



**ልሳነ
ኢኮኖሚክስ**

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ከአዘጋጃ

የኢትዮጵያ ኢኮኖሚክስ ባለሙያዎች ማህበር የርዕይ 2020 ሁለተኛው ዙር ውይይት ጥር 21 ቀን 1996 ዓ.ም ጀምሯል።

ለዚህ ለሁለተኛው ዙር የመጀመሪያው ምዕራፍ አቅራቢ ሆነው የቀረቡት ዶ/ር አለማየሁ ሥዩም ናቸው።

ዶ/ር አለማየሁ «ስለ ኢኮኖሚ አስተዳደርና የኢትዮጵያ ልማት፤ አንዳንድ ግንዛቤዎች» በሚል ርዕስ ሰፊና ትምህርታዊ ንግግር አድርገዋል። ዶ/ር አለማየሁ ባቀረቡት ሐሳብ ላይ ዶ/ር ወልደደ አምላ አስተያየት አቅርበዋል። የሁለቱም ጽሑፍ በዚህ የልሳነ ኢኮኖሚክስ እትማችን ተካቷል።

ከዚህም በተጨማሪ የኢትዮጵያ ኢኮኖሚክስ ባለሙያዎች ማህበር ቀደም ሲል በኢትዮጵያ የአሜሪካን አምባሳደር፤ አሁን በጆርጅታውን ዩኒቨርሲቲ የአለምአቀፍ ጉዳዮች መምህር የሆኑትን ዴቪድ ሺንን ለማህበሩ አባላትና ጉዳዩ ለሚመለከታቸው ህብረተሰብ ክፍሎች የአፍሪካን ቀንድ በተመለከተ ንግግር እንዲያደርጉ ጋብዞ ነበር።

ፕሮፌሰር ሺን ግብዣችንን ተቀብለው «መረጋጋትን በአፍሪካ ቀንድ ማስፈን» በሚል ርዕስ ታህሳስ 29 ቀን 1996 ዓ.ም ሰፊና ጠቃሚ ንግግር አድርገዋል። የርሳቸውም ንግግር በዚህ እትም ቀርቧል።

የኢትዮጵያ ኢኮኖሚክስ ባለሙያዎች ማህበር በሚያዘጋጃቸው ስብሰባዎች ንቁ ተሳታፊና ደጋፊ ለሆኑ አባላቱና ለመላው ህብረተሰብ ከፍተኛ ደረጃ አድናቆቱንና ምስጋናውን ያቀርባል።

ኢኮኖሚያዊ አስተዳደርና የኢትዮጵያ ልማት፤ አንዳንድ ግንዛቤዎች*

አለማዕቅድ ሥነ ምግባር

ትርጉም፣ ብርሃኑ ገበየሁ

ከሁሉ አስቀድሜ ይህን የርዕይ 2020 ውይይት መድረክ ያዘጋጀውን የኢትዮጵያ ኢኮኖሚክስ ባለሙያዎች ማህበር ከዛሬ በፊት በተደረጉት ተከታታይ ውይይቶች አማካኝነት ስላከናወነው ውጤታማ ተግባር እንኳን ደስ አላችሁ እንድል ይፈቀድልኝ። የውይይት መድረኩ ጠቃሚነት ተደጋግሞ የተነገረና የተመሰከረለት በመሆኑ ብዙ ማለት ጊዜ መፍጀት ይመስለኛል። እኔም በዚህ መድረክ ላይ ሃሳቤን አሰማ ዘንድ ማህበሩ ስለጋበዘኝ ክፍተኛ ምስጋና ላቀርብ እወዳለሁ።

ዛሬ የምናገርበት ርዕስ፣ **ኢኮኖሚያዊ አስተዳደርና የኢትዮጵያ ልማት፤ አንዳንድ ግንዛቤዎች** የሚል ነው። ንግግራ ሶስት ክፍሎች አሉት። በመጀመሪያው ክፍል የንግግራ እምብርት ስለሆነው የኢኮኖሚ አስተዳደር (economic governance) ምንነትና ባህርያት አንዳንድ ነጥቦችን በማብራራት፣ በኢትዮጵያ የኢኮኖሚ አስተዳደር ይዘታ ምን እንደሚመስል ለማሳየት እሞክራለሁ። በጽሁፌ ሁለተኛ ክፍል፣ በ2020 ዓ.ም በአገራችን ይሆን ዘንድ የምመኘውን ርዕይን አመለክታለሁ። በመጨረሻው ክፍልም፣ በአሻጋሪ የምመለከተው ይህ ርዕይ እውነታ ይሆን ዘንድ፣ ኢትዮጵያውያን እንደ ዜጋና እንደ ህብረተሰብ ደረጃ በደረጃ እንፈጽማቸው ዘንድ ይገባል ብዬ የማምንባቸውን አንዳንድ ተግባራት ነደፍ ነደፍ አደርጋለሁ።

መነሻ

ወደ ዋናው ጉዳይ ከመዘለቁ በፊት ዛሬ የምናገርበትን ርዕስ እንድመርጥ ስላነሳሁኝ ምክንያቶች መገለጽ እፈልጋለሁ። ስለምናገርበት ጉዳይ ትክክለኛውን አቅጣጫና የሚመጥን ስሜትን ለመፍጠር ይረዳል ብዬ ስለመንኩ ነው በዚህ አጭር ገለጻ የምጀምረው።

ባለፈው ሰዎን፣ በኢትዮጵያውያን ድሃ ህጻናት ህይወት ላይ የሚያተኩርና ስሜቱን በእጅጉ የነገ፣ በእንግሊዝ ህጻናት አድን ድርጅት የተዘጋጀ አንድ ዶኩመንተሪ ፊልም ተመልክቼ ነበር። በርካታ ድሃ ሰዎችን አውቃለሁ፤ ከስጋ ዘመዶቹም ብዙዎቹ የድህነትን ህይወት የሚገፉ ናቸው። ብዙም የማያወላዳ መካከለኛ ገቢ ካለው ቤተሰብ የተወለድኩ በመሆኔ፣ ብዙ ድሃ ቤተሰቦች ከሚያጋጥሟቸው የኢኮኖሚ ችግሮች አንዳንዶቹን በግብር አውቃቸዋለሁ። እንደ ማንኛውም ሰው እኔም በጎዳና ላይ ከሚኖሩ ድሃ ልጆች ጋር ነጋ ጠባ እገናኛለሁ። ነገር ግን ያንን ፊልም እስካየሁበት ሰዓት ድረስ ከድሆች ልጆች ጋር የነበረኝ ግንኙነት አንድም፣ ብዙ ጊዜ እርዳታ/ምጽዋት በመጠየቅና ሽርፍራፊ ገንዘብ በመወርወር የሚገለጽ የሰው-ለሰው (person to person) ግንኙነት፣ አልያም ስለ ድህነትና የኑሮ ሁኔታ (well-

being) በማደርጋቸው ጥናቶች የተጠኘው ማህበረሰብ አንድ ክፍል ሆነው በመገኘታቸው የሚገለጽ ረቂቅ (abstract) ነበር።

ያንን የድሀ ልጆችን የህይወት ገጽታዎች የሰነደውን ፊልም ካየሁ በኋላ ነበር፣ ድሃ ህጻናት ወገኖቻችን ለመጀመሪያ ጊዜ፣ እንደ ሌላው ጊዜ በቀጥታ ሳይማጸኑ፣ በራሳቸው አንደበት አኗኗራቸውን፣ ፍላጎቶቻቸውንና ተስፋቸውን በመግለጽ ብቻ፣ የእርዳታ ጥሪ ሲያሰሙ ያስተዋልኩት። ያ የሰማሁት የልጆቹ የድረሰልን ጥሪ፣ መከላከያና መሸፋፈኛ አድርጌያቸው እኖር የነበሩትን ልግስናን (ምጽዋትን) እና የማህበራዊ ጉዳዮች ተመራማሪ የሚመራባቸውን ምክንያታዊነትንና ገለልተኛነትን፣ በመዘለቅ እውነተኛውን የድህነት ገጽታና ትርጓሜ ገልጸልኛል፣ ድሃ ልጅ መሆን ማለትም ምን ማለት እንደሆነ አስገንዝቦኛል።

በዚያ የመገለጥ አፍታ፣ እኔም ወላጅ ነኝና መጀመሪያ ወደራሴ ልጆች፣ ቀጥሎም፣ ልጆቹ አድገው ወላጅ ለመሆን ሲበቁ ስለሚኖሩባቸው ልጆች አሰብኩ። እናም፣ ልጆቹም እንኳን ባይሆኑ የልጅ ልጆቹ በፊልሙ ላይ ያየኋቸውን ልጆች አይነት የችግር ህይወት እንዳይወድቅባቸው የሚያስችል አስተማማኝ መከላከያ መፍትሄ በአገራችን ውስጥ አለ

* የኢትዮጵያ ኢኮኖሚክስ ባለሙያዎች ማህበር ባዘጋጀው ርዕይ 2020 መድረክ ጥር 21 ቀን 1996 ዓ.ም የተደረገ ንግግር።

ልሳነ ኢኮኖሚክስ

ወይ ብዬ ጠየቅሁ። ለተደላደለ ማህበራዊ ኑሮ (decent opportunities) ዋስትና ያለማቋረጥ የሚያድግ ሕያው ኢኮኖሚ (dynamic economy) እስከሆነና ይህ አይነቱ ኢኮኖሚ ደግሞ በኢትዮጵያ ገና እስካላቆጠቆጠ ድረስ የልጅ ልጆቹ በፊልሙ ያየኋቸውን ድሃ ልጆች አይነት የመከራ ኑሮ እንደማይጠበቃቸው የሚያረጋግጥ ሁነኛ ምክንያት የለም ከሚል መደምደሚያ ላይ ደረስኩ።

ለመጀመሪያ ጊዜም፣ ድህነት የተመናመነበት የበለጸገ ህብረተሰብ ለመገንባት ኢኮኖሚያዊ ጉዳዮቻችንን የምንመራባቸውና የምናስተዳድርባቸው ሁኔታዎች ወሳኝ መሆናቸውን ትርጉም ባለው መንገድ ለመገንዘብ ቻልኩ። ለልጆቻችን ድህነት የሌለበት የተሻለ ዘመን ይመጣ ዘንድ የአገራችንን ኢኮኖሚያዊ አመራር ይዘታ ለማሻሻልና እያንዳንዳችን በነፍስ ወከፍ፣ ሁላችን ደግሞ በጋራ በእጅጉ መጣጣር ይኖርብናል። በዛሬው መድረክ የማዋያችሁ ሀሳቦችና አስተያየቶቹ ከዚህ ግንዛቤ የመነጨ ናቸው። ጊዜ በጨመረ ቁጥር ሀሳብ እየበሰለ፣ እየጠነከረና እየነጠረ ይሄዳልና በዛሬው መድረክ የማካፍላችሁ የሀሳብ ነጸብራቆች (reflections) ወደፊት የሚሻሻሉና የሚያድጉ ውጥን ሀሳቦች መሆናቸውን ላስገነዝብ እወዳለሁ።

ዓላማዎች

ለዛሬ ምሽት ንግግራ ዓላማ አድርጌ የተነሳሁት፣ ስለ ኢኮኖሚ አስተዳደር በተለይ ደግሞ፣ በፖሊሲ አመራረጥ ሂደት (the process of policy selection) ውስጥ ስለሚደረጉ የኢኮኖሚ አመራር ውሳኔዎች (economic management decisions) እና

ውሳኔዎቹ እንዴት እንደሚከናወኑ ስርዓታዊና በእውቀት ላይ የተመሰረተ ውይይት ለመቀስቀስ ነው።

እንደሚታወቀው የፖሊሲ አመራረጥ ሂደት በባህሪው ፖለቲካዊ፣ ኢኮኖሚያዊና ማህበራዊ ገጽታዎች አሉት። ውይይታችን ሁሉንም ገጽታዎች ማካተት እንዳለበት የማምን ቢሆንም፣ የኢኮኖሚክስ ባለሙያ ነኝና አቅም በፈቀደው መጠን አስተያየቶቼ በእጅጉ በኢኮኖሚያዊ ጉዳዮች ላይ የተቀነበቡና የኢኮኖሚክስንና የሚያመለክቱ ይሆናሉ። እንዲያም ሆኖ በመረጥኩት ርዕሰ-ጉዳይ ዙሪያ የማነሳቸው ነጥቦችና የምሰነዘራቸው ሀሳቦች እንደ ኢትዮጵያውያን ከፊታችን ስላሉን አማራጭ እድሎችና ስለተጣሉብን ግዴታዎች ሊያወያዩን የሚችሉ ይሆናሉ የሚል ተስፋ አለኝ።

የመረጥኩት ጉዳይ መጠነ ርዕዩ እጅጉን ሰፊና በርካታ ገጽታዎችም ያሉት በመሆኑ፣ በተመረጡ ጭብጦች ላይ ተወስኖ መናገርን ግድ ይላል። ስለዚህ በዛሬ ምሽት ንግግራ የኢኮኖሚ አስተዳደር ቁልፍ ገጽታዎች ከሚባሉት ውስጥ በአንዳንዶቹ ላይ በማተኮር ለውይይት መንደርደሪያ የሚሆኑ ሀሳቦችን ለመሰንዘር እሞክራለሁ።

