ የተገኘው የምርትና አገልግሎቶች ዋጋ በመጀመሪያው መንገድ ከተገኘው የሚለየው ቀጥተኛ ባልሆኑ የተጣሩ ታክሶች ጠቅላላ ዋጋ (Total Value of

Net Indirect Taxes) ነው።

በመጀመሪያው የመገመቻ ዘዴ ከተገኘው "ጠቅላላ የሀገር ውስጥ ምርት በአምራች ዋጋ" ላይ ቀጥተኛ ያልሆኑ የተጣሩ ታክሶችን ዋጋ በመደመር በሦስተኛው ዘዴ ከተገኘው ጠቅላላ የሀገር ውስጥ ምርት በጊዜው የመገገፍ የገበያ ዋጋ ላይ መድረስ ስለሚቻል የሁለቱን ዘዴዎች አንድነት ከዚህ ትንታኔ መረዳት ይቻላል። በሁለተኛውና በሦስተኛው የመገመቻ ዘዴዎች መካከል ያለው አንድነትና ልዩነትም ተመሳሳይነት ያለው ነው። በገቢ ዘዴ ከተሰላው ጠቅላላ ውጤት ላይ ቀጥተኛ ያልሆኑ የተጣሩ ታክሶችን በመደመር መድረስ ይቻላል።

እዚህ ላይ ሳይጠቀስ መታለፍ የማይገባው ሌላው የብሔራዊ ኢኮኖሚ አካውንት ፅንሰ ሃሳብና በእነዚህ ከዚህ በላይ በተጠቀሱት ዘዴዎች አማካይነት ከሚገኘው ጠቅላላ የኢኮኖሚ እንቅስቃሴ መለኪያ ጋር ተዛማጅነት ያለው ጠቅላላ ብሔራዊ ምርት (Gross National Product-GNP) በመባል የሚታወቀው ነው። ይህ መለኪያ ከገቢ እንግር የሚታይ ጽንሰ ሃሳብ እንጂ ከምርት እንቅስቃሴ አንጻር የሚታይ አልነበረም። ሆኖም የብሔራዊ ኢኮኖሚ አካውንት አሠራር ከተጸነሰበት ጊዜ ጀምሮ በዚህ አግባብ በጥቅም ላይ በመዋሉ አሁንም እየተሠራበት ይገኛል። በመሠረቱ ግን የገቢ ጽንሰ ሃሳብ (Income concept) መሆኑ መታወቅ ይኖርበታል።

በዚህ አጋጣሚ የመጀመሪያው መለኪያ (GDP) ከሁለተኛው መለኪያ (GNP) የሚለይበትንና የሚመሳሰልበትን ምክንያቶች ማመልከቱ ተገቢ ይሆናል። "ጠቅላላ ብሔራዊ ምርት" (ገቢ) ከ "ከጠቅላላ የሀገር ውስጥ ምርት" የሚለየው ከውጭ የተገኘ የተጣራ የምርት ማስገኛዎች ገቢን (Net Factor Income From Abroad) ስለሚጨምር ነው። ስለዚህ የሁለቱ መለኪያዎች ልዩነት ከምርት ማከናወኛዎች ድንበር ዘለል እንቅስቃሴ አንጻር የሚታይ ነው ማለት ይቻላል። "ጠቅላላ የሀገር ውስጥ ምርት" በአንድ በተወሰነ ወቅት በአንድ አገር የጂኦግራፊያዊ ክልል ተቀማጭ በሆኑ የምርት ማስገኛዎች (Resident Factors of Production) አማካይነት የተገኘ የጠቅላላ ምርትና የአገልግሎት ዋጋን የሚያመለክት ሲሆን ሌላው መለኪያ ደግሞ የምርት

ማስገኛዎች ድንበር ዘለልነት (International Flow of Factor Services) የሚጠቁምና የአንድ ሀገር ኢኮኖሚ ከሌላው ሀገር ጋር ያለውን ቁርኝት የሚያመለክት ነው። እዚህ ላይ የሰው ጉልበትን አገር አቋራጭነት እንደምሳሌ መጥቀስ በሁለቱ ጽንሰ ሃሳቦች (መለኪያዎች) መካከል ያለውን ልዩነት ለማብራራት ይረዳል። አንድ አሜሪካዊ ኢትዮጵያ ውስጥ ከአንድ ዓመት ላይ በለጠ ጊዜ ተቀጥሮ ቢሠራና በሌላ በኩል ደግሞ አንድ ኢትዮጵያዊ አሜሪካ ውስጥ በዚህ የጊዜ ገደብ ውስጥ ተቀጥሮ ቢሠራ በኢትዮጵያ የብሔራዊ ኢኮኖሚ አካውንት ውስጥ የሚመዘገበው እንደሚከተለው ይሆናል። ኢትዮጵያዊው ከአሜሪካ ሠርቶ ካገኘው ጠቅላላ ገቢ ውስጥ አሜሪካውው በኢትዮጵያ ሠርቶ ያገኘው ተቀንሶ በኢትዮጵያ አካውንት ውስጥ "ምንጻፍ ደመወዝ" በሚለው ዓምድ (አካውንት) ሥር "የተጣራ የምርት ማስገኛዎች ከፍያ" (Net Factor Payments from Abroad) ተብሎ ይመዘገባል። እዚህ ላይ "ከአንድ ዓመት ላይ በለጠ ጊዜ" የሚለውን ገደብ መጥቀስ ያስፈልገበት ምክንያት የዓለም ሀገሮችን የብሔራዊ ኢኮኖሚ አካውንት መረጃዎች ለንጽጽር አመቺ ማድረግ ይቻል ዘንድ ዓለም አቀፋዊ ስምምነት (Convention) በመኖሩ ነው። ይህም ማለት አንድ የምርት ማስገኛ ከአንድ ዓመት በላይ በሌላው ሀገር ከኖረ የሚያስገኘው ውጤት የዚያ አገር ምርት ተደርጎ ሊቆጠር እንደሚችል መግባባት በመኖሩ ነው።

ከውጭ የተገኘ የምርት ማከናወኛዎች የተጣራ ገቢ በአንጻንድ ሀገሮች ከፍተኛ ከመሆኑ የተነሣ የኢኮኖሚያቸው ዋና መደሳሚያ ሊሆን ይችላል። ለምሳሌ፣ እንደ ግብፅ ባሉ አገሮች በርካታ ዜጎቻቸው ነጻጅ አምራች በሆኑ የመካከለኛው ምሥራቅ አገሮች ተቀጥረው ስለሚሠሩ የተጣራ ወቅታዊ የሰው ጉልበት ገቢ (Seasonal Labour Income) ከፍተኛ እንደሆነ ይታወቃል።

በእነዚህ ሀገሮች በሁለቱ መለኪያዎች ማለትም "በጠቅላላ የሀገር ውስጥ ምርት" እና "ጠቅላላ ብሔራዊ ምርት (ገቢ)" መካከል ያለው ልዩነት ድርጅት ከአጠቃላይ የአገር ውስጥ ምርት (GDP) እስከ 5 በመቶ ሊደርስ እንደሚችል ይገመታል። እንደ አሜሪካ ባሉ አገሮች ደግሞ ይህ ልዩነት በጣም ጠቅላላ ነው። ይህም የሚያመለክተው አሜሪካኖች ወይም

የአሜሪካ ባለሀብቶች በውጭ ሀገር ሠርተው የሚያስገኙት ገቢና የሌሎች ሀገሮች ዜጎች ወይም ባለሀብቶች በአሜሪካ ሠርተው የሚያስገኙት ገቢ በአብዛኛው መላ ለመላ እንደሚሆን ነው።

"ጠቅላላ የሀገር ውስጥ ምርት" ወይም "ጠቅላላ ብሔራዊ ምርት" በሚለው ጽንሰ ሃሳብ ውስጥ "ጠቅላላ" (Gross) የሚለው ቅጥያ ምን እንደሚያመለክት መጠቆሙ አስፈላጊ ነው። ቀደም ብሎ እንደተጠቀሰው ይህ አጠቃላይ አጋዛዊ የኢኮኖሚ እንቅስቃሴ መለኪያ የአንድን የተወሰነ ወቅት (ዓመታዊ) የምርትና አገልግሎት ውጤቶች አጠቃላይ ድምር በጊዜው የገበያ ዋጋ በመተመን የሚያሳይ አጋዛዊ መለኪያ ነው። በመቆጠሪያ ወቅቱ (Accounting Period) በምርት እንቅስቃሴ ሂደት በምርት ማስገኛ የካፒታል ፅቃዎች ላይ የሚደርስ ተፈጥሮአዊ እልቀት (Normal Wear and Tear) ይኖራል። ይህ እልቀት የማንኛውም የምርት ማከናወኛዎች ተካፋይ ባይሆንም በምርት ምክንያት የሚደርስ በመሆኑ አምራች ድርጅቶች የወደፊት የምርት እንቅስቃሴ አቸውን በቀጣይነት ለማካኛድ ቢያንስ በዚህ የካፒታል ፅቃዎችን መተካት እንደሚኖርባቸው ያመለክታል። ለምርት መቀነስ ወይም መጨመር ከሰው ጉልበት ባሻገር ኢንቬስትመንት ወላኝ ነው። ስለዚህ "ጠቅላላ" (Gross) የሚለው ተቀጥቶ የሚያመለክተው ጠቅላላ የሀገር ውስጥ ምርት ወይም ጠቅላላ ብሔራዊ ምርት ይህ የእልቀት መጠን ከመቀነሱ በፊት የተሰላ መሆኑን ነው። ስለዚህ ተጨማሪ እሴት የካፒታል እልቀትን የሚጨምር ወይም የማይጨምር ሊሆን እንደሚችል ከዚህ ትንታኔ መረዳት ይቻላል።