ድፍረት ባይሆንብኝ፣ በንግግራ መጨረሻም፣ እዚህ ቤት ውስጥ ያላችሁ ሁሉ፣ ስለ ልጆቻችሁ፣ የልጅ ልጆቻችሁ፣ ስለአክስት አገቶቻችሁ ልጆችና ስለትውልዳቸው እጣ ፈንታ እኔ ራሴን ጠይቄው የነበሩትን አይነት ጥያቄዎች ራሳችሁን ትጠይቃላችሁ ብዬ ተስፋ አደርጋለሁ። ተጨማሪ ድፍረት ባይሆንብኝም፣ በጥያቄዎቹ አስገዳጅነት ምክንያትም የሚገባውን የሃሳብና የተግባር ጉዞ

ትቀጥላላችሁ የሚል ተስፋ አለኝ።
ግምቶች/ እውቆች
(Assumptions/Presumptions)

እንደ ኢኮኖሚክስ ባለሙያነቴ መላምቶቼን/እውቆቼን በመዘርዘር መጀመር ተገቢ ይመስለኛል።

በማንኛውም መንገድ ቢታሰብ የኢኮኖሚ አስተዳደር ስርዓት (the pattern of economic governance) የአንድን አገር ቁሳዊ ሀብቶች፣ የዜጎችን እምነቶችና ልማዶች፣ ስጋቶችና ምኞቶች፣ ችሎታዎች፣ ዜጎች እንደ ማህበረሰብ ቀደም ባለውና በአሁኑ ዘመን የተከተሏቸውን የውሳኔ አማራጮች (choices)፣ እንዲሁም በአገሪቱ ቁሳዊ ሀብቶችና በዜጎች እምነትና ልማድ ላይ ተመስርተው የበቀሉና በዘመናት ውስጥ የዳበሩ ልዩ ልዩ ተቋማዊ ስርዓቶች (institutional arrangements) ሁሉ ያንጸባርቃሉ ብዬ አምናለሁ። የዝምድናው ሀረግ ከሌላ ጎንም ሊመዘዝ ይችላል። አንድ አገር የሚከተለው የኢኮኖሚ አስተዳደር ስርዓት፣ በዜጎች እምነቶች፣ ልማዶችና ምርጫዎች፣ እንዲሁም በጠቅላላ ደህንነታቸው (their well-being) ላይ ተጽዕኖዎች ያሳድራል።

በተጨማሪም፣ እኛ ኢትዮጵያውያን በአንድ የጋራ የኢኮኖሚ አውድ (common economic space) ውስጥ ሆነን የነፍስ ወከፍና የወል ደህንነታችንን ለማሻሻል እንጣጣራለን የሚል ግምት አለኝ። አሁን በስራ ላይ ካለው፣ የኢትዮጵያ ህገ መንግስት መግቢያ /1987፣6/ የምቀነጭባቸው የሚከተሉት ዐረፍተ ነገሮችም የዚህን ጉዳይ አስፈላጊነት ያረጋግጣሉ።

እኛ የኢትዮጵያ ብሄሮች፣ ብሄረሰቦች፣ ህዝቦች፣... ጥቅማችንን፣ መብታችንንና ነፃነታችንን በጋራ እና

በተደጋጋፊነት ለማሳደግ አንድ የኢኮኖሚ ማኅበረሰብ የመገንባቱን አስፈላጊነት በማመን... ይህ ሕገመንግስት... ማሰሪያ እንዲሆነን... አጽድቀነዋል።

ክፍ ብዬ የጠቀስኩዎቸው ነጥቦች የሚከተሉት ዋና ዋና አንድምታዎች ይኖሩዎቸዋል ብዬ እገምታለሁ፤

- ሀ) በአንድ ወይም በሌላ መልኩ፣ ሁሉም ኢትዮጵያውያን ከኢትዮጵያ ሰላምና ብልጽግና ተጠቃሚ ይሆናሉ፤
- ለ) በአንድ ወይም በሌላ መልኩ፣ ለእነዚህ ግቦች መገኘት ሁሉም ኢትዮጵያውያን አስተዋጽኦ ያደርጋሉ፤ የማድረግ ግዴታም አለባቸው። በሌላ አባባል፣ ሰላምንና ብልጽግናን የማስፈን ኃላፊነት ለአንድ ወይም ለሌላ የተመረጠ ቡድን የተሰጠ መብት፣ ወይም በአንድ ቡድን ላይ የተጣለ ግዴታ አይደለም፤ ስለዚህም፤
- ሐ) ኢትዮጵያውያን ሁሉ የዘመናችንና የመጭው ጊዜ የአገራችንን የኑሮ ደህንነት አስተማማኝ የማድረግ ልዩ ልዩ ኃላፊነቶች አሉብን።

በመጨረሻም፣ ጠንካራና ውጤታማ የገበያ ኢኮኖሚ ስርዓት መገንባት የኢትዮጵያውያን የጋራ ርዕይ ነው የሚል እምነት አለኝ ። ይህንንም ስል አብዛኞቹ ኢትዮጵያውያን ትንሹም ትልቁም የኢኮኖሚ እንቅስቃሴያቸው ከአንድ ማዕከላዊ ስልጣን በሚሰጥ አመራር እንዲተዳደር አይፈልጉም ማለቴ ነው።

ኢኮኖሚያዊ አስተዳደር፣ ጽንሰ ሃሳባዊ ማዕቀፍ (Economic governance - a conceptual framework)

በዛሬ ንግግሬ ኢኮኖሚያዊ አስተዳደር ስል የፖሊሲ ቀረጻ ሂደት፣ በዚህም ሂደት ውስጥ ተቀርጸው የሚወጡ ፖሊሲዎች፣ እንዲሁም የፖሊሲ አፈጻጸም ስርዓቶች ማለቴ ይሆናል። ኢኮኖሚያዊ አስተዳደር አንድ ኢኮኖሚ የሚሰራባቸውን ተቋማዊና ህጋዊ ሁኔታዎች (environment) የሚያካትት እሳቤ ነው። በመሆኑም የአንድ አገር ኢኮኖሚያዊ አስተዳደር፣ የማክሮ-ኢኮኖሚ ፖሊሲዎችን (macroeconomic policies)፣ የመንግሥት ፋይናንስ ፖሊሲዎች (fiscal policies)፣ መንግስታዊ የኢኮኖሚ ድርጅቶችን፣ የቁጥጥር ፖሊሲዎችንና (regulatory policies) የፍትህ አካላትን፣ የንግድ ህጎችንና የህግ ተቋማትን በሙሉ ያካትታል። ስለዚህ በዛሬው ንግግሬ ውስጥ የኢኮኖሚ ፖሊሲ አቀራረጽና አተገባበር የሚለውን ሀረግ የኢኮኖሚያዊ አስተዳደርን ጽንሰ ሀሳብ ይተካል። ዘንድ ልገለገልበት አወዳለሁ።

የኢኮኖሚ ፖሊሲ ሶስት ዋና ዋና ክፍሎች አሉት። እነዚህም፣ የኢኮኖሚ ግቦች፣ የኢኮኖሚ መሳሪያዎችና የኢኮኖሚ ሞዴሎች ናቸው። ፖሊሲ አውጭዎችና መንግስታት ስለኢኮኖሚ ግቦችና መሳሪያዎች ዘወትር በግልጽ ሲናገሩና ሲያብራሩ፣ ሶስተኛውን ግን ብዙ ጊዜ ሽፋፍነው ያልፉታል፤ ወይም ስሙንም ሳያነሱ ይቀራሉ። የኢኮኖሚ ግቦች፡- የኢኮኖሚ ፖሊሲ በማውጣትና ፖሊሲውን በመተግበር ሊደረስባቸው የታቀዱ ዓላማዎችና ታላሚ ውጤቶች

ናቸው። ኢትዮጵያን በመሳሰሉ ድሃ አገሮች ጥቅል የኢኮኖሚ ግቦች ሁለት መሰረታዊ ሰፊ አላማዎችን ይይዛሉ። እነዚህም፤

1. የማክሮ ኢኮኖሚ መረጋጋት (macroeconomic stability)፣ ይህ ዓላማ በኢኮኖሚ ሚዛን በተለይም፣ የገንዘብ ክፍያ ሚዛን (the balance of payments)፣ በመንግስት በጀት በቁጠባና በኢንቨስትመንት ሚዛን (the saving-investment balance) ላይ ያተኩራል። ለማክሮ ኢኮኖሚ መረጋጋት ወሳኝ ሚና ከሚጫወቱ ጉዳዮች ዋና ዋናዎቹ፣ የመንግስት የበጀት ጉድለት፣ የገንዘብ አቅርቦት፣ የጥቅል ፍላጎት ክፍሎች (components of aggregate demand)፣ የብድር መጠን (volume of credit)፣ የወለድ ምጣኔ፣ ምንዳዎችና ትርፎች (wages and profits)፣ የሽቀጥ ዋጋ፣ እና የውጭ/ ምንዛሬ ምጣኔ ዋጋ ናቸው።
2. እድገትና ልማት (growth and development)፣ በአንድ አገር ልማት ሂደት ባህርያት ላይ ወሳኝ ሚና በሚጫወቱ ጉዳዮች ላይ ያተኩራሉ። የልማት ሂደትን ባህርያት የሚወስኑት ቁልፍ ጉዳዮች የምርት መዋቅርና እድገት፣ የዜጎች የስራ እድልና ኢንቨስትመንት ሲሆኑ በስራቸውም፣ የካፒታል ክምችት፣ ከገጠር ወደ ከተማ ፍልሰት (rural-urban migration)፣ የሠራተኛው ሕዝብ ቁጥር እድገት፣ የምርታማነት መሻሻል፣ የንግድ መዋቅር (trade structure)፣ የኢንቨስትመንት

¹ Dervis, Kemal, Jaime de Melo, and Sherman Robinson (1982). *General Equilibrium Models for Development Policy*, The World Bank, Washington D.C.

ልሳነ ኢኮኖሚክስ

ምደባ (allocation of investment) እና የፍላጎት መዋቅር (demand structure) የመሳሰሉ ሁኔታዎችን ያካትታሉ²።

ከፍ ብዬ ያመለከትኳቸውን ሁለት ጥቅል ግቦች በቁርጥ የሚለይ ድንበር ከልሎ መለያየት ብዙ ጊዜ አስቸጋሪ ነው። በመጀመሪያ መረጋጋትና እድገት/ ልማት የተሳሰሩና ናቸው፤ ለኢኮኖሚ እድገት/ ልማት መረጋጋት ወሳኝ ጉዳይ መሆኑ በሁለቱ መካከል ላለው ዝምድና መንስኤ ነው። ሁለተኛ፣ አንዳንድ የፖሊሲ መሳሪያዎች በሁለቱም (በመረጋጋትና በእድገት/በልማት) ላይ የሚያነጣጥሩና አወንታዊ ወይም አሉታዊ ተጽዕኖዎች የሚያስከትሉ ናቸው።

የፖሊሲ መሳሪያዎች (Instruments)፡- የፖሊሲ ግቦችን ወይም ታላሚ ውጤቶችን ለማስገኘት በስራ ላይ የሚውሉ ዘዴዎች ናቸው። የአንድ መንግስት ዝርዝር የፖሊሲ መሳሪያዎች በከፊል በራሱ በመንግስት ተቋማዊ ድርጅቶች ላይ ይመሰረታሉ። በነጻ ገበያ ኢኮኖሚ የፖሊሲ መሳሪያዎች፣ የፋይናንስ አስተዳደር ፖሊሲዎችን (የታክስ ዓይነቶችንና ደረጃዎችን፣ የመንግስትን ወጭ መጠንና ስብጥር)፣ የስርዓተ-ገንዘብ (monetary) ፖሊሲን (የገንዘብ አቅርቦትን፣ የመጠባበቂያ ተቀማጭ ግዴታዎች (reserve requirements)፣ የወለድ መጠን ድንጋጌን)፣ የውጭ ምዝገባ ተመን ፖሊሲን፣ የኢኮኖሚ ዘርፍ ፖሊሲን፣ እና ህጎችንና ድንጋጌዎችን ያካትታሉ።

የኢኮኖሚ ሞዴሎች (Economic Models)፡- የኢኮኖሚ ሞዴል፣ ኢኮኖሚው እንዴት እንደሚንቀሳቀስ አወቃቀሩን፣ እንቅፋቶችንና እድሎችን ጨምሮ፣ የፖሊሲ መሳሪያዎች ከፖሊሲ ግቦች/ታላሚዎች ጋር እንዴት እንደሚተሳሰሩና እነዚህን ስለመሳሰሉ ጉዳዮች ፖሊሲ አውጭዎችና አማካሪዎቻቸው ያላቸውን አተያይ የሚጠቀልል እሳቤ ነው። ይህ አተያይ፣ መነሻና መሰረት ያደረጋቸውን የኢኮኖሚ ትውፍኝ (economic theorizing) እና ተግባራዊ ልምድ (empirical evidences) ጨምሮ በዝርዝር ሊሰፍር ይችላል። ያለበለዚያም በግልፅና በዝርዝር ሳይነገር በውስጠ ታዋቂነት ሊያዝ ወይም ያለበቂ ትውፊት ግብራዊ ይዘት እንደነገሩ ተውተፍት፤ ሲገለጽ ይችላል።

መንግስታት እጅግ በርካታ አይነት የኢኮኖሚ ፖሊሲዎችን ሊነድፉ ይችላሉ። የኢኮኖሚ ፖሊሲ በአንድ በኩል፣ መንግስት የተቀናጁ የኢኮኖሚ ግቦችን ለመምታት፣ በተለይ የማክሮ-ኢኮኖሚያዊ መረጋጋት-ትን ለማስፈንና የኢኮኖሚ እድገትንና ልማትን ለማፋጠን ያስችለኛል ብሎ የመረጣቸውን ቁልፍ ስልቶች ያመለክታል። በሌላ በኩል ደግሞ፣ የአንድ አገር የኢኮኖሚ ፖሊሲ የተመረጠባቸው መንገዶችና ሂደቶች፣ የአንድን አገር የኢኮኖሚ አስተዳደር ስርዓት፣ ወይም የአንድ አገር ኢኮኖሚ የሚሰራባቸውን ተቋማዊ ሁኔታዎች ባህርያትን ያንጸባርቃል። ስለዚህም፣ የመንግስት ፖሊሲዎች የአንድ አገር ኢኮኖሚያዊ አሰራርና እድገታዊ ለውጥ (evolution) ውስጥ ወሳኝ ሚናዎች የሚጫወቱ የኢኮኖሚው መሰረታዊ ክፍሎች ናቸው³።

የኢኮኖሚ ፖሊሲዎች የመጨረሻ ግብ የዜጎችን ኑሮና ደህንነት (well-being) ማሻሻል መሆን አለበት። ይህንን ማሻሻል ለማምጣት ፖሊሲዎች በኢኮኖሚው ውስጥ ተዋናይ የሆኑት ክፍሎች (ግለሰቦች፣ ቤተሰቦችና የኢኮኖሚ ድርጅቶች) የሚወስዷቸውን ውሳኔዎችና ምርጫዎች ተስማሚና ተገቢ በሆነ መንገድ ያስተካክሉ ዘንድ በቀጥታም ይሆን በተዘዋዋሪ ማግባባት መቻል አለባቸው።

የእነዚህ ተዋናይን ምርጫ፣ ስለዚህም የመንግሥት ፖሊሲዎች ውጤታማነት የሚወሰነው በግልጽ በሚታዩት የፖሊሲዎቹ ባህርያት ብቻ ሳይሆን፣ ስለፖሊሲዎች የኢኮኖሚው ተዋናዮች በሚኖራቸው ግንዛቤም (perception) ጭምር ነው።

በአጭሩ ጥሩ የመንግሥት ፖሊሲዎች የአንድን አገር የኢኮኖሚ እንቅስቃሴ በማሳደግ የዜጎችን የኑሮ ደህንነት ያሻሽላሉ። ፖሊሲዎች የሚያስገኙት ፋይዳ የሚለካው የፖሊሲዎች ጥራት ማረጋገጫ በሆኑት ትክክለኛነት (correctness)፣ ተአማኒነትና (credibility) ውጤታማነት (effectiveness) ነው⁴።

- **ፖሊሲዎች ትክክለኛ (correct) ሊሆኑ ይገባል**፣ ፖሊሲዎች ትክክለኛ የሚባሉት፣ ተቀባይ ካላቸው የሕብረተሰብ ፍላጎቶች (the 'accepted' needs of the society and its economy) ጋር የተጣጣሙ

Gunning (1999), and Kaufmann, Kraay, and Ziodo-Lobat (1999, 2002). The first two specifically analyse Africa.

⁴ On correctness see Stiglitz (1996), Tanzi (2000), and World Bank (1997). On credibility see, for instance, Brunetti, Kisunko, and Weder (1998)

² Dervis, Kemal, Jaime de Melo, and Sherman Robinson (1982). *General Equilibrium Models for Development Policy*, The World Bank, Washington D.C

³ For a recent exploration of the impact of policies and, more broadly, governance see Ndulu and O'Connell (1999), Collier and

ተገቢውን የመንግሥት ኢኮኖሚያዊ ሚና ያገናዘቡና የመንግስትና አቅም ጨምሮ በኢኮኖሚው አቅም ተግባራዊ ሊሆኑ የሚችሉ ሲሆኑ ነው። ፖሊሲዎች ተአማኒ (credible) ሊሆኑ ይገባል፤ ፖሊሲዎች ተአማኒ የሚባሉት ምክንያታዊና የሚዘልቁበት አቅጣጫ የሚገመት እና እርስ በእርስ የተቀናጁና የተጣጣሙ (reasonably predictable) ፖሊሲዎች ውጤታማ (effective) ሊሆኑ ይገባል፤ ፖሊሲዎች ውጤታማ የሚባሉት አመራረጣቸውና አተገባበራቸው ቀልጣፋ (efficient) እና በበቂ ግልጽነትና ተጠያቂነት ላይ የተመሠረተ ሲሆን

እነዚህ ሶስት የፖሊሲ እርምጃ (policy interventions) ገጽታዎች አንዳቸው ከሌላቸው ጋር የማይፋቱ የኢኮኖሚ ፖሊሲ ጥራት ጥምር አመልካቾች (joint indicators of the quality of economic policy) ናቸው። ከእነዚህ ባህርያት አንዳንዶቹን ከፍ ብሎ ከተገለጹት ሌሎች የፖሊሲ አላባውያን (policy elements) ጋር በማቀናጀት፣ የኢትዮጵያን የኢኮኖሚ አስተዳደር ገጽታዎች ለማብራራት እገልገልባቸዋለሁ።

ኢኮኖሚያዊ አስተዳደር በኢትዮጵያ

በዘመናዊት ሁለት-ወገኛ ሁኔታ ለመጀመሪያ ጊዜ በወጡ የተነደፈ ብሄራዊ የኢኮኖሚ ፖሊሲ በንጉሥ ነገስቱ ዘመን የወጣውና ከ1957-1961⁵ የቆየው *አንደኛው የአምስት ዓመት የልማት ዕቅድ (The First Five-Year Development*

Plan) ነው⁶። ከእዚህ አቅድ በኋላም ሁለተኛው (1963-1967) እና ሶስተኛው(1968-1973) የአምስት ዓመት የልማት እቅዶች ወጥተዋል። *ሶስተኛውን የአምስት ዓመት የልማት እቅድ* መሰረት በማድረግ በንጉሥ ነገስቱ ዘመን የወጡት የኢኮኖሚ ፖሊሲዎች ባህርያት ለማመልከት እሞክራለሁ።

ሶስተኛው የአምስት ዓመት የልማት ዕቅድ በዘመኑ ከተነደፉት ዕቅዶች ሁሉ ይበልጥ የዳበረና ዘመናዊ የፖሊሲ ሰነድ ነገር ማለት ይቻላል። በእኔ እምነት፣ ይህ ፖሊሲ በተጠየቁ (its logic)፣ በጥልቀት (depth) እና በሽፋን (coverage) ረገድ ከእርሱ በሁዋላ ባሉት ዘመናት ከተዘጋጁት ዕቅዶችና ስትራቴጂዎች የማይተናነስ ነው⁷። የዚህን ዕቅድ ሰነድ በማነብበት ወቅት በጣም የተገረምኩበት ጉዳይ ቢኖር፣ እጅግ ብዙዎቹ ትንታኔዎች ባለንበት ዘመንም ተቀባይነት ያላቸውና ሊያገለግሉ የሚችሉ መሆናቸው ነው። ተንታኞቹ የተከተሉት የምርመራ ስልትና ትንታኔያቸውን ያቀረቡበት ቋንቋ በቅርብ ዘመን ከወጡት ሰነዶች ጋር በጣም ተመሳሳይ መሆኑ፣ ይህ ሰነድ ከ35 ዓመታት በፊት የተዘጋጀ መሆኑን እስከመርሳት ድርሼ ነገር። ሌላ ሌላው ነገር ይቅርና ይህ ሰነድ ከተዘጋጀበት ዘመን ወዲህ ባሉት ዓመታት የኢኮኖሚያችን እርምጃ ምን ያህል ቀለበደ እንደሆነ ለማየት የምትሹ አድማጮቹ፣ ይህንን ሰነድ ትመለከቱት ዘንድ ላሳስባችሁ እወዳለሁ።

ግቦች/ዓላማዎች፣ ሶስተኛው የአምስት ዓመት የልማት እቅድ ግቦቹ አድርጎ የነቀሳቸው ዓላማዎች የሚከተሉት ነበሩ፤

1. የነፍስ ወከፍ ገቢን በዓመት 3 በመቶ ማሳደግ፤
2. በሁሉም ጎን የተቀናጀ ማበረታቻና ድጋፍ በማድረግ የብሄራዊው ኢኮኖሚ መደላድል (mainstay) እና የአብዛኛው ኢትዮጵያዊ ኑሮ መሰረት የሆነውን ግብርናን ማሻሻል፤
3. ኢኮኖሚያዊና ማህበራዊ ልማትን ከከተማ ማዕከላት የበርካታው የኢትዮጵያ ህዝብ መኖሪያና የአገሪቱ የተፈጥሮ ሃብት መገኛ ወደሆነው ገጠር ማስፋፋት።

ሰነዱ እነዚህን ዋና ዋና ጥቅል ግቦች ወደ ዝርዝር አላማዎች በመሸንሸን፣ በልዩ ልዩ ዘርፎች የሚጠበቁ ዝርዝር ክንዎኔዎችንና ታሳቢ ውጤቶችን አመለክቷል።

መሳሪያዎች፣ ሶስተኛው የአምስት ዓመት የልማት ዕቅድ ከፍ ብሎ የተመለከቱትን ግቦች እውን ለማድረግ የሚያስችሉ በርካታ ልዩ ልዩ የፖሊሲ ማስፈጸሚያ ስልቶች/ መሳሪያዎችን የነደፈ ሲሆን ከእነዚህ መካከል ከልዩ ልዩ ዘርፎች በተመረጡ የተወሰኑ ፕሮጀክቶች ላይ የሚደረግ አማላይ የኢንቨስትመንት እቅድ (impressive investment plan) አንዱ ነው። የኢንቨስትመንት እቅዱን በስራ ላይ ለማዋል ከሚያስፈልገው ገንዘብ ግማሽ ያህሉ በግሉ ዘርፍ ይሸፈናል ተብሎ ይጠበቅ ነገር። *ሶስተኛው የአምስት ዓመት የልማት ዕቅድ*፣ የግሉን ዘርፍ ኢንቨስትመንት ለማበረታታት ያስችላሉ ተብለው የሚገመቱ የፖሊሲ እርምጃዎችና መሳሪያዎች

⁶ See Asfaw (1992) and Molla (1992).
⁷ Imperial Ethiopian Government (1968). *Third Five Year Development Plan*, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.

⁵ All years are in Gregorian Calendar.

ልሳነ ኢኮኖሚክስ

በተግባር ላይ እንዲውሉ አሳስቧል። ሰነዱ ነቅሶ ካወጣቸው የፖሊሲ መሰሪያዎች መካከል፣ ዝርዝር ይዘቱ ወደፊት በኢንቨስትመንት ህግ የሚደነገግ፣ በዘመኑ የንግድና ኢንዱስትሪ ሚኒስቴር በመባል ይታወቅ በነበረው ሚኒስቴር ስር በሚደራጅ የኢንቨስትመንት ኮሚቴና የኢንቨስትመንት ማበረታቻ ቢሮ የሚተዳደሩ የፋይናንስ ማበረታቻ እርምጃዎች (ከታክስ ነጻ ማድረግን የመሳሰሉ) አስፈላጊነት አንዱ ነው። የመንግስትን ኢንቨስትመንት በተመለከተም ሰነዱ ለዓመታዊ የመንግስት በጀት አዘገጃጀት መሰረት የሚሆኑ ዓመታዊ ዕቅዶችን ነድፎአል።

ኢኮኖሚያዊ ሞዴሎች፣ ሶስተኛው የአምስት ዓመት ዕቅድ

የተከተላቸው የኢኮኖሚ ሞዴሎች በሚከተሉት ሶስት አበይት መርሆች ሊገለጹ ይችላሉ። እነርሱም፤

1. የኢትዮጵያ ኢኮኖሚ የቆመበት መሰረት የግብርና ኢኮኖሚ እስከሆነ ድረስ የግብርና ልማት ቅድሚያ ሊሰጠው ይገባል (በነገራችን ላይ የፖሊሲው አርቃቂዎች ይህን እምነታቸውን ለማስረገጥ የሚያቀርቧቸው አሃዛዊ ግምቶች (figures cited) ከሞላ ጎደል በአሁኑ ዘመን ከሚሰጡ አሃዛዊ ግምቶች ጋር ተመሳሳይ ናቸው)፤
2. የኢንዱስትሪ ልማት እጅግ አስፈላጊ ነው። ኤክስፖርትን ማስፋፋት አስፈላጊ ቢሆንም፤ በኢንዱስትሪ ለመልማት ከውጭ የሚገቡ ሸቀጦችን በአገር ምርት መተካት (Import substitution) የተሻለው ተመራጭ ስትራቴጅ ነው ።

3. የትምህርት መስፋፋትና የዜጎች በልዩ ልዩ ክላሎች መሰልጠን (በዘመናችን ቋንቋ ሰብአዊ ካፒታልን (human capital) ማሳደግ ለአገሪቱ ልማት እጅግ ወሳኝ ነው፤ የሚሉት ናቸው።

እነዚህ መርሆችና እምነቶች ዕቅዱ በተነደፈበት ዘመን የነበረውን የኢኮኖሚክስ አስተሳሰብ በጥቅሉ የሚያንጸባርቁ ነበሩ።

ፖሊሲውን ያረቀቁት የዘመኑ ሰዎች ለፖሊሲያቸው <ትክክለኛነት>፣ <ተአማኒነት> እና <ውጤታማነት> የሰጡት ትኩረት ሳይነሳ መታለፍ የሌለበት ጉዳይ ነው። ፖሊሲውን የቀረጹት ባለሙያዎች፡-