4. የብሔራዊ ኢኮኖሚ አካውንት አዘገጃጀት ሥራ በኢትዮጵያ

እሰካሁን ስለ ብሔራዊ ኢኮኖሚ አካውንት አዘገጃጀት ሥራ አጠቃላይ መርሆዎችና ጽንሰ ሃሳቦች ላይ አጠር ያለ ማብራሪያ ለመስጠት ተሞክራል። በዚህ ክፍል ደግሞ ከአጠቃላይ መርሆዎችና ጽንሰ ሃሳቦች አንጻር የኢትዮጵያ ብሔራዊ ኢኮኖሚ አካውንት እንዴት እንደሚዘጋጅ ማለትም የግመታ ዘዴዎችን፣ የመረጃ ምንጮችንና፣ ጠቅላላ ባለ መልኩ

በሥራው ሂደት የሚታዩ ችግሮችን ለመጠቀም እሞክራለሁ።

ኢትዮጵያ እንደ ወጥ የሆነውን የተባበሩት መንግሥታት የብሔራዊ ኢኮኖሚ አካውንት አዘገጃጀት መመሪያ ከሚከተሉት አገሮች አንዷ መሆናትና በዚህም መመሪያ መሠረት ላለፉት 40 ዓመታት የግመታ ሥራ ስታካሂድ መቆየቷ ቀደም ብሎ በመግቢያው ላይ ተጠቅሷል። ይህ እንደ ወጥ የሆነው የተባበሩት መንግሥታት የብሔራዊ ኢኮኖሚ አካውንት አዘገጃጀት መመሪያ ያስፈለገበት ዋናው ምክንያት የየአገሮችን የኢኮኖሚና የግብር-ዊ ሁኔታ አመልካች አንጻራዊ ንዕስ ወጥነት እንዲኖረው ለማድረግ ታስቦ ነው። ሆኖም የየአገሮች ዕቃዎችና አገልግሎቶች በዓይነትም ሆነ በጥራት መለያያት፣ በዚህም ሣቢያ የሚኖረው የዋጋ ልዩነት፣ በሀገራዊ የገንዘብ ምክራርና በሀገ ወጥ ገበያ መካከል በሚኖረው ልዩነትና እንዲሁም በሀገራዊ የባህሪና የግጥም ልዩነት ምክንያት የየአገሮችን የኢኮኖሚ እንቅስቃሴ መለኪያዎች በማንጸጸር የአንድ አገር ዕድገት ከሌሎች የተሻለ ወይም ያነሰ ነው የሚል ፍጹማዊ መደምደሚያ ላይ መድረስ ሊያስቸግር እንደሚችል መጠቀም ያስፈልጋል። በአሠራር ላይ የሚታዩ ሊከሰቱ የሚችሉ ችግሮች እንደ ተጠበቀ ሆኖ አጠቃላይ መመሪያው እስካሁን ለሁለተኛ ጊዜ ማሻሻያና ማጻጸፊያ ተደርጎበት በሥራ በመተርጎም ላይ ይገኛል። የመጀመሪያው አንድ ወጥ የሆነው የተባበሩት መንግሥታት የብሔራዊ ኢኮኖሚ አካውንት አዘገጃጀት መመሪያ ማሻሻያና ማጻጸፊያ ሀሳብ ተደርጎበት በሥራ ላይ የዋለው እ.ኤ.አ. በ1968 ነው። ለሁለተኛ ጊዜ እ.ኤ.አ በ1993 ማሻሻያ የተደረገበት መመሪያም በዕንባ ሃሳብ ደረጃ ከ1968ቱ ብዙ ያልተለየ ቢሆንም ለአሠራር አመቺነትን የሚፈጥሩ ለውጦች የተደረገበት በመሆኑ ከዚህ አንጻር በተለያዩ ደረጃ በአገሮች በመተግበር ላይ ይገኛል ።

4.1. የብሔራዊ ኢኮኖሚ አካውንት ታሪካዊ ዕድገት በኢትዮጵያ

በኢትዮጵያ የብሔራዊ ኢኮኖሚ አካውንት ዝግጅት ሥራ የተጀመረው እ.ኤ.አ. በ1950ዎቹ መጀመሪያ ላይ ሲሆን ከዚያን ጊዜ ጀመሮ ሥራው

በተለያዩ የመንግሥት መ/ቤቶች ኃላፊነት ሲከናወን ቆይቶ ለመጀመሪያ ጊዜ እ.ኤ.አ. በ1952 በወቅቱ የኢትዮጵያ መንግሥት ባንክ (State Bank) በመባል ይታወቅ የነበረውና የአሁኑ ብሔራዊ ባንክ (National Bank) ዋና ዋና የኢኮኖሚ እንቅስቃሴ መለኪያ አሃዶችን ግምት በመወሰን ጠቀሜታ ዓይነት (Expenditure by Final Use) አዘጋጅቶ ነበር። ሆኖም የግመታዊ የመረጃ መሠረት እጅግ ውሴን ስለነበረ የተገኘውም መረጃ ተአማኒነት በጣም አጠራጣሪ እንደነበር መረዳት ተችሏል። የችርቻሮ ዋጋ መረጃ በወቅቱ ባለመኖሩም የመወሰን ተጠቃሚዎች ወጪ በተለይም የግል ፍጆታን በሚመለከት ግምቱ የተሰላው በወጪ ንግድ ዋጋ (Export Price) ስለነበር ግምቱን በጣም የተጋነነ አድርጎት ነበር።

የግብርና ምርት መጠን ግምት የተገኘውም በወቅቱ የግብርና ሚ/ር በዓይን እይታ ላይ በመመርኮዝ ካጠናቀረው መረጃ በመሆኑ የአመልካቾችን ተአማኒነት የበለጠ አጠራጣሪ አድርጎት ቆይቷል። በኋላም እ.ኤ.አ. በ1958 ባንኩ ቀደም ብሎ ከነበረው መረጃ በተወሰነ የሀገብ ብዛትንና የነፍስ ወከፍ የሰብል ምርት ፍጆታ እንዲሁም የማምረቻ ዋጋ (Producers' price) የአዲስ አበባን የጅምላ ዋጋ ከ40 - 50 በመቶ ይሆናል ብሎ በመገመት ከቀድሞው የተሻሉ የብሔራዊ ኢኮኖሚ አካውንት መረጃዎችን አዘጋጅቶ እንደነበር ይታወሳል።

ከዚህ በኋላም ሥራው ወደ ቀድሞው የጥላኔ ገበያ ስርዓት ሲዞር ገዜው የመጀመሪያው አምስት ዓመት (1957 - 1962) ዕቅድ የሚዘጋጅበት ወቅት ስለነበር ለዕቅድ ዝግጅቱ ሲባል የኢኮኖሚ እንቅስቃሴ አጠቃላይ መለኪያ አስፈላጊ በመሆኑ ጠቅላላ የሀገር ውስጥ ምርት ግምት በመነጨበት ከ/ኢኮኖሚ ተዘጋጅቶ ነበር። አዘገጃጀቱም ተወሳኝ እሴት ግመታን (Production Method) የተከተለ ነበር። የግመታው መሰረትም በወቅቱ ከሀገር ውስጥ ጉዳይ ሚ/ር ከ1956 - 1957 ከየክፍለ ሀገሮቹ የተሰበሰበው የሀገብ ብዛት መረጃ ነበር። በወቅቱም የኢትዮጵያ ሀገብ ብዛት 18.1 ሚሊዮን እንደሚሆን ተገምቶ ነበር። በመቀጠልም እ.ኤ.አ በ1960 በርዱ ከ1957 - 1960 ላሉት ዓመታት የማሻሻያ ግመታ ሥራ አከናውኗል። ሁለተኛው የአምስት ዓመት ዕቅድ

(እ.ኤ.አ. 1963) ሲዘጋጅም አመልካች ገቢ የተገመቱት እንደቀድሞው ሁሉ የሀገብ ብዛትና ዓመታዊ የሀገብ ዕድገት መረጃዎችን መሰረት በማድረግ እንደነበር ታወቋል።

እ.ኤ.አ. በ1964 የግመታ ሥራውን የቀድሞው ማዕከላዊ ስታትስቲክስ ጽ/ቤት ተረከቦ ማከናወን ጀመረ። የስታትስቲክስ ጽ/ቤትም ቀድሞ የጥላኔ ገበያ ስርዓት ይጠቀምበት የነበረውን የዕቃዎችንና አገልግሎቶችን ዋጋ ከማሻሻሉም በላይ በሚከተለው አኳኋን የብሔራዊ ኢኮኖሚ አካውንትን ያዘጋጅ ነበር።

- 1. ጠቅላላ የሀገር ውስጥ ምርት በመነጨበት ክፍለ ኢኮኖሚ፤
- 2. ጠቅላላ የሀገር ውስጥ ምርት በመወሰን ጠቀሜታ ዓይነት፤
- 3. ጠቅላላ የካፒታል ክምችት በንብረትና በኢንፎርሙሽን ጠቀሜታ ዓይነት፤
- 4. የገቢና ወጪ ንግድ አካውንት፤