1. የፖሊሲ አቀራረጹ ተግባር የአገሪቱን ኢኮኖሚ በጥልቀት/ጠንቅቆ ከማወቅ መመንጨት እንዳለበት ተረድተው ነበር። ጥራት ያለው ስታትስቲክስን አስፈላጊነት ከማጤናቸውም በላይ፣ የተገለገሉበት መረጃ ችግሮች እንዳሉበትና ለወደፊቱ ማዕከላዊ ስታትስቲክስ ቢሮን ማጠናከር እንደሚያስፈልገውም በግልጽ ተገንዝበው ነበር።
2. ዕቅዱን ለማሳካት የሚያስፈልጉትን ተቋማዊ መሠረቶችን በአጽንኦት በመግለጽ፣ በመንግስት ልዩ ልዩ መስሪያቤቶች መካከል ቅንጅት ለመፍጠር የሚያስችሉትን ጨምሮ የተለያዩ ተጓዳኝ የማሻሻያ ሂደቶች አመለካከተዋል።
3. የልማት ዕቅዱ ይሳካ ዘንድ፣ ህዝቡ በወጉ ሊያውቀውና ሊረዳው፣ እንዲሁም ሊቀበለውና ድጋፍ ሊሰጠው እንደሚገባ ተገንዝበዋል። ይህንንም ከዕቅዱ ሰነድ መቅድም/መግቢያ

የምጠቅሳቸው የሚከተሉት ዐረፍተ ነገሮችን ያሳያሉ፤

ውጤት ለማስገኘት ዕቅዱ የመላውን ህዝቡ ድጋፍ ሊያገኝ ይገባል። ይህን ድጋፍ ለማግኘት ቅድመ ሁኔታ ህዝቡ ስለዕቅዱ ምንነት፣ ስለዓላማዎቹ፣ ስለፖሊሲዎቹ፣ ከሁሉም ይልቅ ደግሞ ዕቅዱ በዕለት ከዕለት ኑሮው የሚኖረውን ፋይዳ/ጠቀሜታ የሚኖረው ግንዛቤ ነው። የዚህ አይነቱ ግንዛቤ ሊኖር የሚችለው ደግሞ፣ ሰነዱ ብዙሀኑ ህዝብ ሊረዳው በሚችል መልክ ተዘጋጅቶ በንጉሥ ነገስቱ ግዛት ሲሰራጭ ነው።

4. ዕቅዱን የነደፉት ባለሙያዎች በተጨማሪ፣ የሃብት ምንጮችን በተቀላጠፈ ሁኔታ የመጠቀምን አስፈላጊነትም አበክረው ገልጸዋል።

ሶስተኛው የአምስት ዓመት የልማት እቅድ እነዚህ ሁሉ ጥንካሬዎች ቢኖሩትም ውጤታማ እንዳልነበረ ብዙ ባለሙያዎች ይናገራሉ። ለፖሊሲው ውድቀት አስተዋጽኦ ያደረጉ በርካታ አገራዊና አለማቀፋዊ ምክንያቶች እንዳሉ ቢታወቅም፣ ፖሊሲው ከራሱ የመነጨ ቴክኒካዊ ድክመቶችም ነበሩበት። እነዚህ ችግሮች ዋና ዋና የሚባሉትን ሁለቱን ለአብነት ያክል ማመልከት ተገቢ ይመስለኛል።

1. ዕቅዱ በኢትዮጵያ ኢኮኖሚ ልዩ ልዩ ዘርፎች መካከል ስላሉ ውስጣዊ ትስስሮች (inter-linkages) እና ከእነዚህ

ልሳነ ኢኮኖሚክስ

ትስስርች ጋር ስለተቆራኙ እንቅፋቶች (constraints) በተደራጀ በተግባራዊ ልምድ ትንታኔ የተገኘ እውቀትን መሰረት አላደረገም፤

2. ዕቅዱ የተመሰረተበት ሀብተ-መረጃ (database) ደካማ ነበር። ተግባራዊ ልምዶች ትንታኔ (empirical analysis) በገላጭ አሀዞች (descriptive statistics) ላይ ብቻ መወሰኑ የሀብተ-መረጃ ደካማነትን ያመለክታል።

ከእነዚህ በተጨማሪም፣ የፖለቲካ ስርዓት ለውጥን አስፈላጊነት አለመገንዘብና ለመሬት ስርዓት ለውጥ በቂ ትኩረት አለመስጠት ለልማት ዕቅዱ ውድቀት ሌሎች መሰረታዊ ምክንያቶች ናቸው። ይህ ዕቅድ እምብዛም የተጠያቂነትና የግልጽነት ባህርይ ያልነበረው ፈላጭ ቆራጭ ንጉሳዊ አገዛዝ የእጅ ስራ በመሆኑ እነዚህን መሰረታዊ ለውጦች አለማካተቱ ብዙም አስገራሚ ላይሆን ይችላል። በእርግጥም፣ ለፖለቲካ ስርዓትና ለመሬት ይዞታ ስርዓት ለውጥ የተደረጉ ትግሎች የኋላ ኋላ ለአገዛዝ ስርዓቱ መወገድ መሰረታዊ ምክንያቶች ሆነዋል።

የአጼው ስርዓት ሲወገድ የኢትዮጵያን ፖለቲካዊና ኢኮኖሚያዊ አስተዳደር ጠቅልሎ የተቆጣጠረው ወታደራዊው ደርግ ነበር። የደርግ አገዛዝ መገለጫ አበይት ባህርያት ጭካኔ የተሞላበት ፖለቲካዊ አፈና እና የተማከለ የኢኮኖሚ አስተዳደር ቁጥጥር ነበረ። ይህ አገዛዝ በሀገሪቱ ከነበሩ የማምረቻ ተቋማት አብዛኞቹን፣ የፋይናንስ ተቋማትንና ታላላቅ ዘመናዊ እርሻዎችን በሙሉ፣ ከመኖሪያ ቤቶችና ህንጻዎች ብዙዎቹን፣ እንዲሁም መሬትን ሙሉ በሙሉ በመንግስት ይዞታ

ስር አድርጓል። አገዛዙ በመጀመሪያ «ብሄራዊ አብዮታዊ የምርት ዘመቻ» (1978-1984)፣ በኋላም በ «አስር አመት ጠቋሚ ዕቅድ» (ከ1984 ወዲህ) የተባሉ የኢኮኖሚ ልማት መርሃ ግብሮችን ነድፎ ነበር። በዚህ አገዛዝ ዘመን ስለ ነበረው የኢኮኖሚ አስተዳደር አይነት አንዳንድ ሀሳቦችን ለመሰንዘር ያመቸኝ ዘንድ የአስር አመት ጠቋሚ ዕቅድን እመለክታለሁ።⁸

ግቦች/ዓላማዎች፣ የደርግ አገዛዝ የኢኮኖሚ ልማት ፖሊሲ የሩቅ ግብና ህልም የሰሻሊስት ኢኮኖሚን መገንባት ነበር። የአስሩ አመት መሪ ዕቅድ በዚህ ሩቅና ሰፊ ግብ የሚታቀፉ አያሌ ዝርዝር የቅርብ ጊዜ ዓላማዎችንና ታላሚ ውጤቶችን አካቷል። ከእነዚህ ውስጥ አንዳንዶቹ፡-

1. 3.5 በመቶ አማካይ ዓመታዊ የነፍስ ወከፍ ገቢ እድገት ማስገኘት፤ በተጓዳኝም በግብርና፡- የ4.3 በመቶ፣ በኢንዱስትሪ፡- የ10.8 በመቶ፣ እንዲሁም በአገልግሎት ዘርፍ፡- የ6.9 በመቶ አማካይ የእድገት ምጣኔ ማምጣት፤
2. የምግብ ዋስትናን ለማረጋገጥና የግብርና ምርታማነትን ማሳደግ፤ የህብረት ሥራን (co-operativisation) እና የመስኖ እርሻን ማስፋፋት፤
3. በተለይ ወደ አገር የሚገቡ ምርቶችን በሀገር ውስጥ ምርቶች በመተካት፣ ከጠቅላላ ብሄራዊ ምርት የኢንዱስትሪውን ድርሻ ወደ 1/4 ኛ ማሳደግ፤ የሚሉት ናቸው።

መሰሪያዎች፣ የደርግ አገዛዝ የኢኮኖሚ ፖሊሲው ዋነኛ ማስፈጸሚያ መሰሪያ አድርጎ የመረጠው ማዕከላዊ እቅድን ነበር። በሀገሪቱ አብዛኛውን ዘመናዊውን የኢኮኖሚ ዘርፍ የሚወክሉት ወደ መንግስት ይዞታነት የተዛወሩ ኢንተርፕራይዞች ለዚህ ተግባር በተቋቋሙ የማዕከላዊ መንግስት ሚኒስቴር መሰሪያ ቤቶችና ኤጀንሲዎች ይተዳደሩ ነበር። የግሉን ዘርፍ እንቅስቃሴ ለማዳከም ሲል ዘመናዊ ኢንተርፕራይዞችን ከመውረስ በተጨማሪ በሌሎቹም የኢኮኖሚ እንቅስቃሴዎች ላይ አገዛዙ ጥብቅ የቁጥጥር ስርዓት ዘርግቶ ነበር። ከእነዚህ የቁጥጥር ስልቶች አንዳንዶቹ፤

- የሰዎች እንቅስቃሴንና የሸቀጥ ዝውውርን/ የሚገታ የይለፍ ፈቃድ ግዴታና በዋና ዋና መተላለፊያ መንገዶችና በሮች ላይ የተቋቋሙ አያሌ የቁጥጥር ኬላዎች፤
- ከልካይ የታሪፍ ምጣኔዎች (prohibitive tariff rates)፣ ሰፊ የኮታ ጥሎሽ (extensive quota restrictions)፣ ረጅሹምና የተወሳሰቡ የንግድና የስራ ፈቃድ አሰጣጥ ደንቦች፤
- በእርሻው ዘርፍ የጉልበት ቅጥርና ሽያጭን ሙሉ በሙሉ ማገድ፤
- አራሽ ቤተሰቦች ከገበያ በታች በሆነና በተቆረጠ ዋጋ የግብርና ምርቶችን ለመንግስት እንዲያሰረክቡ የሚያስገድድ ቋሚ የሰብል አቅርቦት ኮታ፤ እና
- የፋብሪካ ምርቶችና ሽቀጦች የራሽን እደላ፤ ናቸው።

እነዚህና ሌሎቹ የደርግ የቁጥጥር ስርዓቶች የዜጎችን ሰብአዊ መብቶች በእጅጉ ከመገደባቸውና ከህጋዊ

⁸ Provisional Military Government of Socialist Ethiopia (1984). *Ten-Year Perspective Plan*, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.

የኢኮኖሚ እንቅስቃሴዎች የሚገኙ ጥቅሞችንና ገቢዎችን ከማፈናቸውም በላይ፣ ተገቢነት ለሌላቸው ክፍተኛ አስተዳደራዊ ወጭዎች፣ ለሙስና በእጅጉ መስፋፋትና ለሀገጣዊ የሸቀጦች ስርገትም (smuggling) መንስኤ ሆነዋል። የእዳው ተሸካሚ የሆነው ሀብተሰባችንም ለቀሰሰተኛ እድገትና፣ እየከፋ ለሚሄድ ድህነት ተዳርጓል።

የኢኮኖሚ ሞዴሎች፤ የአስሩ ዓመት መሪ እቅድ የተከተለው የኢኮኖሚ ሞዴል የዘመኑ አገዛዝ በሚከተለው ሶሻሊስታዊ አመለካከት የተቃኘና አመለካከቱ የሚያቀነቅነውን የተማከለ የውሳኔ አሰጣጥንና የሀብት ምንጭ ቁጥጥር (resource control) የሚያንጸባርቅ ነበር። የግሉን ዘርፍና የግል ሀብት እንደ ብዝሃ መሣሪያ ተቆጥረው መድከም እንዳለባቸው ይታመን ነበር። ከእነዚህ መሰረታዊ ባህርያቱ በስተቀር፣ የአስሩ ዓመት መሪ እቅድ የተመሰረተባቸው ግምቶችና እምነቶች በንጉሱ ዘመን ከነበረው ከሶስተኛው የአምስት ዓመት የኢኮኖሚ ልማት እቅድ ጋር በእጅጉ ተመሳሳይ ናቸው። ከእነዚህ አመለካከቶችና እምነቶች መካከልም፡-

1. ለብሄራዊ ምርትና የስራ ኃይል ስምሪት ክፍተኛ ድርሻ የሚያበረክተው የግብርናው ዘርፍ ቅድሚያ ሊሰጠው ይገባል፤
2. የኢንዱስትሪ እድገት ለሀገር ልማት ወሳኝ በመሆኑ፣ በተለይ ከውጭ የሚገቡ ምርቶችን በአገር ውስጥ ምርቶች በመተካት ስልት መበረታታትና መስፋፋት ይኖርበታል፤ የሚሉት ይገኙበታል።

በአገዛዙ የመጨረሻ ዘመናት የኢትዮጵያ ኢኮኖሚ የነበረበት የደቀቀ/ የኮሰመነ ይዞታ በራሱ በቂ ምስክር ስለሚሆን የደርግን የኢኮኖሚ አስተዳደር ባህርያት ለመኮነን ብዙ ማስረጃዎችን መደርደር አስፈላጊ አይመስለኝም። የደርግ አገዛዝ ከተከተለው መጥፎ ልማድና መንፈስ አሁንም ገና ሙሉ ለሙሉ አልተላቀቅንም።