የጠቅላላ የሀገር ውስጥ ምርት ግመታ በጠቅላይ ስታትስቲክስ ጽ/ቤት የተዘጋጀው የተለያዩ የአሠራር ዘዴዎችን እንደአስላጊነቱ በተጓዳኝ (Mix of Methods) በመጠቀም ነበር። የዕቃ አምራች ዘርፎች (ግብርና፣ ቀላልና ከባድ መፈብረኪያዎች፣ ወዘተ...) ለጠቅላላ ኢኮኖሚው ያላቸው አስተዋጽኦ የተሰላው ተወሳኝ እሴትን የማግኘት ዘዴ ተከትሎ ነበር። የባንኮችና የኢንፎርሙሽን ትራንስፖርትና መገናኛ በገቢ ዘዴ (Income Method) የተሰላ እንደነበርም ታወቋል። የአገር መከላከያና የሲቪል አስተዳደር ደግሞ የመወሰን ጠቀሜታ ወጪ ዘዴን መሠረት በማድረግ ይሰላ እንደነበር መረዳት ተችሏል። በሌላ በኩል የሌሎች አገልግሎት ሰጪና የምርት ዘርፎች አስተዋጽኦ የተሰላው የነፍስ ወከፍ ገቢ/ወጪ ግምትና በመስኩ የተሠማራውን የሰው ኃይል ግምትን መሠረት በማድረግ ነበር። ጠቅላላ የሀገር ውስጥ ምርት በመወሰን ጠቀሜታ ዓይነት የተሰላው ደግሞ ለአያንዳንዱ የመወሰን ተጠቃሚ በተናጠል በመገመት ሲሆን የግል ተጠቃሚዎቹ (Private Households) ግን የሌሎቹን የመወሰን ጠቀሜታ ወጪዎች ድምር ከጠቅላላ የሀገር ውስጥ ምርት በመነጨበት ከ/ኢኮኖሚ ውጫት ላይ በመቀነስ እንደቀረ

(Residual) ነበር።

ቀደም ብሎ እንደተጠቀሰው እ.ኤ.አ. ከ1952 ጀምሮ የብሔራዊ ኢኮኖሚ አካውንት መረጃዎች በተለያዩ ደረጃዎች የተዘጋጁ ቢሆንም የአዘገጃጀት ዘዴዎችንና የመረጃ ምንጮችን ያካተተ እፊሌላዊ ሰነድ ተዘጋጅቶ የቀረበበት ጊዜ አልነበረም።

ሥራው ወደ ጠቅላይ ስታትስቲክስ ጽ/ቤት ከተዛወረ በኋላ እ.ኤ.አ በ1965 ለመጀመሪያ ጊዜ የኢትዮጵያ ብሔራዊ ኢኮኖሚ አካውንት መረጃዎች የመጀመሪያ ደረጃ ግምቶች (National Accounts of Ethiopia: Preliminary Estimates) በሚል ርዕስ ታትሞ የወጣ የተከታታይ ዓመታት መረጃዎች ላይ ማሻሻያ ሲካፈል ከቆየ በኋላ እ.ኤ.አ በ1967 የኢትዮጵያ ብሔራዊ ኢኮኖሚ አካውንት ግምቶች (1961-1966) በሚል ርዕስ በድጋሚ በስታትስቲክስ ጽ/ቤት አማካኝነት ታትሞ ወጥቷል።

እ.ኤ.አ. ከ1977 ጀምሮ ሥራው ወደ ቀድሞው የፕላን ኮሚሽን የዛሬው የኢኮኖሚ ልማትና ትብብር ሚኒስቴር ተዛወሮ እሰካሁን ድረስ በዚህ መ/ቤት የብሔራዊ ኢኮኖሚ አካውንት ቡድን አማካኝነት ይከናወናል። ከመረጃ ግንት እንግር ማሻሻያዎች ከመደረጋቸው በስተቀር እሰካሁን የነበረው አሠራር ከጠቅላይ ስታትስቲክስ ጽ/ቤት አሠራር ብዙም የተለየ አይደለም።

በዚህ እንግር ከፍተኛ መሻሻል የተደረገበት ክ/ኢኮኖሚ ግብርና በተለይም የሰብል ምርት ሲሆን ለዚህም ዋናው ምክንያት የምርትና የዋጋ ስታትስቲክስ ከ1972 ጀምሮ በየዓመቱና በየወሩ ከሚካፈሉ የኖሎግ ጥናቶች የተገኘው መረጃ በነፍስ ወከፍ ገቢና በህዝብ ብዛት እንዲሁም በአዲስ አበባ የጅምላ ዋጋ ላይ ተመሰርቶ ይከናወን የነበረውን የግመታ ሥራ በማስቀረቱ ነው። የእንስሳት ተዋጽኦ የምርት ወጪትን በተመለከተ ለአሥር ዓመት መሪ ዕቅድ ዝግጅት (1977-1986) በኢኮኖሚ ጥናት የተደረሰበትን ቴክኒካል ኮከረኝንት (Technical Coefficients) በመጠቀም የንዑስ ክ/ኢኮኖሚዉን የምርት ተዋጽኦ ግምት ለማሻሻል ተሞክሮል።

4.2. በአሁኑ ጊዜ የኢትዮጵያ ብሔራዊ ኢኮኖሚ አካውንት አዘገጃጀት ሥራ የሚገኝበት ደረጃ

ከዚህ በላይ ከተደረገው ገለጻ ለመረዳት እንደሚቻለው የኢትዮጵያ የብሔራዊ ኢኮኖሚ አካውንት ሥራ ለረጅም ጊዜያት የተካከረ ቢሆንም የመረጃ መሠረቶችን (Data Base) ከማሻሻል አንጻር ለውጥ ቢታይም አሁንም በተለይም በግብርናው ዘርፍ ሁሉን አቀፍ ጥናቶች (Agricultural census) በብዛት ባለመካከላቸው ለሥራው የመሠረት ድንጋይ የሆኑ የየክ/ኢኮኖሚዎችን የምርት እንቅስቃሴ የሚዘክሩ እስተማማኝ አሃዛዊ መረጃዎች እጥረት በተለይም በግብርና (እንስሳት ህብት)፣ በደን ወጪቶች፣ በአደንና አሃ ማስገር በአነስተኛ ኢንዱስትሪዎችና ዕደ ጥበባት፣ በንግድ (የግል ንግድ) እና እንዲሁም ሌሎች አገልግሎቶች ጎልቶ ይታያል። በቅርቡ የእነስተኛ ኢንዱስትሪዎችና ዕደ ጥበባት እንዲሁም የማከፋፈያ አገልግሎቶች የኖሎግ ጥናት በማዕከላዊ ስታትስቲክስ ባለሥልጣን በመካከላቸው በእነዚህ ዘርፎች ይታይ የነበረውን የመረጃ ችግር ለመቅረፍ ተሞክሮል።

ይህንን የመረጃ መሠረት በማስፋትና በማሻሻል የኢኮኖሚ እንቅስቃሴ አጠቃላይ አሃዛዊ መለኪያዎችን በአስተማማኝ ሁኔታ ለማዘጋጀት ይቻላል ዘንድ በፕላንና ኢኮኖሚ ልማት ሚ/ርና በተባበሩት መንግሥታት የልማት ድርጅት (UNDP) አማካይነት በተደረገው የቴክኒክ ተራድኦ ስምምነት መሠረት አንዲት የብሔራዊ ኢኮኖሚ አካውንት አማካሪ በማስመጣት የብሔራዊ ኢኮኖሚ አካውንት መረጃዎችን በመገመቻ ዘዴዎችና ከተለያዩ ምንጮች የተገኙ መረጃዎችን በግመታ ሂደት ከመጠቀም አንጻር ከፍተኛ ጥረት ተደርጋል። በዚህ ፕሮጀክት አማካኝነትም የመረጃ መሠረትን በመስፋትና በማሻሻል ወደኋላ በመመለስ ላለፉት አሥር ዓመታት (1973 -1986) የብሔራዊ ኢኮኖሚ አካውንት መረጃዎች ላይ የማሻሻያ ሥራ (Revision Work) ተከናወኗል። በተለይም ከላይ በተጠቀሱት የመረጃ እ ጥ ረ ጥ በ ሚ ታ ይ ባ ጥ ው ክ/ኢኮኖሚዎች ላይ የተሻሉ የመረጃ ምንጮችን በመጠቀም እንዲሁም እንደአስፈላጊነቱ የአሠራር ዘዴ (ሜቴዶሎጂ) ለውጥ በማድረግ

የማሻሻያ ሥራ ተከናወኗል። ይህም ውጤት በየመስኩ ምርምር ለሚያደርጉ ባለሙያዎችም ሆኑ ለፖሊሲ አጫጫዎች ከፍተኛ እገዛ እንደሚያደርግ ይታመናል። ውጤቱም "የኢትዮጵያ ብሔራዊ ኢኮኖሚ አካውንት፣ የመረጃ ምንጮች የግመታ ዘዴዎችና ውጤቶች" (National Accounts of Ethiopia: Source, Methods and Estimates) በሚል በሁለት ቅጽ (Volume) ተዘጋጅቶ ለተጠቃሚዎች ተሰራጭቷል።

የኢትዮጵያ ብሔራዊ ኢኮኖሚ አካውንት አዘገጃጀት ቀደም ብሎ ከተጠቀሱት ሦስት ዘዴዎች ውስጥ ሁለቱን በመከተል ይከናወናል። እነሱም ጠቅላላ የሀገር ውስጥ ምርት በመነጨበት ክ/ኢኮኖሚና በመሠረባጠቅ ጠቀሚታ ዓይነት የሚባሉት ናቸው። "ጠቅላላ የሀገር ውስጥ ምርት ግመታ በገቢ ዓይነት" (Income Method) በወጥነት ሊሠራበት ይቻላል። በዚህ መልኩ ለማከናወን ለጊዜው በሁሉም የኢኮኖሚ ዘርፎች የተሟላ መረጃ ሊገኝ ባለመቻሉ ነው።

ጠቅላላ የሀገር ውስጥ ምርት ግመታ በመነጨበት ክ/ኢኮኖሚ በኢትዮጵያ የሚሠራበት ዋነኛው መንገድ ነው። በዚህ መንገድ የሚገኘው ጠቅላላ የሀገር ውስጥ ምርት ግመት የሚያሳየው በየኢኮኖሚ ዘርፉ ማለትም በግብርና፣ በኢንዱስትሪ፣ በንግድ ተራዝም፣ በትራንስፖርትና መገናኛ፣ ወዘተ... በዓመቱ ውስጥ የተገኘውን ተጨማሪ እሴት በአጠቃላይ ኢኮኖሚው ደረጃ በማጠቃለል ነው። ቀደም ሲል ለመጥቀስ እንደተሞከረው የአንድ አምራች ወይም አገልግሎት ሰጪ ድርጅት ለምሳሌ የሰብል ምርትን ተጨማሪ እሴት ለማግኘት በዘርፉ ሥር በሚገኙ የግል ገበሬዎችና የመንግሥት እርሻ የተመረተውን የሰብል ምርት ለማስገኘት አምራች የተጠቀሙበትን ቁሳዊ ግብአቶች (ዘር፣ ማዳበሪያ፣ የተባይ ማጥፊያ፣ ወዘተ...) ዋጋ ከጠቅላላ ምርት ዋጋ ላይ መቀነስ ያስፈልጋል። እዚህ ላይ ቁሳዊ ግብአቶች በተጠቃሚዎች የመግዣ ዋጋ (Purchasers' Price) የሚሰሉ ሲሆን፣ ምርት ደግሞ በዓመቱ በነበረው አማካይ የአምራች ዋጋ (Producers' Price) ይሰላል። በቅድሚያ ግን እነዚህ የምርትና የዋጋ መረጃዎች ከተለያዩ ምንጮች መገኘት ይኖርባቸዋል። የዋና ዋና ሰብሎች ምርትን በሚመለከት የማይለካዊ ስታትስቲክስ ባለሥልጣን

ዓመታዊ የሰብል አጫጭ የናሙና ጥናት ውጤትን ከ1972 ጀምሮ እንደ ምንጭነት በመጠቀም ነው። የዋጋ መረጃንም በሚመለከት ማዕከላዊ ስታቲስቲክስ በየወሩ የሚካሄደው የገጠር የአምራች ዋጋ የናሙና ጥናት ውጤት ዋናው ምንጭ ነው። በእነዚህ ጥናቶች ላልተካተቱ የሰብል ምርቶች ደግሞ በ1975 የተካሄደው የገጠር ቤተሰቦች የፍጆታና ገቢ የናሙና ጥናት (Rural Household Income Consumption Expenditure Survey - RHICE) እና በቅርቡ በ1988 በገጠር እና በከተማ የተካሄደው ተመሳሳይ ጥናት መሠረት የተገኘ ዓመታዊ የነፍስ ወከፍ መረጃዎችን በመጠቀም ተተኛ ባልሆነ መንገድ የምርት መጠን ግመታ ሥራ ያከናውናል። በዚህም መሠረት የምርት ተዋጽኦአቸው የሚገመተው የእርሻ ሰብል ወጪዎች፣ ቆሞ፣ አትክልትና ፍራፍሬ፣ ሥራ ሥሮችና ቅመማ ቅመሞች፣ ወዘተ... ናቸው። ይህንን ዓመታዊ የነፍስ ወከፍ ፍጆታ መጠን በገጠሩ የየዓመቱ የህዝብ ብዛት በማባዛት የጠቅላላ ምርት ግምት ላይ ይደርሳል። በሌላ በኩል ደግሞ ይህን የምርት ውጤት ግምት ለሰብል-ዓይነት በወቅቱ የአምራች ዋጋ በማባዛትና ከዚህም አጠቃላይ የምርት ግምት ዋጋ ላይ ለምርት ግብአቶች የወጣውን በመቀነስ ጠቅላላ ተጨማሪ እሴት ላይ በመደመር ጠቅላላ የሰብል ምርት ተጨማሪ እሴት (Crop Sub-Sector Value Added) ላይ መድረስ ይቻላል።

የግብርና ንዑስ ክፍል የሆነው የእንስሳት ተዋጽኦን ተጨማሪ እሴት ለመገመት በመጀመሪያ በየዓመቱ ያለውን የተለያዩ እንስሳት ብዛት ማለትም ያዳልጋ ከብቶች፣ በጎች፣ ፍየሎች፣ ግመሎች፣ ደርዎችና የንብ እረባታን በሚመለከት መረጃዎችን ማግኘት ያስፈልጋል። ብዛታቸው ከታወቀ በኋላ ለእያንዳንዱ የእንስሳት ዓይነት የምርት ተዋጽኦ ለምሳሌ የሥጋ ውጤቶች፣ ወተት፣ ቅቤ፣ የቆዳ ውጤቶች፣ ማርና ሰም፣ ወዘተ... ቅሳዊ ምርት ግምት ይሰላል። ለዚህም ተደም ብሎ የተጠቀሰው የአሥሩ ዓመት መሪ ዕቅድ አዘጋጅ ኮሚቴ የጥናት ውጤት የሆነው ተከኒካል ፓራሚትር በእንደ ወቅት በጥቅም ላይ ውሏል። ይህ የጥናት ውጤት ለምሳሌ ከጠቅላላው የላሞች ብዛት ምን ያህል የወተት ላሞች እንደሆኑና ከእያንዳንዱ ላም በአማካይ በዓመት ምን ያህል ሊትር ወተት እንደሚገኝ ይጠቁማል። ይህንን በመጠከም ከጠቅላላ የአገሪቱ የወተት ምርት

መጠን ላይ ይደረሳል። ይህንን የወተት ምርት መጠን በጊዜው አማካይ የአምራች ዋጋ በማባዛት ጠቅላላ የወተት ምርት ይሰላል። በዚህ ዓይነት ለሌሎች የእንስሳት ምርት ተዋጽኦዎችም ግመታ ከተከናወነ በኋላ ከጠቅላላ የእንስሳት ተዋጽኦ የምርት ዋጋ ላይ ይህንን የምርት ወጪት ለማስገኘት የተደረጉ ግብአቶችን (የእንስሳት መኖር፣ የከብት ወጪ፣ የደሮ መኖር፣ ወዘተ...) ዋጋ በመቀነስ የእንስሳት ተዋጽኦ ተጨማሪ እሴት ላይ ይደርሳል። በመቀጠልም የሰብል ምርትን ጠቅላላ ተጨማሪ እሴት ከእንስሳት ተዋጽኦ ተጨማሪ እሴት ላይ በመደመር ከአጠቃላይ የግብርና ተጨማሪ እሴት ላይ መድረስ ይቻላል።

ለሌሎች የኢኮኖሚ ዘርፎችም በተመሳሳይ ሁኔታ የጠቅላላ የዘገጃ ውስጥ ምርት የግመታ ስራ ይከናወናል። ይህም ማለት ከማንኛውም የኢኮኖሚ ዘርፍ የምርት እንቅስቃሴ ተጨማሪ እሴት ላይ ለመድረስ ሁለት ነገሮችን ማወቅ እንደሚያስፈልግ መገንዘብ ይቻላል። የመጀመሪያው ጠቅላላ የምርት ወጪት ዋጋ (Gross Value of Production) ሲሆን ሌላው ይህን የምርት ውጤት ለማስገኘት በምርት ሂደት ወቅት ጥቅም ላይ የዋሉ ግብአቶችን ዋጋ (Value of Intermediate Inputs) ነው። እነዚህ ከታወቁ ተጨማሪውን እሴት ከመጀመሪያው ሁለተኛውን በማቃናነስ ማግኘት ይቻላል። እዚህ ላይ የዚህን ዓይነት ዘዴ በመከተል ለአጠቃላይ የሀገር ውስጥ ምርት ያላቸውን ድርሻ መጠን ለማወቅ የሚያገለግላቸውን የኢኮኖሚ ዘርፎች ለይቶ መጥቀስ አስፈላጊ ይሆናል። በተፈጥሮ ባህሪያቸው ለየት ያለ የአግማሚት ዘዴ የሚያስፈልጋቸው የአገር አስተዳደርና ደንበኝነት ጥበቃ፣ ጤናና ትምህርት ናቸው። እነዚህ የአገልግሎት ዘርፎች በተፈጥሮአቸው ከሌሎች የሚለዩት አትራፊ ያልሆኑና ለትርፍ ያልተቋቋሙ ተቋሞች በመሆናቸው ነው። በመሆኑም ለጠቅላላ የአገር ውስጥ ምርት የሚያበረክቱት ተጨማሪ እሴት የሚለካው ተቋሞችን ለማንቀሳቀስ ለምርት ማስገኛዎች በወጣው ጠቅላላ ወጪ (Cost) መጠን ነው።

ሌላው አማራጭ ጠቅላላ የሀገር ውስጥ ምርትን አጠቃላይ አካዊ መለኪያ ማግኛ መንገድ ጠቅላላ የሀገር ውስጥ ምርት ግመታ በመጨረሻ ጠቀሜታ ዓይነት የሚባለው ሲሆን፣ ይህም