ኢትዮጵያውያን የታሪካችን አንድ ምዕራፍ ከሆነው ከዚያ ክፉ ዘመን ልንማራቸው የሚገቡን አያሌ ጠቃሚ ልምዶችና ትምህርቶች ይኖራሉ። ከእነዚህ ውስጥ ዛሬ ለያዘኩት ጭብጥ እጅግ ሁነኛ ናቸው ብዬ የማስባቸው ሁለቱ፤

- ግለሰቦችን የማበረታታትና የማትጋት ባህርይ የሌላቸው የኢኮኖሚ ፖሊሲዎች ዘላቂነት ያላቸው የኢኮኖሚ መሻሻሎችን ሊያስገኙ እንደማይችሉ፤ እና፤
- የተማከለ ቁጥጥርና ጫና (repression) የማያዛልቅና ውሎ አድሮ መውደቁ/መወገዱ እንደማይቀር፤

መዘከር እወዳለሁ። እነዚህን አይነት ባህርያት ያሏቸው ፖሊሲዎች፣ ማንኛውንም ሀብተሰብና አባባቶችን የሚያዳክሙና የሚደቁሱ መሆናቸውን በእርግጠኝነት መናገር ይቻላል። በእኛ አገር ሁኔታ ደግሞ እነዚህን መሰሎቹ ፖሊሲዎችና ጨካኝ የፖለቲካ ጭቆናዎች በአስከፊ የኢኮኖሚ ድቀትና የእርስ በእርስ ግጭቶች ያዳክሩን አደገኛ መንገዶች ነበሩ። እነዚህ ፖሊሲዎች በመጨረሻም በ1991 ዓ.ም ለደርግ ስርዓት መንኮታኮትና ለኢትዮጵያ ህዝቦች ዲሞክራሲያዊ ግንባር (ኢህአዴግ) ወደ ፖለቲካ ስልጣን መምጣት ምክንያት ሆነዋል።

ከ1992 ወዲህ የኢህአዴግ መንግስት የመዋቅር ማስተካከያ መርሃ ግብር (structural adjustment program) በማውጣት ኢኮኖሚውን በገበያ ስርዓት መልሶ በመቃኘት ላይ አተኩሮ ቆይቷል። በዚህም ምክንያት መንግስት በኢኮኖሚው ውስጥ የነበረው ቀጥተኛ ተሳትፎ እየቀነሰ መጥቷል። ከዚህም በተጨማሪ፣ የታሪፍ ተመን ተቀንሷል፤ የፈቃድ አሰጣጥ ደንቦች ቀለልና ፈጣን ብለዋል፤ የውጭ ምንዛሬ ቁጥጥር ላልቷል፤ የሀብረት ሥራ ማህበር አባልነትና የሰብል አቅርቦት ግዴታዎች ተቋርጠዋል፤ በሌላ በኩል ደግሞ የግል ይዞታ ማስፋፋት (privatisation) ተጀምሮአል፤ የግል ባንኮች ህጋዊነት አግኝተዋል፤ የወለድ ምጣኔ ተመን ቁጥጥር ተነስቷል፤ እንዲሁም የባንክ-ለባንክ የገንዘብ ግብይት ተጀምሯል።

ኢህአዴግ በስልጣን ላይ ከቆየባቸው የመጀመሪያዎቹ አመታት ውስጥ እነዚህ የማሻሻያ እርምጃዎችና እንዲሁም በነበረው ሰላምና መልካም የአየር ሁኔታ በአብዛኞቹ ዓመታት ፈጣን አማካይ እድገት የነበረው የኢኮኖሚ ማገገም (economic recovery) ታይቶ ነበር። በቅርቡ ግን በጦርነት፣ በድርቅና በአለም አቀፍ የቡና ዋጋ ውድቀት ምክንያት የኢኮኖሚው እድገት እንደገና ቀሰሰተኛ መሆን ጀምሮአል (እንዲሁም የጠቅላላ ብሄራዊ ምርት በ2002/2003 የበጀት አመት ቀንሷል)። በተጨማሪ በበኩሌ እስካሁን የተደረጉት የኢኮኖሚ ማሻሻያዎች በኢኮኖሚው አቅም ላይ ሊያመጡ የሚችሉት ማገገም ተሟጧል የሚል እምነት አለኝ።

⁹ See Easterly (2002) for some evidence on the growth impact of policy reforms and the limits thereof.

ልሳነ ኢኮኖሚክስ

መንግስት በትናንሽ እርሻዎች ምርታማነት እድገትና የሰው ጉልበትን በብዛት በሚጠቀም ኢንዱስትሪ ላይ የሚያተኩር ግብርና-መር የኢንዱስትሪ ልማት ስትራቴጅን ዐቢይ የልማት መርሃ ግብር አድርጎም ተቀብሎአል ። የግብርና ምርታማነትን ለማሳደግ እንደ ዋና ዘዴ የተመረጠው የኤክስፔንሽን መርሃ ግብርም በስፋት በተግባር ላይ እየዋለ ነው።

የኢህአዴግ መንግስት እስከ ቅርብ ጊዜ ድረስ ከቀዳሚዎቹ አገዛዮች የሚለይበት አንድ ባህርይ እቅድን እንደ ኢኮኖሚ ፖሊሲ መንደራያና መተግበሪያ ዋና ብልሀት የመገልገልን ልማድ መተው ነበር። ይሁን እንጂ ከ2002 ጀምሮ የኢትዮጵያ መንግስት ድህነት ቅነሳን ዋና ግብ ያደረገ፣ የዘላቂ ልማትና የድህነት ቅነሳ መርሃ ግብር (Sustainable Development and Poverty Reduction Program) በመባል የሚታወቅ የልማት ስትራቴጅ ይፋ አድርጓል።

ፕሮግራሙ የኢትዮጵያን ኢኮኖሚያዊ ችግሮች በዝርዝር የሚገልጽና መፍትሄዎችን የሚያመለክት ሰነድ ነው። ዋና ዋና ዓላማዎቹም በሚከተለው አንቀጽ ውስጥ በተጠቀሱት ነጥቦች ይካተታሉ፤

- የኢትዮጵያ የልማት ስትራቴጅ በገጠር ልማት፣ በቁሳዊና ሰብአዊ ካፒታል መሻሻል፣ እንዲሁም የህዝቡን አቅም ለማጎልበትና የሰዎችን የኑሮ አማራጮች ለማስፋፋት ስልጣንን ወደህዝብ በማውረድ በሚያስችሉ ተግባራት ላይ በማተኮር ፈጣን፣ ሰፊ መሰረት ያለውና ፍትሃዊ

ልማትን ይኖርበታል [ከእንግሊዝኛው የተተረጎመ] ።

መሻት ቅጅ ይህንን መርሃ ግብር መሰረት በማድረግ፣ መንግስት በቅርቡ የበጀት አስተዳደር ስርዓትን ያልተማከለ አድርጓል፤ የፍትህ ስርዓትና የሲቪል ሰርቪስ ማሻሻያና እንዲሁም የአቅም ግንባታ መርሃ ግብሮችን እያካሄደ ይገኛል። እነዚህ መርሃ ግብሮች መልካም የተቋማዊ ግንባታ ጅምሮች ሲሆኑ ስለአስገኛቸው ውጤቶች አስተያየት ለመስጠት ጊዜው ገና ነው። ያም ሆነ ይህ የመርሃ ግብሮቹ ስኬት ትክክለኛዎቹን ማትጊያዎች (right incentives) በመስጠት በኢኮኖሚው ውስጥ ሁነኛ ሚና ያላቸው ክፍሎችን እምነትና ተግባራት ለማስለወጥ በመቻል ወይም አለመቻላቸው ላይ የሚመሰረት ይሆናል።

የኢትዮጵያ ኢኮኖሚ ይዞታ

ከፍ ብዬ ያነሳኝቸው ሀሳቦች የኢትዮጵያ ህብረተሰብ ባለፉት 40 ዓመታት በልዩ ልዩ የኢኮኖሚ አስተዳደር ስልቶች ውስጥ እንዳለፈ ያመለክታሉ። የምግብ ጣዕም የሚታወቀው ሲቀመስ ነው እንደሚባለው ብሂል፣ ቁምነገር እነዚህ የተለያዩ የኢኮኖሚ አስተዳደር ፖሊሲዎች የህዝቡን ህይወት ምን ያህል አሻሽለዋል፣ ለውጠዋል ነው። ባለፉት 40 ዓመታት የኢትዮጵያ ሰዎች አኗኗርና ደህንነት ከዚያ ቀደም ሲል ከነበረው ዘመን ምን ያህል ተሻሽሏል?

በታዩ መሻሻሎች እንጀምር። በእነዚህ ዘመናት ውስጥ በትምህርትና በጤና ረገድ የማይናቁ መሻሻሎች

ተደርገዋል፤ እየተደረጉም ነው። በአንጻሩ ደግሞ በነዚህ ዘመናት የህዝቡ የምግብ ዋስትናና የስርዓተ ምግብ (nutrition) ደረጃ በእጅጉ አሸቆልቋል።

ባለፉት አራት አስርታት የነፍስ ወከፍ የሰራተኛ ምርት ውጤት (output per worker) የነበረበትን ደረጃ መመልከት ምናልባት ሁኔታውን በተሻለ መልክ ሊያስረዳ ይችላል። በተጠቀሰው ዘመን ነፍስ ወከፍ የሰራተኛ ምርት ውጤት ሁኔታ በኢትዮጵያ በሚከተለው ሰንጠረዥ የተመለከተውን ይመስላል።

	በነፍስ ወከፍ የሰራተኛ ምርት ውጤት	
	የነፍስ ወከፍ ምርት ዋጋ ምጣኔ በዶላር	የዕድገት ምጣኔ
1961-1970	1212.8	1.59%
1971-1980	1360.3	0.84%
1981-1990	1341.1	-0.65%
1991-2000	1246.7	1.18%
1994-2000	1300.6	3.47%
1961-2000		0.74%

ከሰንጠረዥ በግልጽ እንደሚታየው ባለፉት ዘመናት ምርታማነትን በማሳደግና ደህንነታችንን በማሻሻል ያደረግነው ርምጃ በጣም ትንሽ ነው። ይህንን ውድቀታችንንም በሚከተሉት እውነታዎች ማረጋገጥ ይቻላል፤

ሀ. በዝናብ መገባደጃ በልማዳዊ/ጥንታዊ ቴክኖሎጂ ላይ በተመሰረተ ግብርና ላይ መመርኮዝ፤

ለ. ዝቅተኛ የሰው ኃይል ልማት፤

ሐ. ዝቅተኛ የካፒታል ክምችት (በ2000 ዓም በተደረገ ቅኝት ከአፍሪካ በመጨረሻ ደረጃ ላይ የሚገኝ በነፍስ ወከፍ ሰራተኛ ዝቅተኛ የካፒታል ክምችት (stock capital per worker)፤

መ. መሻሻሎች ቢታዩበትም ገና ከበቂ ደረጃ ያልደረሰና ያልዳበረ የመሰረተ ልማት፤

ሠ. ሲቪል ሰርቪስንና የፍትህ ስርዓት ጨምሮ ደካማ ተቋማት (ለምሳሌ የቢሮክራሲው የጥራት ደረጃ ሲገመገም ከከፍተኛ የአራት ነጥብ ውጤት ብቻ ነው ያገኘው)፤ መስና እንዲሁም የባለንብረትነት መብቶች አለመከበር

አንድምታዎች

ከፍ ብዩ የዘረዘርኩዎቻቸው ማስረጃዎች ኢትዮጵያውያን እንደ ህብረተሰብ እስካሁን ድረስ ዘላቂ እድገትና ልማት ላይ ለመድረስ ሳንችል መቆየታችንን ያስረግጣሉ። ይህም፣ ትክክለኛውን የኢንቨስትመንት ደረጃና አቅጣጫ ያለመከተላችንና፣ በዚህም ምክንያት፣ ለፈጣን የኢኮኖሚ እድገት ተስማሚ የሆኑ የኢኮኖሚ ልማት ተቋማት ለመመስረት ያልቻልን መሆናችንን ያመለክታል። ውድቀታችን ከአያሌ ምክንያቶች ጋር የተያያዘ ሊሆን ይችላል። በአንድ ወይም በሌሎች ምክንያቶች የሚመጡ ነውጦች (shocks) (ለምሳሌ ተደጋጋሚ የሚከሰቱ ድርቆች፣ ጦርነቶች እንዲሁም አለማቀፍ የገበያዎች ዋጋ መዋዠቅ) እና እነርሱ የሚያስከትሉዎቻቸው የረጅም ጊዜ ችግሮች፣ እንዲሁም ከታሪካችን የሚመነጨ አያሌ መሰረታዊ ችግሮች በኢኮኖሚ ልማት ወደኋላ ለመቅረታችን አስተዋጽኦ እንዳደረጉ ይታወቃል። በዛሬው ንግግራ ከእነዚህ በሚለዩና ከኢኮኖሚ አስተዳደር ጋር በሚያያዙ ሌሎች ምክንያቶች ላይ ላተኩር እወዳለሁ። ይህንን የማደርግበት ምክንያት፣