የሚያሳየን በመጀመሪያው መንገድ የተገመተው ጠቅላላ የሀገር ውስጥ ምርት በምን ጥቅም ላይ እንደዋለ ነው። ቀደም ሲል እንደተጠቀሰው እስከ 1988 ድረስ በኢትዮጵያ የተሟላ ሁሉን አቀፍ የሆነ የፍጆታ ናሙና ጥናት ባለመካከዱ (በጠቅላይ ስታቲስቲክስ ሁለት ጊዜ ከተካሄዱት የገጠር የገቢና ፍጆታ ናሙና ጥናቶች በስተቀር) ጠቅላላ የሀገር ውስጥ ምርትን በመጨረሻ ጠቀሜታ ዓይነት ለመገመት የሚያስችሉ መረጃዎች ባለመገኘታቸው በዚህ ዘዴ የሚገኘው አጠቃላይ አካዊ መለኪያ የተሟላ ሊሆን አልቻለም። በዚህ ምክንያት የግል ፍጆታ እሳካሁን ይገመት የነበረው በተዘዋዋሪ ምክንያት ሌሎች የመጨረሻ ተጠቃሚዎች ወጪን በመጀመሪያው መንገድ ከተገኘው ጠቅላላ የሀገር ውስጥ ምርት አካዊ መለኪያ ላይ በመቀነስ ነበር። አሁን በተካሄደው የማሻሻያ ፕሮጀክት ግን ይህን ድክመት በማረም ይህንን የጠቅላላ የሀገር ውስጥ ምርት ንዑስ ክፍል ራሱን በቻለ መንገድ ለመገመት ተሞክሯል። ቀደም ብሎ እንደተጠቀሰው ጠቅላላ የሀገር ውስጥ ምርት በመጨረሻ ጠቀሜታ ዓይነት እንደሚከተለው ተለይቶ ይገመታል።

1. የግል ፍጆታ ወጪ (Private Final Consumption Expenditure)
2. የመንግሥት ፍጆታ (Government Final Consumption Expenditure)
3. ጠቅላላ የሀገር ውስጥ ካፒታል ክምችት (Gross Domestic Capital Formation)
4. የተጣራ የወጪ ንግድ ሽያጭ (Net Exports)

የእነዚህ የመጨረሻ ተጠቃሚዎች ጠቅላላ ወጪ ድምር ጠቅላላ የሀገር ውስጥ ምርት በገበያ ዋጋ በመጨረሻ ጠቀሜታ ዓይነትን ይሰጣል። ይህም የሚያሳየን በሀገር ውስጥ በእንደ ዓመት ውስጥ ከተገኘው ጠቅላላ ምርት ምን ያህል ለግል ለግል ፍጆታ ማለትም በግለሰቦችና ለትርፍ ባለቆሙ መንግሥታዊ ያልሆኑ ድርጅቶች (ግብርናይ ድርጅቶች፣ የሠራተኛ ማኅበራት፣ ክለቦች፣ ወዘተ...) በኩል አላቂ በሆኑ ለምሳሌ ለምግብ፣ ለመጠጥ፣ ለአልባሳት፣ ለውኃ፣ ለሙቀት መስጫ፣ ወዘተ... እና አላቂ ላልሆኑ (Durable Goods) ማለትም የቤት ውስጥ ቁሳቁሶች፣ ዘመናዊ ምጣድ፣ ወዘተ... ላይ እንደዋለ ያመለክታል።

የመንግሥት ፍጆታ ደግሞ በማዕከላዊ መንግሥት በኩል ለህዝብ እስተዳደርና መከላከያ፣ ለትምህርት፣ ለጤና፣ ወዘተ... የተደረገውን ጠቅላላ ወጪ ያመለክታል። ከዚህ ጠቅላላ ወጪ ላይ አንዳንድ የመንግሥት ድርጅቶች ለመንግሥት የሚያስገኛቸው ገቢዎች መቀነስ ይኖርባቸዋል። ለምሳሌ በማዕከላዊ ስታትስቲክስ ባለሥልጣን ከዶክመንቶች ሽያጭ የሚገኝ ገቢ አንዱ ነው።

ጠቅላላ የሀገር ዉስጥ የካፒታል ክምችት የምንለው ምርትን በተከታታይ ዓመታት ለማካኔድና የወደፊት የማምረት እቅድን ለማዳበር በኢኮኖሚ ዉስጥ በግልም ሆነ በመንግሥት አማካይነት በዓመቱ ዉስጥ የሚገዙ የካፒታል ዕቃዎችን ማለት ሲሆን ጠቅላላ ካፒታል ሲባል ደግሞ ቀደም ብለው የተደረጉ ኢንቨስትመንት ወጪዎችንና በወቅቱ የተገዙ አዲስ የካፒታል ዕቃዎችን ጭምር ማለት ነው። ጠቅላላ የሀገር ዉስጥ ካፒታል ክምችት ከቋሚ ኢንቨስትመንት በተጨማሪ በዓመቱ መጀመሪያና መጨረሻ መካከል ያለውን የኢንቨንተር ክምችት ለውጥ ይጨምራል። የኢንቨንተር ክምችት ለውጥ (stock Change) ለወደፊት ለምርት ግብዓት የሚወለዱ ቁሳቁሶችን፣ ለወደፊት ለፍጆታ የተቀመጡ ቁሳቁሶችን፣ ለኢንቨስትመንት የሚውሉ ዕቃዎችን፣ በምርት ሂደት ላይ ያሉ ዕቃዎች (Work in Progress) ለወደፊት ለውጭ ንግድ ሽያጭ የተቀመጡ ዕቃዎችን፣ ወዘተ... ያጠቃልላል። ቋሚ ኢንቨስትመንት ደግሞ የፋብሪካ ማምረቻ ዕቃዎችን፣ የመኖሪያ ቤት ሥራን፣ የቋሚ ተክሎች ልማትን (ቡና፣ ባህር ዛፍ፣ ወዘተ...) ያጠቃልላል።

የተጣራ ወጪ ንግድ ሲባል ሌሎች አገሮች በእኛ አገር በተመረቱ ዕቃዎች ላይ ያደረጋቸው ወጪዎች ላይ (Export Receipt) በሌሎች አገሮች በተመረቱ ዕቃዎች ላይ እኛ ያደረግናቸው ወጪዎች (Import Bill) ተቀንሰው የሚገኘው ልዩነት ነው። ይህ ልዩነት ከዘር በላይ ከሆነ ለአገራችን የውጭ ምንዛሪ ትርፍን ሲያሳይ ከዘር በታች ከሆነ ደግሞ የውጭ ምንዛሪ እጥረትን ማለትም በሽያጭ ከምናገኘው የውጭ ምንዛሪ ይልቅ በግዢ የምናወጣው የውጭ ምንዛሪ እንደሚበልጥ ያመለክታል።

5. የብሔራዊ ኢኮኖሚ አካውንትን መረጃዎች ለዕቅድ ዝግጅትና ፖሊሲና ትንተና የሚኖራቸው ሚና

የተለያዩ ዘዴዎችን በመጠቀም የአንድን አገር ኢኮኖሚ ወይም ንዑሳን ዘርፎች እንቅስቃሴ በአንድ አጋዛዊ መለኪያ መግለጽ እንደሚቻል እስካሁን ከተደረጉት ማብራሪያዎች ለመረዳት ይቻላል። ከዚህ በመቀጠል ደግሞ እነዚህ መረጃዎች አስተማማኝና የወቅቱን ሁሉን አቀፍ የኢኮኖሚ ሁኔታ የሚያንጸባርቁ ከሆነ የኢኮኖሚ ሁኔታን ለመተንተንና የወደፊቱን ለመተንበይ መንደርደሪያ ሊሆኑ እንደሚችሉ ማሳየት ነው።

እነዚህ መረጃዎች ለዚህ ዓይነት ተግባር የሚወሉበት አንዱና ዋነኛው ዘዴ በግብዓተ ምርቶችና የምርት (Input Output) ሰንጠረዥ አማካይነት ነው። መረጃዎቹ ለዚህ ሥራ ከመዋላቸው በፊት ሁሉን አቀፍ አስተማማኝ መሆናቸውን ማረጋገጥ ያስፈልጋል። ይህ ተግባር ሲገኝ ይህ የዕቅድና ትንተና መሣሪያ ለአንድ አገር አጠቃላይ የኢኮኖሚ አስተዳደር (Economic Management) እና ፖሊሲ ትንተና ከፍተኛ ጠቀሜታ እንደሚኖረው ዘዴውን ከሚጠቀሙ አገሮች ተመክሮ ለመገንዘብ ይቻላል። ለኢትዮጵያ ይህን መሰል ሰንጠረዥ ገና ያልተዘጋጀ ቢሆንም በኢኮኖሚ ልማትና ትብብር ሚ/ር አማካይነት የሚካኔደው የኢትዮጵያን ብሔራዊ ኢኮኖሚ አካውንት የመረጃ መሠረት የማስፋፋትና የማጠናከር ሥራ ለዚህ ሰንጠረዥ ዝግጅት መንገድ ጠራጊ እንደሚሆን ይታመናል።

ከዚህ በላይ ስለ ሰንጠረዥ ይዘት ከተሰጠው ግብራሪያ መረዳት እንደሚቻለው ሁለንተኛ ጠቀሜታ ያለው በመሆኑ ሰንጠረዥ ብቻ ስለአንድ ኢኮኖሚ አጠቃላይ ግንዛቤ ያስጨብጣል። ለምሳሌ የኢኮኖሚ ዋነኛ መሠረት የትኛው ዘርፍ እንደሆነ፣ የአቅርቦትና ፍላጎት ሚዛን፣ ከምርት ላይ ለኢንቨስትመንት ለፍጆታና ለውጭ ሽያጭ የሚወለደውን መጠን፣ የአንዱ ዘርፍ ምርት ለሌላው ግብዓት መሆኑን፣ የመጨረሻ ጠቀሜታ ፍላጎትን ለማሟላት ኢኮኖሚ ማምረት የሚገባውን አቅርቦት፣ የአንድን ኢኮኖሚ የሀብት አጠቃቀም፣ የኢኮኖሚ ዘርፎችን ቁርኝት፣ ለየዘርፉ የሚያስፈልጉትን ቀጥተኛና ቀጥተኛ ያልሆኑ

ግብዓቶችን፣ የአንድ ዘርፍ ዕድገት ለሌሎች ዘርፎች የግብዓት ፍላጎትን ማሟላትና ለኢኮኖሚ ዕድገት የሚያደርገው አስተዋጽኦ ወዘተ... ከሰንጠረዥ ማግኘት ይቻላል። ሰንጠረዥን ለኢኮኖሚ ትንተና ስንጠቀም የአንዱን ወቅት የምርቶች አገልግሎቶች ዋጋ መሠረት በማድረግ ነው። ስለዚህ ከጊዜ ወደጊዜ የዋጋ መለዋወጥ (Price change) በትንተናው ላይ እንግራዊ ለውጥ ስለሚያመጣ የጊዜውን ሁኔታ ላያንጸባርቅ ይችላል። ስለዚህ ሰንጠረዥን ለሚፈለገው ትንተና ከመጠቀም በፊት የዋጋ ለውጥ ተጽዕኖን ማስወገድ አስፈላጊ ነው። ይህ አሠራር ደግሞ ከጊዜ ወደ ጊዜ ለሚካኔድ ማንኛውም ኢኮኖሚያዊ ትንተና ጭምር ወላኝ ነው።

6. የብሔራዊ ኢኮኖሚ አካውንት መረጃዎች አንዳንድ ድክመቶች

ጠቅላላ የሀገር ምርት ግምት አጋዛዊ አመልካች ለዕቅድ ዝግጅትና ፖሊሲ ትንተና የሚኖራቸውን ጠቀሜታ ቀደም ብሎ ከቀረበው ማብራሪያ ለመረዳት ይቻላል። ይሁንና እነዚህ አጋዛዊ አመልካች በተሟላ መልኩ የኢኮኖሚ ማገባራት ዕድገት ደረጃን ያመለክታሉ ማለት አይቻልም። ከዚህ አኳያ የመረጃዎቹ ተጠቃሚዎች የሚከሉትን ነጥቦች ማስገባት ይኖርባቸዋል።

1. መለኪያዎቹ የአንድን ሀገር የኢኮኖሚ እንቅስቃሴዎች ሁለንተናዊ ገጽታ ላይ መለኮቱ እንደሚችሉ፣ ለዚህም አንዱ ምክንያት የአንድን የኢኮኖሚ እንቅስቃሴ ተጨማሪ እሴት የማስላት ችግር ሊኖር ስለሚችል ነው። ሌላው ችግር የምርት እንቅስቃሴዎችን የሚዘክሩ አጋዛዊ መረጃዎች በአግባቡ የማይያዙ ከሆነ በመረጃ እጥረት ሣቢያ እንቅስቃሴው በብሔራዊ ኢኮኖሚ አካውንት ላይካተት ሲቀር ነው። የምርት ስፔሻላይዜሽንና የሥራ ክፍፍል ባልደበረባቸው ድጋፍ ታዳጊ አገሮች የአንዳንድ የግልና የቤት ውስጥ አገልግሎቶች የምርት ውጤት በብሔራዊ ኢኮኖሚ አካውንት ስለማይታቀፍ የእነዚህን አገሮች ጠቅላላ የሀገር ዉስጥ ምርት መለኪያ ዝቅ ሊያደርገው ይችላል። እዚህ ላይ እንደ ምሳሌ ሲጠቀስ የሚገባው በቤት እመቤቶችና የቤተሰብ አባላት አማካይነት የሚከናወን የቤት ዉስጥ

ሥራዎች (Domestic Household Activities) ናቸው።

2. ህጋዊ ያልሆኑ ወይም ድብቅ የኢኮኖሚ እንቅስቃሴዎችን የሚዘክሩ አጋዛዊ መረጃዎች ማግኘት አስቸጋሪ ስለሚሆን ውጤቶቹ በብሔራዊ ኢኮኖሚ አካውንት ውስጥ መከተታቸው አጠራጣሪ ነው። እንደደገፍ ጊዜ መረጃዎችን ለማግኘት ጥረት ቢደረግም ተአማኒነት ላይኖራቸው ይችላል። በምሳሌነት የሚጠቀሱ እነዚህን መሰል እንቅስቃሴዎችም ህገ ወጥ ንግድ (Smuggling)፣ ያልተመሰከረላቸው የሀገር ባህል ህክምና እገልግሎቶች፣ ወዘተ...ናቸው።

3. ጠቅላላ የሀገር ዉስጥ ምርት አጋዛዊ አመልካቾች በወቅቱ የተገኘውን የምርት ውጤት መጠን እንጂ የገቢ ሥርዓት ፍትሃዊነትን አያመለክቱም። በእነዚህ መልኪያዎች መሠረት የሚገኘው የነፍስ ወከፍ ገቢ ድርሻ (Per Capita Income) የሀብረተሰቡን የገቢ ተመጣጣኝነት ላያመለክት ይችላል።

4. ጠቅላላ የሀገር ዉስጥ ምርት አጋዛዊ መለኪያ በምርት እንቅስቃሴ ሂደት በአካባቢዉ አየር ላይ የሚያደርሱት ጠቃሚም ሆነ ጎጂ ተጽዕኖዎች (Positive or Negative Externalities) በሀብረተሰቡ የዕለት ተዕለት ህይወት ላይ የሚኖረዉን እንደምታ ሙሉ በሙሉ ከግምት ዉስጥ ላያስገባ ይችላል። ለምሳሌ የፋብሪካዎች እንቅስቃሴ ምርትን የሚያስገኝ ቢሆንም በፋብሪካ ዝቃጮች ምክንያት የሚደርስ የመጠጥ ዉኃ ብክለት በጤና ሙታወክ ምክንያት ለሀብረተሰቡ ተጨማሪ ወጪን ያስከትላል። ይህ ወጪ በመለኪያው ውስጥ ሙሉ በሙሉ ላይነጻባረቅ ይችላል። በሌላ በኩል የደን ልማት ደግሞ በጠቅላላ ምርት መጨመር ላይ ከሚኖረዉ ቀጥተኛ አስተዋጽኦ በተጨማሪ የተፈጥሮ ሚዛንን ከመጠበቅ አንጻር በመለኪያው ውስጥ ያልተካተተ ቀጥተኛ ያልሆነ ጠቀሚታ አለው። ለሁለተኛ ጊዜ ማሻሻያ የተደረገበት እንደ ወጥ የሆነዉ የብሔራዊ ኢኮኖሚ አካውንት እዘጋጃጀት መመሪያ (The 1993 Revised UN System of National Accounts) መሠረት ይህንን መሰል ሁኔታዎች ሊያካትቱ የሚችሉ ልዩ አካዉንቶች (Satellite Accounts) ለመጠቀም ከስምምነት ላይ የተደረሰ ቢሆንም ዉጤቱን በተሟላ መልኩ ማንፀባረቅ

አይቻልም ይሆናል።

7. በኢትዮጵያ የብሔራዊ ኢኮኖሚ አካውንት ሥራ ላይ የሚታዩ ችግሮች

የብሔራዊ ኢኮኖሚ አካውንት መረጃዎች ለማንኛውም የዕቅድ ዝግጅትና ፖሊሲ ትንተና ሥራ መነሻ መሆናቸውን ካለፉት ማብራሪያዎች ለመገንዘንብ ይቻላል። የእነዚህ መረጃዎች ደካማና ጠንካራ ጎን የሚለካዉ በየዘርፉ መረጃ ለማጠናቀር ከምንጠቀምባቸዉ የመረጃ ጥንቅር (Data Base) አንጻር ነዉ። በኢትዮጵያ ለብሔራዊ ኢኮኖሚ አካውንት ዝግጅት ሥራ ዋናው ችግር የመረጃ በወቅቱና በአስተማማኝ ህጂታ አለመገኘት ነው። የችግሩ መንስዔ በአገሪቱ ዉስጥ መጠነ ሰፊ የኢኮኖሚ አውታሮችን ያቀፈ የጠቅላላ ቆጠራ ወይም ናሙና ጥናት የሚፈለገውን ያህል አለመካኒድ ሲሆን በየዘርፉ ያጋጠሙና እሰካሁን ሙሉ በሙሉ ያልተፈቱ ችግሮችን እንደሚከተለው ለመጠቀም ይሞክራል።

1. የግብርናው ክ/ኢኮኖሚ ዋናው የሀዘቡ የኑሮ መሠረት ሲሆን ይህንን ዘርፍ በሚመለከት በየዓመቱ በማዕከላዊ ስታትስቲክስ ኮሚሽኒደዉ የሰብል አዉጾ የናሙና ጥናት በስተቀር የጠቅላላ የግብርና ቆጠራ ጥናት (Agricultural census) አለመካኒድ በተለይም በእንስሳት ሀብት መስክ ሁሉን አቀፍ (Comprehensive) የሆነ የናሙና ጥናት ያልተካኒደ በመሆኑ የአገሪቱን የእንስሳት ሀብት ግምት በውል ለማወቅ ባለመቻሉ የዘርፉን ተጨማሪ እሴት በአስተማማኝ ሁኔታ ለማስላት አለመቻሉ ናቸው።

2. የደን ሀብት ዉጤቶች፣ አሣ ማሰገርና አደንን በተመለከተም የተሟላ መረጃ ሊያስገኝ የሚችል ጥናት ካለመካኒዱ የተነሣ የእነዚህ ዘርፎች ተዋጽኦ የሚገመተው የሀዘብ ብዛት ዕድገትንና ሌሎች ጠቃሚ መረጃዎችን መሠረት በማድረግ ብቻ መሆኑ፤

3. እንስተኛ ኢንዱስትሪዎችንና ዕደጥበባትን በሚመለከት የአነስተኛ ኢንዱስትሪዎችና ዕደ ጥበባት ማስፋፊያ ድርጅት በአንድ ወቅት ካካኒደዉ የናሙና ጥናት እና በቅርቡ በማዕከላዊ ስታትስቲክስ ባለሥልጣን