ከተጋረጡበት ልዩ ልዩ እንቅፋቶች መካከል በተለይ እነዚህኛዎቹ

ልንቆጣጠራቸው የምንችል በመሆኑና ይህንንም ካደረግን እድገታችንን ማፈጠን ስለምንችል ነው።

በዚህ መንፈስም፣ የመንግስት ፖሊሲዎች የታለመላቸውን ግብ ሳይመቱ ሊቀሩና ሊወድቁ የሚችሉባቸው ምክንያቶች ምን ምን እንደሆኑ፣ እንዲሁም እነዚህን እንቅፋቶች ለማስወገድ ምን ማደረግ እንደሚኖርብን አንዳንድ ነጥቦች አነሳለሁ።

የፖሊሲ ውጤት አለማምጣት ምክንያቶች

ትክክለኛነት

ፖሊሲዎች ትክክለኛ የሚባሉት፣

- ህብረተሰቡ ይበጃኛል ብሎ ከተቀበላቸው ፍላጎቶችና ከአገሪቱ ኢኮኖሚ አቅም ጋር ሲገናዘቡ፣
- መንግስት በኢኮኖሚው ውስጥ ሊኖረው የሚገባውን ሚና የሚመጥኑ፣ እንዲሁም፣
- ከኢኮኖሚውና ከመንግስት አቅም ተግባራዊ ለመሆን የሚችሉ፣

ሲሆኑ ነው።

እነዚህን የትክክለኛነት መለኪያ እንዴት ማሟላት ይቻላል፤

መጀመሪያ መንግስት የሚመረጥባቸው የፖለቲካ ሃይቶች ዲሞክራሲያዊና የአብዛኛውን ህዝብ ትክክለኛ ፍላጎት የሚያንጸባርቁ ሊሆኑ ይገባል። በሁለተኛ ደረጃም ስለህዝቡ ፍላጎት፣ ስለኢኮኖሚው አቅምና ሊያጋጥሙ ስለሚችሉ እንቅፋቶች፣ እንዲሁም ስለ መንግስት አቅም በምርምር ላይ የተመሰረተና ቀጣይነት ያለው እውቀት ሊኖር ይገባል። ሶስተኛም፣ በዚህ እውቀት ላይ ተመስርቶ ቅድሚያ ሊሰጣቸው በሚገቡ ጉዳዮች ዙሪያ ውይይቶችን አካሂዶ ስምምነት ላይ መድረስ አስፈላጊ ነው።

ሀሳቤን የሚያሰረግጥልኝ አንድ ምሳሌ ላምጣ። ብዙ ጊዜ የመንግስት ባለስልጣናት፣ «ፖሊሲው ጥሩ ነበር፣ አተገባበሩ ነው መጥፎ»፣ ሲሉ ይሰማሉ። ዳሩ ግን፣ የፖሊሲ አቀራረጽንና የፖሊሲ አተገባበርን ነጣጥሎ መመልከት ብዙ ጊዜ ከተሳሳተ አስተሳሰብ የሚመነጭ ነው። አንድ ፖሊሲ ጥሩና ተፈጻሚነት ያለው (feasible) ፖሊሲ እንዲሆን ነው ከተባለ፣ በኢኮኖሚው ውስጥ ሁነኛ ድርሻ ያላቸው ቡድኖች ፖሊሲውን ተመርኩዘው ስለሚወሰዱት እርምጃዎች (responses)፣ እንዲሁም ስለሌሎች ወሳኝ ጉዳዮችና ሁኔታዎች ባልተጋነኑና ምክንያታዊነት ባላቸው ግምቶች ላይ ተመስርቶ የተነደፈ ሊሆን ይገባዋል። ስለዚህም፣ የፖሊሲ አተገባበር እንቅፋቶች መመንጨት ያለባቸው አስቀድሞ ባልታወቁና ይደርሳሉ ተብለው ባልተገመቱ ውጫዊ ቀውሶች (unanticipated exogenous shocks) ምክንያት

መሆን አለበት። የአተገባበር ችግሮች ከበዙና ተደጋጋሚ ከሆኑ ግን የፖሊሲውን ተገቢነትና አስተማማኝነት በተመለከተ ያሉንን ግምቶች ደግመን መፈተሽ ብልህነት ነው።

ስለህብረተሰባችን ታሪክና ስለ ኢኮኖሚያችን አሰራር ያለን እውቀት ውሱንነት ለብዙ ፖሊሲዎች አለመሳካት አንዱ ምክንያት መሆኑን መገንዘብ ያሻል። ከዚህም በተጨማሪ ያለን ጥቂት እውቀትም፣ በወጉ ያልተደራጀና ያልተሰነደ በመሆኑ በአስፈላጊ ጊዜ እንደ ልብ ስለማይገኝ በአግባቡ ልንጠቀምበት አለመቻላችንም የችግሩ አንድ ሌላ ገጽታ ነው።

አመኔታ

አመኔታ የሚጣልባቸው ፖሊሲዎች ምክንያታዊና የሚሄዱበት አቅጣጫ የሚገመት፣ እንዲሁም እርስ በእርሳቸው የተጣጣሙና የተቀናጁ ናቸው።

የአመኔታ ችግር የሚመነጨው የመንግሥት መሠረታዊ ተፈጥሮ ከሆነው ቃልን ለመጠበቅ አለመቻል ባህርይ ነው። መንግሥት ኮንትራቶችን የሚያስፈጽም ዋናኛ አካል ነው። ስለዚህም፣ ሕጋዊ ጉልበት የመጠቀም ሞኖፖሊ ላይ ተመስርቶ በግለሰቦች ወይም በድርጅቶች መካከል የተገረሰሱ ህጋዊ ስምምነቶች እንዲከበሩ ያስገድዳል። ህግ አስከባሪነት ሥራው የሆነውን ይህንን አካል ህግ እንዲያከብር የሚያስገድደው ሌላ አካል ግን የለም። ስለዚህም፣ መንግሥት ቃልኪዳን መስጠትም አይችልም። ቀደም ብለው የተሰጡ ቃል ኪዳኖችም ተግባራዊ ሳይሆኑ ሊቀሩ ይችላሉ። በዚህም ምክንያት መንግሥት የፖሊሲ ውሳኔዎችን ራሱም ቢሆን ለመቀልበስ የማይችል መሆኑን በኢኮኖሚው ውስጥ ሁነኛ

ድርሻ ያላቸውን ክፍሎች ማሳመን ይኖርበታል።

አንድ ህብረተሰብ መንግስት በሻው ጊዜ ተነስቶ ያሻውን ማድረግ እንደማይችልና ተጠያቂነት እንዳለበት ማረጋገጫ መንገዶችን መንደፍ ያስፈልገዋል። ይህን ከመሰሉት ማረጋገጫዎች መካከል የሥልጣን ክፍፍልንና ገደብን (checks and balances) የሚደነግጉ ህገ-መንግስታዊ አንቀጾች ጥሩ ምሳሌዎች ናቸው። የጠንካራ ሲቪል ማህበረሰብ ማብብ በመንግሥት ላይ ተጨማሪ ገደብ የሚያበጅና በዚያም ምክንያት የአመኔታ ችግርን የሚቀንስ ሌላው መንገድ ነው። እነዚህ ተቋማት፣ መንግስት ፖሊሲዎችን እንዳይቀላብስና በፖሊሲ ቅልበሳ ሊከሰቱ የሚችሉ ችግሮች እንዳይኖሩ ይረዳሉ። መልካም ስም ማግኘትም ሌላው መንግስት የህዝቡን ዘላቂ አመኔታ እንዲያገኝ የሚረዳ ዘዴ ነው። በልዩ ልዩ ጉዳዮች ላይ እርስ በእርስ የሚጋጨ/ተግራራ ፖሊሲዎች እንዳይቀረጹ መጠንቀቅና በልዩ ልዩ የመንግስት ክፍሎች መካከል ውጤታማ ቅንጅት መፍጠር የህዝብን አመኔታ ለማግኘት ሌላው ቁልፍ ጉዳይ ነው። የልዩ ልዩ የፖሊሲ መስኮችና ጉዳዮች ገደብ መወሰንና የአስፈጻሚ ክፍሎችን ስልጣንና ኃላፊነት በግልጽ ለይቶ መደንገግ በልዩ ልዩ የመንግስት አካላት መካከል ቅንጅት ለመፍጠር በጣም ጠቃሚ ስልት ነው።

በፖሊሲ አቀራረጽ ሂደት ውስጥ ሚስጥር ማብዛት ወይም ግልጽ አለመሆን የተአማኒነትን ችግር ያባብሳል። ሚስጥራዊነት አለመተማመንን በመፍጠር በፖሊሲ ጉዳዮች ላይ የጋራ ስምምነት ለመመስረት የሚደረጉ ጥረቶችን ሂደት ይገድባል። የሀሳብ ልዩነቶችን በማስፋት፣ አሸናፊውና

ተሸናፊው ወገኖች መካከል መራራቅ/መቃቃር እንዲፈጠር ያደርጋል። በተጨማሪም፣ የመረጃ እጥረት ያስከትላል። የትክክለኛና ወቅታዊ መረጃዎች እንደልብ አለመገኘት ደግሞ አድሻዊና ከእውነት የራቁ መረጃዎች በፍጥነት እንዲሰራጩ፣ ሃሜትና አሉባልታ እንዲሰፋፋ ያደርጋል። ግልጽነትና የጋራ ስምምነት አመኔታ የማጣትን ስጋትና አደጋ ይቀንሳሉ።

በጋራ ስምምነት (consensus) ላይ የተመሠረተ የፖሊሲ ቀረጻ ሂደት አያሌ ጠቀሜታዎች አሉት። ከሁሉ በፊት፣ ዲሞክራሲያዊና ግልጽ በሆነ መንገድ ስምምነት ላይ መድረስ በራሱ እንደ አንድ ውጤት ይቆጠራል። ሁለተኛም፣ የሁሉም ወገኖች ከስምምነት ላይ መድረስ፣ በባላንጣነት ስሜት ከሚካሄዱ አሰጥ አገባዎችና አሸናፊ ሆኖ ለመውጣት ከሚደረጉ ሙግቶች ይልቅ የተሻሉና ጥራት ያላቸው ፖሊሲዎችን ለመቅረፅ የሚረዱ ግልጽና ጠቃሚ ውይይቶች እንዲኖሩ ያበረታታል። በሶስተኛ ደረጃም፣ ከቅን ልቦና፣ ከብልሀትና ከእውቀት ከመነጨና እንደ ባህል ከተቆጠረ የጋራ ስምምነት የሁሉንም ወገኖች የጋራ እምነትና ጥቅም ያስከብራል። በአራተኛ ደረጃ፣ እነዚህን መሰሎች ውይይቶች ስለህዝቡ ፍላጎቶች፣ ምኞቶች፣ ስጋቶችና እደርስቦቶች (expectations) መረጃ መሰብሰቢያ ዘዴዎች ስለሚሆኑ መንግስት ፖሊሲዎችን በመቅረጽና በመተግበር ሂደት የሚያጋጥሙትን የመረጃ ችግሮች ሊያቃልሉ ይችላሉ። በአጭሩ በፖሊሲ ፓኬጆች ላይ የጋራ ስምምነት መድረስን ባህል ማድረግ የፖሊሲዎችን ትክክለኛነትና ተአማኒነት ያጠነክራል።

የህዝብ አመኔታ በአጅጉ አስፈላጊ የሚሆንበት ምክንያት በኢኮኖሚው ውስጥ የሚሳተፉ ክፍሎች ፖሊሲዎች አይቀለበሱም ብለው እስካላመኑ ድረስ (በግልጽ የለውጥን አስፈላጊነት እስካላመኑ)፣ እምነታቸውንና ተግባራቸውን ከፖሊሲዎች ጋር ለማጣጣም ስለማይጣጡ ነው። «ፈረስ ያደርሳል እንጂ አይዋጋም» እንደሚባለው ፖሊሲዎች በራሳቸው ብቻ ለውጥ ማምጣት አይችሉም። ለምሳሌ፣ መንግስት ትምህርት ቤቶችንና የጤና ተቋማትን ሊገነባ ይችላል፤ ዳሩ ግን፣ ውጤት ሊገኝ የሚችለው ወላጆች ልጆቻቸውን ወደ ትምህርት ቤቶቹ ለመላክ ፈቃደኞች ሲሆኑ፣ ሰዎችም በታመሙ ጊዜ እንደ ወትሯቸው የለመደቸውን የፈውስ መንገዶች ከመከተል ይልቅ ወደ ጤና ተቋማት ሄደው ለመታከም ፈቃደኞች ሲሆኑ ብቻ ነው። እነዚህ ለውጦች የሚመጡት ወላጆችና ህዝቡ አዳዲሶቹ ነገሮች ለእነርሱ መልካም መሆናቸውን ሰላመኑ ብቻ ሳይሆን እነዚህ አዳዲስ አገልግሎት ሰጭ ተቋማት እንደሚያዛልቁቸውና አገልግሎታቸው እንደማይቋረጥ እርግጠኛ ሲሆኑ ጭምር ነው።

ወደ ኢትዮጵያ ሁኔታ ስንመጣ በበኩሌ ለአንዳንድ ጅምር የፖሊሲ ተግባራት ህዝቡ የሚሰጠው ምላሽ (response) መቀዝቀዝ መንስኤ በፖሊሲዎቹ ላይ አመኔታ ማጣት ነው የሚል ጥርጣሬ አለኝ። ይህንን ጥርጣሬን የሚያጎሉ ምክንያቶቹን ለጊዜው ላቆያቸውና ስለመልካም የኢኮኖሚ አስተዳደር ያለኝን ርዕይ ልዘርዘር።