ከተካኒደዉ የናሙና ጥናት በስተቀር ያለፉትን ዓመታት ሁኔታ የሚጠቀሙ መረጃዎች አለመኖር፤

4. በንግዱ ክ/ኢኮኖሚ በግል ንግድ ዘርፍ የንግድ አገልግሎትን በተመለከተ በቅርቡ ከተካኒደው የማከፋፈያ አገልግሎቶች የናሙና ጥናት በስተቀር ያለፉትን ዓመታት በሚመለከት ተከታታይነት ያላቸው መረጃዎች አለመኖር፤

5. የዋጋ መረጃዎችን በሚመለከት በማዕከላዊ ስታትስቲክስ ባለሥልጣን በየወሩ የሚካኒደው የአምራችና የችርቻሮ የናሙና ጥናት ለማግኘት ቢቻልም እነዚህ መረጃዎች በከፊል ወደ ዋጋ ንረት ተመልካችነት (Index) ያልተዋቀሩ በመሆናቸው ጠቀሚታቸዉ ዋጋን ከማስላት አንጻር ብቻ መወሰኑ፤


6. ጠቅላላ የሀገር ዉስጥ ምርት በመጨረሻ ጠቀሚታ ዓይነት ከተገመተ በኋላ በአገር አቀፍ ደረጃ የዋጋ ንረት አመልካች በመጨረሻ ተጠቃሚዎች ዓይነት ወይም ለጠቅላላ ኢኮኖሚ መተሟላ መልኩ ያልተዘጋጀ በመሆኑ መረጃዎቹን ለትንበያና ለኢኮኖሚ ትንተና ለመጠቀም አስቸጋሪ መሆኑ። በቅርቡ ከ1989 ጀምሮ በአገር አቀፍ በገጠርና በከተማ አዲስ የዋጋ ንረት አመልካች ኢንዱስትሪ በመዘጋጀቱ ችግሩን ሊቀርፈዉ እንደሚችል ይገመታል፤

7. የኢትዮጵያ ፌዴራላዊ ዲሞክራሲያዊ ሪፐብሊክ መንግሥት በነደፈዉ የኢኮኖሚ ፖሊሲ መሠረት የግሉ ክ/ኢኮኖሚ ከፍተኛ ትኩረት የተሰጠው በመሆኑ ለወደፊቱ ይህንን ሁኔታ ከግምት ዉስጥ ያስገባ የተቀናጀ የመረጃ ፍስት ሥርዓት ካልተዘረጋ በስተቀር ለብሔራዊ ኢኮኖሚ አካውንት ዝግጅት ሥራ አስቸጋሪ ይሆናል።

8. በመወሰድ ላይ ያሉ የመፍትሔ እርመጃዎች

የኢትዮጵያ የመረጃ ችግር ሥር የሰደደ በመሆኑ በአጭር ጊዜ መፍትሔ የሚገኝለት አለመሆኑ ይታመናል። በዚህ መሠረት የኢትዮጵያ የስታትስቲክስ ስተራቴጂን በሚመለከት እንደ አገር አቀፍ ኮሚቴ በኢኮኖሚ ልማትና ትብብር ሚ/ር አማካይነት ተቋቁሞ ለጥናቱ አስፈላጊ ሁኔታዎችን ሲያመቻች ቆይቷል። በዚህ መሠረት

በቅርቡ የአምስት ዓመት የመካከለኛ ጊዜ (Medium Term) የሰታትስቲክስ ፕሮግራም (1991-1995 ዓ.ም) በኢኮኖሚ ልማትና ትብብር ሚ/ር አስተባባሪነት የተረቀቀ በመሆኑ ችግሩን ለዘለቄታው ለመፍታት መልካም ጅምር ነው። ይህም የመካከለኛ ጊዜ ግብ በመሆኑ ለጊዜው በአገር አቀፍ ደረጃ በተካከረው የ1987 የህዝብና የቤት ቆጠራ ጥናት ውጤት አማካይነት የተገኘ የመረጃ ውጤቶችን እና በቅርቡ የተካከሉ የኑሙና ጥናት ውጤቶችን በመጠቀም ይደረስ የነበረውን የመረጃ ክፍተት በማሟላት ከዚህም በላይ የሚገለጹ መ/ቤቶችና ድርጅቶች እንዲሁም ከልሎች መረጃ በመስጠት በኩል ሊተባበሩ የሚችሉበትን መንገድ ማመቻቸት ጊዜ ሊሰጠው የማይገባ አጣጣሪ ጉዳይ ነው። ከዚህም በተጨማሪ መ/ቤቶችና ድርጅቶች በተናጠል የኑሙና ጥናት ከማካከያቸው በፊት በመጠየቅ ዝግጅት ወቅት ጥናቱ ከብሔራዊ ኢኮኖሚ አካውንት ሥራ የመረጃ ፍላጎት ጋር ሊጣጣም የሚችልበትን መንገድ ለመቀየስ ይቻል ዘንድ የኢኮኖሚ ልማትና ትብብር ሚ/ር ባለሙያዎች የሚሳተፉበት ሁኔታ ቢፈጠር የመረጃዎችን አጠቃቀም የተሟላ ሊያደርገው እንደሚችል ይታመናል።



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BY GOMERAW, IMBYLTA, VOLUME 1, NUMBER 2

MAJOR ECONOMIC NEWS IN THE LAST TWO MONTHS

I. GENERAL

An official of the UNHCR said multi-faceted programs that would enable to protect the environment within refugee operations in Ethiopia are being implemented. (The Ethiopian Herald, vol. IV, No. 032, Oct. 18, 1998)

The Ministry of Water Resources said the first phase study of the potable water development and rehabilitation project which will be undertaken in 25 towns at a cost of 65.5 million U.S. dollars has been completed. (The Ethiopian Herald, Vol. IV, No. 023, Oct.8, 1998)

Over 26 million birr worth government money has been wasted within three years in Gambella state, the state's audit bureau reported. (The Ethiopian Herald, Vol. IV, No. 029, Oct. 15, 1998)

A 90 million dollars worth research and training project aimed at raising agricultural productivity will be effected as of next month, executive director of the Ethiopian Agricultural Research Organization (EARO), Dr. Seifu ketema, said. (The Ethiopian Herald, Vol. LV, No. 035, Oct. 22, 1998)

The Minister of Finance says the Government of Ethiopia has recently adopted a new medium-term economic adjustment program for 1998/99-2000/01. (The Ethiopia Herald, vol.,LV, No. 043, Oct, 31, 1998)

In its monthly situation report for Ethiopia of October 1998, the UNDP stated that a number of donors, including the European Union, have indicated an "interest in making use of the 'Somaliland' port of Berbera to supplement the still limited bulk cargo handling capacity of Djibouti." (The Reporter, Vol. III, No. 110, Oct. 14, 1998)

The Ethiopian Roads Authority (ERA) reported that the modern transport system in Ethiopia covers only about 20 percent of the existing transport demand. (The Ethiopian Herald, Vol. LV, No. 039, Oct. 27, 1998)

The Iranian vice Minister of Agriculture said his country is keenly interested to co-operate with Ethiopia in the field of Agriculture. (The Ethiopian Herald, vol. LV, No. 039, Oct. 27, 1998)

The Ethiopian National Bank and the Customs Authority are facing a serious challenge from under-invoicing of the prices of goods. (The Reporter, Vol. III, No. 112, Oct. 28, 1998)

The Ministry of Trade and Industry says the establishment of the Ethiopian Export Promotion Agency will help alleviate problems faced in the country's export trade. (The Ethiopian Herald, Vol. LV, No. 43, Oct. 31, 1998)

Various public health institutions are to be built across the country in the next five years with an outlay of 5.2 billion Birr, according to the Minister of Health. (The Ethiopian Herald, Vol. LV, No. 062, Nov. 22, 1998)

Over 300,000 Birr of the 1,042,447 Birr embezzled from various cooperatives and governmental organizations in Kefa Sheka zone has been reimbursed, the finance and cooperatives promotion department announced. (The Ethiopian Herald, Vol. LV, 050, Nov.8, 1998)

The Ministry of Water Resource said a draft proclamation providing for water management, preservation and utilization is in the pile line. (The Ethiopian Herald, Vol. LV, No. 051, Nov. 10, 1998)

The Ethiopian Telecommunication Corporation (ETCO) said it had installed more than 100,000 digital exchanges in Addis and other towns last Ethiopian year. (The Ethiopian Herald, Vol. LV, No. 47, Nov. 5, 1998)

A California based private foundation announced that it is awarding 375 million dollars to fund family planning programs in developing countries including Ethiopia. (The Ethiopian Herald, Vol. LV, No. 058, Nov. 18, 1998)

The World Bank has issued a call to the world's wealthy countries to increase their foreign aid contributions to poor countries that adopt sound economic policies and institutions. (Addis Tribune, No. 319, Nov. 11, 1998)

The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) says foreign direct investment for 1998 is projected to reach a record \$430-440,000 million despite slower global economic growth and the crises in financial markets. (Addis Tribune No. 319, Nov.13, 1998)

I. SOCIO - ECONOMIC

The Works and Urban Development Department of Bale zone allotted 840,000 square meters of land for over 3,500 urban residents of 13 towns. Similarly, the Addis Ababa City Administration Works and Urban Development Bureau said 2,400 people organized in 114 housing associations are receiving building plots. (The Ethiopian Herald, Vol. LV, No. 017, Oct. 2, 1998)

II. AGRICULTURE

The National Fertilizer Industry Agency has announced that the

total fertilizer requirement for this year (1991 E.C.) will be 419,000 metric tons. Of the stated amount 265,000 tons is Dap and 154,000 tons Urea. (The Ethiopian Herald, Vol. LV, No. 017, Oct. 1, 1998)