የእኔ ርዕይ

በዚህ ህዝባዊ የውይይት መድረክ ተገኝተው ርዕያቸውን እንዳመለከቱን ያገራ ሰዎች ሁሉ እኔም በበኩሌ በ2020 ዘመን ሰላም የሰፈነበት፣ የሀሳብ፣ የእምነት፣ የአመለካከት፣ ወዘተ... ልዩነትና እኩልነት የነገሰባት (pluralistic) እና የበለፀገች ኢትዮጵያን ለማየት እናፍቃለሁ። በዚህ አይነቱ ህብረተሰብ ሁነኛ ባህርይና መሰረት የኢኮኖሚ አስተዳዳሪ ሁኔታ ነው ብዬ ስለማምንም ይፋ (open)፣ ከሁኔታዎች ጋር እራሱን የሚያስማማ (flexible)፣ በተጠያቂነት (accountability)፣ እና ግልፅነት (transparency) ላይ የተመሠረተ ፖሊሲ አቀራረብና አተገባበር ስርአት በሀገራችን ተገንብቶ ለማየት እመኛለሁ። በተለይ ደግሞ፣

1. የፖሊሲ ውሳኔዎችን ተገቢነት የማያረጋግጥ ግዴታና በውሳኔዎች ውጤትም ኃላፊነት መውሰድ በህግ የተደነገገበትና በሁሉም ክፍል ላይ የሚተገበርበት፣ ከዚያም በላይ ባህል የሆነበት፤
2. የፖሊሲ ውሳኔዎችና ምክንያቶቻቸው ከነሱም ጋር የተያያዘው የተጠያቂነት ሥርዓት ለህዝብ ግልጽ የሆኑበት እንዲሁም ከፖሊሲ ጋር አግባብነት ያላቸውንና ሌሎች መረጃዎች ህዝቡ እንደልብ በተሟላና ወቅቱን በጠበቀ ሁኔታ የሚገኙበት፤
3. ሁሉም ተጠቃሚ ወገኖች (Stakeholders) በልዩ ልዩ መልኮች የሚሳተፉበት ፖሊሲ ከመቀረጹ አስቀድሞና ተቀርጾ ከወጣ በኋላ የሚደረግ ምክንያታዊና ገንቢ ውይይትና፣ ከተለያዩ ወገኖች የሚመጡ አስተያየቶችን

ልሳነ ኢኮኖሚክስ

ለመቀበል ዝግጁነት፣ መደበኛነትና ቀጣይነት ያለው የውይይት መድረክ በቋሚነት የሚከፈትበት ፤

4. ኢኮኖሚያዊ እውቀትና ምርምር ሞገስ የሚያገኙበት፣ በተቀላጠፈ ሁኔታ በተግባር ላይ የሚውሉበትና በየጊዜው በሚደረግ በቂ ኢንቨስትመንት እየተደገፉ የሚዳበሩበት ስርዓት፤ እና

5. አደገኛ የኢኮኖሚ ነውጦችን በአግባቡ ለመቋቋም የሚያስችል የቅድመ ማስጠንቀቂያ አቅም (pre-warning capacity) በወጉ የዳበረበት፤

ሁኔታ በኢትዮጵያ ተፈጥሮ ማየት አሻለሁ።

ምን መደረግ አለበት

ከፍ ብዬ ያመላክትኩትን ርዕይ ወደ እውነታነት ለመተርጎም በርካታ ነገሮች ያስፈልጋሉ። ከሁሉም በላይ ግን ሁለት ጉዳዮችን ለመለወጥ መጣጣር ወሳኝ መሆኑን አምናለሁ፡ መሰረታዊ ለውጥ ከሚያስፈልጋቸው እነዚህ ነገሮች አንዱ ኢኮኖሚያዊ ጉዳዮቻችንን የምንይዝበትና የምንመራበት መንገድ ሲሆን፣ ሌላኛው ይህን መንገድ በመወሰን ረገድ ሁነኛ ሚና ያሏቸው ማህበራዊ ልማዶችና እምነቶች ናቸው። ከዚህ ቀጥሎ እነዚህን ጉዳዮች በአንጻራዊ ፋይዳቸው ደረጃ ሳይሆን እንደ አመጣጣቸው ለማብራራት እሞክራለሁ።

መለወጥ ያለባቸው ልማዶቻችን፣ እምነቶቻችንና አመለካከቶቻችን ፤

የግል ወይም የራስ ጥቅም (self-interest) በንግድም ይሁን በመንግስት አገልግሎት፣ ወይም

በትምህርትና ምርምር ዘርፍ፣ ወይም በሌሎች ህጋዊ ሥራዎችና ተግባራት፣ የራስን ጥቅም መሻት ተገቢነት ባለው መንገድ እስከተፈጸመ ድረስ ሊበረታታና ሊደገፍ የሚገባው ጉዳይ መሆን አለበት። ይህንን ጉዳይ ማንሳቴ፣ ማህበረሰባችን የሌላ ሰው ስኬት የማያስደስተውና የሚያስከፋው መስሎ ስለሚታይ ነው። ለጊዜው ስሙን የዘነጋሁት አንድ ጸሐፊ (ወንድ መሆኑን ግን ርግጠኛ ነኝ)፣ የሚኖርበትንና የበቀለበትን ህብረተሰብ፣ የገለጸው «የእኛ ህብረተሰብ ሁለት ነገሮችን አምርሮ ይጠላል፣ ስኬትንና ውድቀትን» በማለት ነበር። እኔም የእኛ ህብረተሰብ የዚህ ዓይነቱ ጥላቻ (prejudice) የበላይነት ይመስለኛል። የዚህ መሰሉ ጥላቻ የመጨረሻ ውጤት ደካማነት ወይም ነፈዝነት የሚወደስበት ሕብረተሰብ ነው። ይህንን ስል፣ ማህበራዊ ግድየለሽነትን (Laissez-faire) ማድነቁና መደገፌ አይደለም። የማህበራዊነትንና የጋራ ተግባራትን አስፈላጊነት አምናለሁ፤ ከልክ ያለፈ ራስ ወዳዳድነትና ገደብ የለሽ የግል ጥቅምን መሻት በማህበረሰብ ደህንነት ላይ የሚያስከትላቸውን አደጋዎችንም እገነዘባለሁ። አበው፣ «ዓሳውም እንዳይሞት፣ ባህሩም እንዳይደርቅ» እንዲሉ፣ መፍትሄው ያለው እመሀል ቤት ነው። ሰዎች ተገቢነት ባለው ሁኔታ የግል ጥቅማቸውን ይሹ ዘንድ የሚያደፋፍሩ የማበረታቻ ስልቶችን መቀየስ፣ ግለሰቡ የማህበሩን ፍላጎቶች ሳይጋፉ፣ ማህበሩ በፈንታው ግለሰቡን ሳይበድል፣ የግል ጥቅምና የወል ጥቅም ሳይጋጩ ጎን ለጎን መራመድ ይችሉ ዘንድ የሚረዳ ሚዛናዊ የፖሊሲ ስርዓት መገንባት፣ እንዲሁም ሽፍጠኞችና አጥፊዎች

የሚታረሙበትና ለጥፋታቸው ተገቢውን ቅጣት የሚያገኙበት የፍትህ ስርዓት ማስፈን አስፈላጊ ነው። እነዚህ ሁኔታዎች በተግባር እስካልዋሉ ድረስ ግን እድገትንና መሻሻልን ማሰብ ዘበት ይመስለኛል።

ተግባሩ ከባድና ውስብስብ ሊሆን እንደሚችል ይታያል፣ ሆኖም ከባድ ነውና አይቻልም፣ ወይም ሩቅና አድካሚ ነው ብለን ልንተወው አይገባንም። ሩቅ ተጎዳኝ የጉዞውን አስቸጋሪነት ተቀምጦ ከማሰላሰል ይልቅ፣ አስፈላጊውን ነገር አዘጋጅቶ በጊዜ መንገድ መግባት የተሻለ ምርጫው እንደሚሆን፣ እንደዚህም ሁሉ ፣ እኛም ወደፊት ለመራመድ የምንችለው፣ ችግሮቻችን ነቅሰን ለማውጣት ስንችል፣ መፍትሄ ሊሆኑ የሚችሉ ልዩ ልዩ አማራጮችን ለይተን ማመልከት ስንችልና፣ በአነርሱ ላይ ተወያይተን የተሻለ ጥቅም የሚያስገኙልንን መምረጥና በተግባር ማዋል፣ ቀስ በቀስም ይህንን መሰሉን አሰራር ልማድና ስርዓት ማድረግ ስንችል ብቻ ነው።

ስለመንግስት ያለን አመለካከት

መንግስትን የማይመጠን ስልጣን ያለው አካል አድርጎ የመውሰድ ስር የሰደደ አመለካከት በሕብረተሰባችን ውስጥ ያለ ይመስለኛል። ስለመንግስት ከታሪካችን የወረሰነው ይህ የተሳሳተ አመለካከት፣ መንግስትን በአንድ በኩል ግዙፍ በሌላ በኩል ደግሞ ትንሽ እንደሆነ በሚያገናዝብ አተያይ መተካት ይኖርበታል። ከአንድ ግለሰብ አንጻር ሲታይ መንግስት ግዙፍ አካል ነው። ስለዚህም በዚህ ግዙፍ አካል፣ የግለሰቦች ሰብአዊ መብቶች

ልሳነ ኢኮኖሚክስ

እንዳይደፈጠጡ አሁን ካለው የበለጠና የተጠናከረ የሰብአዊ መብቶች ማስከበሪያ ስርዓት መዘርጋት ያስፈልጋል።

ለአገራችን ከሚያስፈልጋት የማህበረ-ኢኮኖሚያዊ መሻሻል አንጻር ስንመለከተው ደግሞ የመንግስት አቅም በጣም ትንሽ ነው። ይህንን እውነት ለማስረገጥ የመንግስትን ዓመታዊ በጀት መመልከት ይረዳል። በ2002 የበጀት ዓመት መንግስት 68 ሚሊዮን የሚገመተውን የአገራችንን ህዝብ ወቅታዊና የወደፊት ፍላጎቶች ለማሟላት ወጭ ያደረገው ገንዘብ ከ20 ቢሊዮን ብር አይበልጥም። ይህ የመንግስት ዓመታዊ ወጭ፣ መቶ የሚሆኑ የቤተሰብን አባላት ዓመታዊ የትምህርት፣ የጤና፣ እና ሌሎች መሰረታዊ የደህንነት ፍላጎቶች ለማሟላት፣ እንዲሁም፣ ለቤተሰቡ የወደፊት ኑሮ ዋስትና አስፈላጊ የሆኑ ኢንቨስትመንቶችን በ30000 ብር ዓመታዊ በጀት ለማስተዳደር ደፋ ቀና ከምትል አንዲት ባተሌ እማውራ ጋር ይመሳሰላል። በዚህ አይነት አነስተኛ በጀት በሚተዳደር ቤተሰብና አገር ውስጥ ደግሞ የብዙ ሰዎች ፍላጎቶች እንደማይሟሉ የታወቀ ነው።

የእኛን ዓይነት የድህነት ኢኮኖሚ ማስተዳደር እጅግ አስቸጋሪ ነው። የአገርን ኢኮኖሚ ማስተዳደር ቀርቶ፣ ብዙዎቻችን የየቤታችንን ጣጣ ለመሸፈን ምን ያክል ውጣውረድ እንዳለብን የምናውቀው ነው። ይህንን ስል፣ በመንግስት በኩል ሊከሰት የሚችለውን ንዝህላልነት፣ አባካኝነት ወይም ሌሎች ኢ-ምግባራዊ ተግባራትን ይቅር ማለት ተገቢ ነው ማለቱ አይደለም። አጠንክሮ ለመግለጽ

የፈለግሁት፣ ስለመንግስት ኢኮኖሚያዊ አቅም ያሉንን የተጋነኑና የተሳሳቱ ግንዛቤዎችን ማስተካከል እንደሚያስፈልግ ነው።

ይህ ማሳሰቢያም ለፖሊሲ ቀራጮች የሚከተሉት አንድምታዎች አሉት፤

ፖሊሲ አውጪዎች፣ በምርጫ ወይም በሹመት ህብረተሰቡ ውክልናና ስልጣን የሰጣቸው፣ የስልጣን ውክልና ዘመናቸው የተወሰነና ጊዜያዊ መሆኑንና፣ በተለይም እነርሱም እንደሚገኛውም ሰው የሚሳሳቱ መሆናቸውን ሊገነዘቡ ይገባቸዋል። እነዚህ እምነቶች በህብረተሰባችን ውስጥ ገና ስር ያልሰደዱ መሆናቸውን ታሪካችን ያሳያል። ከዚህም በተጨማሪ በሚቀርጷቸው ፖሊሲዎች ውስጥ አቅም (limitations) ምክንያት ህብረተሰባችን ያለበትን የኑሮ ሁኔታ በፍጥነት ለመለወጥ ፖሊሲዎች ብቻ በቂ እንዳልሆኑ ሊገነዘቡ ይገባል። ይህንንም በራሳቸው አንደበት ለህዝቡ በይፋ ለመግለጽ ፈቃደኞች መሆን ይኖርባቸዋል።

ይህንንም ማድረጋቸው፣ ከሁሉ በላይ፣ መንግስትና የመንግስት ፖሊሲዎች ፍጹምና እንከን የለሽ ናቸው ወይም መንግስት ሁልጊዜ ትክክል ነው የሚለው ስር የሰደደና የቆየ እምነት ስህተት እንደሆነ ማህበረሰባችን እንዲገነዘብ ይረዳል። በመንግስት ተግባራትና ፖሊሲዎች ላይ ሰዎች አስተያየት እንዳይሰጡና የተሰማቸውን እንዳይገልጡ ለጉሞ የሚይዛቸውን ፍርሃትም ያሰወግዳል።

ፖሊሲ አውጭዎች፣ ፖሊሲዎች ውጤታማ የሚሆኑት የዜጎችን አመኔታና ድጋፍ ሲያገኙ ብቻ መሆኑንም ማመን ይኖርባቸዋል።

ስለመንግስት ያሉን አመለካከቶችና እምነቶች መለወጥ ለዜጎች ያለው አንድምታ ምንድነው?