Some 37,000 quintals of food grain has been distributed to 250,000 people in west Hararge Zone who were affected by shortage of food precipitated by climate change last Ethiopian Year. (The Ethiopian Herald, Vol. LV, No. 027, Oct. 13, 1998)

The United States Government recently provided 60,000 metric tons of wheat grain in support of World Food Program (WFP) activities in Ethiopia. (Addis Tribune, No. 315, Oct. 16, 1998)

The Vice Minister of the Ministry of Economic Development and cooperation, Ato Mekonnen Manyazewal, said "We should not carry the illusion that provision of fertilizer alone will solve the problem of small-holder agriculture. Complementary actions in other areas are required for it to bear fruit." (Addis Tribune, No. 315, Oct. 16, 1998)

Ethiopia and Eritrea are among a group of countries that risk a food crisis, the UN Food and Agriculture organization (FAO) said. (Addis Tribune, No. 314, Oct. 9, 1998)

The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) announced that more food assistance for Ethiopia has arrived at Djibouti harbor. (The Ethiopian Herald, Vol. LV, No. 35, Oct. 22, 1998)

Director of the Biodiversity Conservation and Research Institute said over 600 of the estimated 7000 plant species in Ethiopia are known to have medicinal value. (The Ethiopian Herald, Vol. LV, No. 057, Nov. 17, 1998)

Sasakawa Global 2000 said it has been undertaking a demonstration site project that would help farmers minimize the labor they employ and preserve soil fertility. (The Ethiopian Herald, Vol. LV, No. 057, Nov. 17, 1998)

The Emergency Food Reserve Administration said it had given 281,000 metric tons of grain to donors in loan last Ethiopian year. (The Ethiopian Herald, Vol. LV, No. 051, Nov. 10, 1998)

The Disaster Prevention and Preparedness Department of Illubabor Zone said it has provided over 13,000 quintals of relief food for the inhabitants of the zone facing food shortage. (The Ethiopian Herald, Vol. LV, No. 055, Nov. 14, 1998)

The Ethiopian Grain Marketing Enterprise said it has started making all the necessary precautions to avoid undue grain price falls that may occur due to the expected bumper harvest this year. (The Ethiopian Herald, Vol. LV, No. 066, Nov. 27, 1998)

Agricultural Inputs Supply Corporation announced that it will buy 10,000 metric counts DAP from grants received from the Italian Government. (Addis Tribune, No. 330, Nov. 20, 1998)

Dispatches from Brussels show the European Commission opened a tender recently for the supply of 36,793 tones of common wheat for Ethiopia. (Addis Tribune, No. 319, Nov. 13, 1998)

An agricultural expert disclosed that it is possible to prevent soil erosion by spraying weed killers in unploughed maize growing fields. (The Ethiopian Herald, Vol. LV, No. 056, Nov. 15, 1998)

The Sihul Incense Project of Western Tigray Zone said it plans to collect 25,000 quintals of incense this year. (The Ethiopian Herald, Vol. LV, No. 056, Nov. 15, 1998)

The Somali State Disaster Prevention and Preparedness Bureau disclosed that about half million people in the state are exposed to famine due to lack of rain over the last two consecutive rainy seasons. (The Ethiopian Herald, Vol. LV, No. 065, Nov. 26, 1998)

I. EXTERNAL ASSISTANCE

The United Nations Educational Scientific and cultural organization (UNESCO) has pledged to donate a sum of 350,000 U.S. dollars for the reconstruction of schools destroyed by Eritrean war of aggression. (The Ethiopian Herald, Vol. LV, No. 23, Oct. 8, 1998)

The Tourism Development Project launched through the cooperation between the government of Ethiopia and Austria has planned to undertake various development activities in the Semen Mountains National Park at a cost of about 12 million birr. (The Ethiopian Herald, Vol. LV, No. 27, Oct. 13, 1998)

Ethiopia and U.S.A signed agreements amounting to 23.4 million U.S. dollars. According to the agreements, the U.S. government will give the sum of 11.4 million U.S. dollars and 12 million dollars to Ethiopia in support of the country's Health Sector Development Program and Education Sector Development respectively. (The Ethiopian Herald, Vol. LV, No. 029, Oct. 15, 1998)

The French Development Agency has approved a new 60 million French franc (70 million ETB) grant to the Addis Ababa Water and Sewage Authority. Norway granted 10.5 million birr to a research Programme at Addis Ababa University. (Addis Tribune, No. 317, Oct. 30, 1998)

The World Bank approved US \$100 million to support the first five year phase of Ethiopia's 20-year health sector development programme. (Addis Tribune, No. 317, Oct. 30, 1998)

The Ethiopian government has signed agreements with donors providing for over three billion Birr for the execution of investment in the education and health sectors program, according to a senior government official. (The Ethiopian Herald, Vol. LV, 068, Nov. 29, 1998)

V. TRADE

The Ethiopian Customs Authority said over 275, 000 tonnes of goods have been imported to the country via the Djibouti port over the past three months alone. (The Ethiopian Herald, Vol. LV, No. 35, Oct. 22, 1998)

More than 11,000 tonnes of washed and dry coffee would be supplied by Illubabor Zone to the central market this Ethiopian year, the zonal agriculture department said. (The Ethiopian Herald, Vol. LV, No. 37, Oct. 24, 1998)

VI. CREDIT

The Development Bank of Ethiopia (DBE) said it has a plan to lend 195 million birr this year for various economic sectors. (The Ethiopian Herald, Vol. LV, No. 21, Oct. 6, 1998)

The International Monetary Fund (IMF) approved the second annual loan for Ethiopia which is about \$42 million to support the Ethiopian government's economic and financial program for the fiscal year 1998-99 under the Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility (ESAF). (The Reporter, Vol. III, No. 112, Oct. 28, 1998)

The world's poorest countries, including Ethiopia, are to receive over 20 billion US dollars in concessional loans from International Development Association (IDA). (The Ethiopian Herald, Vol. LV, No. 066, Nov. 27, 1998)

The Fiche branch of the Development Bank of Ethiopia and the Debre Markos branch of the Amhara Credit and Saving Company are planning to give over 13.5 million Birr for people in the low-income bracket. (The Ethiopian Herald, Vol. LV, No. 056, Nov. 15, 1998)

Nine micro-finance institutions have been providing credit and saving services to poor people in various states, the National Bank of Ethiopia said. (The Ethiopian Herald, Vol. LV, No. 055, Nov. 14, 1998)

The Axum branch of the Dedebit Credit and Saving Share Company in Central Tigray Zone said it has loaned a sum of over 79.3 million Birr to over 162,000 clients, branch manager Ato Yoseph Dira said. (The Ethiopian Herald, Vol. LV, 013, Nov. 12, 1998)

The Oromia Trade and Industry Bureau said it has drawn a plan to give 6.4 million Birr loan this year for people in the low income bracket. (The Ethiopian Herald, Vol. LV, 046, Nov. 4, 1998)

VII. PUBLIC REVENUE

The fish production and marketing enterprise said it earned a total of over six million income from fish production during the past budget year. (The Ethiopian Herald, Vol. LV, No. 30 Oct. 16, 1998)

The Assela Malt Factory has netted over 11 million birr the previous Ethiopian budget year and has made salary increment in addition to the bonus it paid to its workers. (The Ethiopian Herald, Vol. LIV, No. 34, Oct. 21, 1998)

The Methara sugar factory said it has made over 104 million birr in gross profit in 1990 E.C. (The Ethiopian Herald, Vol. LV, No. 27, Oct. 13, 1998)

The Methara Sugar factory said it has earned 3.7 million birr from the sale of 40,000 tonnes of molasses to a German market. (The Ethiopian Herald, Vol. LV, 29, Oct. 15, 1998)

The Middle Awash Agricultural Development Enterprise reported that it has earned a profit of more than 12 million birr over the Previous Ethiopian Year. (The Ethiopian Herald, Vol. LV, No. 27, Oct. 13, 1998)

The Road Fund Administration said it has secured 328 million birr from fuel tariff for the construction and maintenance of roads. (The Ethiopian Herald, Vol. LV, No. 37, Oct. 24, 1998)

The East Wollega Zone inland revenue office said it has filled

charges against 10 organizations and 52 persons who owe it over 4,000, 000 birr in tax. (The Ethiopian Herald, Vol. LV, No. 27, Oct. 13, 1998)

VIII. INVESTMENT

One hundred and seventy nine private investors have launched various development ventures in West Shoa Zone with a combined capital of over 600 million birr. (The Ethiopian Herald, Vol. LV, No. 017, Oct. 1, 1998)

A group of Ethiopian and South African investors are preparing to setup a brewery in Akaki woreda, East Shoa zone, at a cost of over 300 million birr - similarly, A total of 212 investors possessing an aggregate capital of 2.3 billion birr have started ventures in various investment sectors in Oromia State, according to reports coming from different zonal Administration of the state. (The Ethiopian Herald, Vol. LV, No. 23, Oct. 8, 1998)

An official of the Ministry of Economic Development and Co-operation said 28 out of the 57 projects launched with a 1.2 billion birr allocated by the African Development Bank (ADB) have been completed. (The Ethiopian Herald, Vol. LV, No. 39, Oct. 27, 1998)

A state owned Chinese firm and a private Ethiopian company are to build a pharmaceutical plant worth 1.7 million outside the Ethiopian capital. (Addis Tribune, 320, Nov. 20, 1998)

The Ministry of Mines and Energy said a total of 16 foreign and local investors have been licensed last year to undertake mining exploration activities. (The Ethiopian Herald, Vol. LV, 058, Nov. 18, 1998)

IX. BUDGET

Dr. Tekelehaimanot Haile Selassie, Vice Minister of Education said that the Ministry of Education has allocated 12.2 billion birr for this fiscal year. (Addis Tribune, No. 314, Oct. 9, 1998)

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