ዜጎች የመንግስትን አቅም ውሳኔነት በመገንዘብ የግላችንንና የማህበረሰባችንን የኑሮ ደህንነት በማረጋገጥ ረገድ የሚኖሩንን ሚናዎች በአግባቡ መፈጸም ይኖርብናል። ሚናችንንና ተግባራችንን በአግባቡ ልንወጣ እስካልቻልን ድረስም ሁኔታዎች ሊሻሻሉ እንደማይችሉ አምነን መቀበል ይኖርብናል። ከዚህም ከሚጠበቁ ነገሮች መካከል፣ ታክስ መክፈል፣ በፖሊሲ ጉዳዮች ላይ ገንቢ ውይይቶችን ማካሄድ፣ ስራችንንና ኃላፊነትን በቅንነትና በታታሪነት መወጣት፣ እንዲሁም የፖሊሲ አውጭዎች ኃላፊነትና ተግባር አስቸጋሪ፣ አድካሚና ፈታኝ መሆኑን መገንዘብ፣ ጥቂቶቹ ናቸው።

ኃላፊነትን መውሰድ

አንዳንዴ፣ ኢትዮጵያውያን እንደ ማህበር ክፉ የስምተኛነት ባህል (blame culture) በእጅጉ የተጠናወተን መስሎ ይሰማኛል (ምናልባትም ከዚህ በፊት ሌሎች ሰዎች ተናግረውት ሊሆን ይችላል)። ብዙ ጊዜ ለችግሮቻችን ሌሎች ወገኖችን ተወቃሽና ኃላፊ እናደርጋለን። በልማት ወደ ጎሳ ለመቅረታችን፣ ህብረተሰቡንና ባህላችንን በጅምላ፣ ወይም የዘመኑን የአየር ሁኔታ፣ ወይም መንግስትን፣ አለቆቻችንንና የተሳሳቱ ፖሊሲዎችን፣ ወይም ስግብግብ ነጋዴዎችን፣ ወይም ሕርቀው የማያስቡ ገበሬዎችን፣ ወይም ግሉባላይዜሽንን ተጠያቂ አድርገን እናቀርባለን። መቼም ቢሆን፣ ለመጣው ጥፋት ወይም ለሆነው ነገር ሕኔ ኃላፊነኝ ወይም

ልሳነ ኢኮኖሚክስ

«አኛ» ኃላፊ ነን ስንል አንሰማም። ከፍ ብዬ ከዘረዘርኳቸው መካከል ብዙዎቹ የችግር መንስዔ አይደሉም ወይም በእድገትና በልማት ተግባራት ላይ አሉታዊ ተጽእኖዎች አያሳድሩም ማለቴ አይደለም። እየተቃወምኩ ያለሁት፣ ለችግሮቻችን አፋጣኝና ዘላቂ መፍትሄዎች እንዳንፈልግ እንቅፋት ሲሆንን የኖረውንና አሁንም እየሆንን ያለውን ኃላፊነትንና ተጠያቂነትን ወደ ሌሎች የመግፋት ልምዳችንን ነው።

ይህ ልማድ በሚያሰገርም ሁኔታ የተሰፋፋና ስር የሰደደ ነው። ከተራ ቤተሰባዊ ህይወት እስከ ታላላቅ ህዝባዊ ውይይቶችና ምክክሮች «ሌሎች» ሲወጡ መስማት የተለመደ ነው። ከግል ኑሮዬ አንዳንድ ምሳሌዎችን መናገር ቢፈቀድልኝ፣ እኛ ቤት አንድ ጥፋት የሚባል ነገር ከተፈጸመ፣ እንበል፣ ከመጸሀፍቶቹ አንዱን ከሚቀመጥበት ቦታ ፈልጌ ባጣው፣ እኔ ነኝ ያነሳሁት የሚል ባለመኖሩ፣ ጥፋተኛውን ማወቅ በእጅጉ አስቸጋሪ ነው። እያንዳንዱ ሰው ሲጠየቅ «እኔ የለሁበትም» ለማለት ይፈጥራል። ሁኔታው ከተረጋጋና መጽሃፉ የተፈለገበት ጊዜ ካለፈ በኋላ ግን አንዱ ወይም ሌላው የቤተሰባችን አባል፣ «አ! ያ በቀደም ተፈልጎ የጠፋው መጽሃፍ ተገኝቷል፣ እንትኑ ውስጥ አስቀምጬው እንደ ነበረ ረስቼ ነው።» ሊል ይችላል። እነዚህን መሰሎቹ ነገሮችም የአለት ተአለት ጨዋታ ከሆኑ ጊዜው ዋል አደር ብሏል። ይህ ነገር የተፈጠረው እኔና ባለቤቴ መጥፎ የቤተሰብ አስተዳዳሪዎች ስለሆንን ነው ብዬ ለማመን እቸገራለሁ። የችግሩ ዋና መንስዔ ነው ብዬ የምጠረጥረው ኃላፊነትን ወደ ሌላ የማስተላለፍ፣ በሌሎች የማሳበብ ልማድ ነው።

ሌላ ጠንክር ያለ ምሳሌ ላምጣ። ጉዳይ ኖሯችሁ በሄዳችሁባቸው ስፍራዎች፣ ጉዳያችሁን ለማሰፈጸም ማሟላት ያሉባችሁ መመሪያዎችና ህጎች ምን እንደሆኑ፣ ወይም ስለ መስሪያቤቱ አሰራር ያስረዷችሁ ዘንድ የሚመለከታቸውን ክፍሎች ጠይቃችሁ ግልጽና ቁርጥ ያለ መልስ ያገኛችሁባቸው አጋጣሚዎች ምን ያህል ትንሽ እንደሆኑ ማስታወስ ትችላላችሁ። ይህ አይነቱ ሁኔታ በመንግስት መስሪያ ቤቶችም፣ በግል ድርጅቶችም የተለመደ መሆኑ ደግሞ ችግሩ ምን ያክል ስር የሰደደ እንደሆነ ያሳያል። በልዩ ልዩ ምክንያቶች፣ «ለምን» እና «እንዴት» ይደባለቁብናል፣ ወይም፣ አንድ ነገር ለምን ሆነ ተብለን ስንጠየቅ መልስ ስለማይኖረን ቁጣ ይቀናናል።

ኢትዮጵያውያን በወጡ የታሰባቸውና ተለይተው የታወቁ የህይወት ዓላማዎች ሊኖሩን እንዲሁም የመንፈስ ዝግጁነትን ልናዳብር ይገባናል። ከዚህም ጋር የኃላፊነት ስሜትን ማጎልበት ይኖርብናል። በእርግጥ የምንኖረው በአንድ ማህበረሰብ (collective) ውስጥ ስለሆነ ከዛ ማህበረሰብ እንጠ ቀማለን። በዛ ማህበረሰብም ከሞላ ጎደል እንወሰናለን፣ ነገር ግን መርላት የሌለብን ያ ማህበረሰብ ሕብረተሰቡ በጠቅላላም ይሁን ወይም ሌላ የሕብረተሰብ አካል የሚኖረው በአብዛኛው በውስጣችን የሚገለጸውም በእያንዳንዳችን ነው። ስለዚህ ራሳችንን ችለን የማሰብና የመተግበር ሰፊ ያለ ነጻነት አለን ብዬ አምናለሁ። ይህ ነጻነት ጥረት ኬታከለበት እያንዳንዳችን እራሳችንን፣ በዚያም አማካኝነት ማህበረሰባችንን የመለወጥ ችሎታን ይፈጥራል። ከዚህም ግለሰባዊ ነጻነት፣ ግለሰባዊ ኃላፊነት ይመነጫል።

አርበኝነት

በበኩሉ አርበኝነት አንድን ሰው ከህብረተሰቡ ጋር በጠንካራ ስሜታዊ ትስስር የሚያቆራኝ፣ ግለሰቡ ስለህብረተሰቡ ባለው አወንታዊ እምነት የሚወከልና ለዜጎች ደህንነት የሚበጁ ተግባራትን ለመፈጸም ግለሰቡ በሚኖረው ፈቃደኝነት የሚገለጽ እሴት (value) ነው። አርበኝነት ብዙ መገለጫ ባህርያትና ገጽታዎች ቢኖሩትም፣ አንድ ሰው ለቤተሰቡ ከሚያሳየው ቁምነገረኛነትና የቤተሰቡንና በተለይም የልጆቹን የአሁንና የወደፊት ደህንነት አስተማማኝ ለማድረግ ከሚፈጽማቸው ተግባራትና ከሚያደርጋቸው ጥንቃቄዎች ይጀምራል ብዬ አምናለሁ።

አርበኛ መባል ያለበት ማነው? ብለን ስንጠይቅ፣ በእርግጠኝነት አፋችንን ጥልቀን የምንናገረውና በጣም የተለመደው መልስ፣ የሃገራቸውን ሉአላዊነት ለማስከበር በጦር ሜዳ የመጨረሻውና መስዋዕትነት የከፈሉ ሲቪል ጀግኖችና ወታደሮች ናቸው የሚል ነው። ይህንን መሰሉን ጀግንነት የሚጠይቁ ሁኔታዎች እየቀነሱ መጥተዋል። የአርበኝነት ስንጠረኻ ሌሎችንም ሙያዎችና ተግባራት መጨመር አለበት ብዬ አምናለሁ። ይህ ከሆነ ዘንድ በእኛ ህብረተሰብ ውስጥ፣ ከልፋታቸው ያገኙትን ትርፍና ጥሪት ወደ ውጭ አገር ሳያሸሹ መልሰው አገራቸው ውስጥ ለኢቮስትመንት የሚያውሉ ባለሀብቶች፣ በውጭ አገር ትምህርታቸውን አጠናቀው የሚመለሱ ሰዎች፣ የማህበረሰባቸውን ችግሮች ለማመናመን አቅማቸው በቻለ መጠን ደፋ ቀና የሚሉ ሰዎች አርበኛ መባል ያንሳቸዋልን? ብዙ ነገሮች ባልተሟሉባቸው

ልሳነ ኢኮኖሚክስ

ትምህርት ቤቶች ትውልድን ለማስተማርና ለማሰልጠን ቆርጠው የተነሱ መምህራንና የሚከፈላቸውን ደመወዝ በቁ አሰጣጥን ከቁብ ሳይጥፉ ጋላፊነታቸውንና ግዴታዎቻቸውን በቅንነትና በታታሪነት የሚፈጽሙ የመንግስት ሰራተኞችን በእኛ አገር ሁኔታ አርበኞች አይደሉም ማለት ይቻላል? ከኤች አይ ቪ/ ኤድስ እና ከሌሎች ጠንቀኛ በሽታዎች የሚዋጉ፣ በተለይ ቫይረሱ በደማቸው ውስጥ መኖሩን ካወቁ በኋላ ለበቀልና ለበደል ሳይሆን ሌሎችን ለመታደግና ለማስተማር ቆርጠው የተነሱ ወገኖች፣ በምርምርና በፈጠራ ስራ ላይ ተጠምደው ለሰው ልጆች ህይወት አንድ ተጨማሪ መልካም ነገር ለማስገኘትና እውቀትን ለማስፋፋት ተግተው የሚመረምሩ ሳይንቲስቶች፣ ምርታቸውን ለማሳደግ ሌት ከቀን የሚታትሩ ገበሬዎች፣ እነዚህና ሌሎች ሰዎች የአርበኝነት ተግባር አልፈጸሙም ማለት አይቻልም።

ከእነዚህ ከፍ ብዬ ከዘረዘርኩባቸው ቡድኖች በተነጻጸሪ አገራቸውን ትተው ለመሄድ ያቆቡበት ዜጎች ምን ያክል በርካታ እንደሆኑ ከጥቂት ሳምንታት በፊት በዲቪ ማዕከሎች የነበረው የደራ ገበያና ሰልፍ የሚመሰክር ይመስለኛል። የዲቪ ቪዛ ለማግኘት አመልክተውና ተሳክቶላቸው የሄዱ የተደራጀና የተደላደለ ኑሮ ይመሩ የነበሩ ሰዎችን አውቃለሁ። ይህን ማለቴ፣ እነዚህ ሰዎች የሚፈልጉትን ነገር ለመምረጥ ያላቸውን ግለሰባዊ መብትና ነጻነት መቃወም እንዳይመስልብኝ እሰጋለሁ። እኔ የሌሎችን ምርጫዎች አከብራለሁ። ስለዚህም አስረግጬ መናገር የምፈልገው፣ በተለይ በአገራቸው ለመቆየትና ወደ አገራቸው ለመመለስ ቁርጠኝነት ያላቸውን

ሰዎች ማህበረሰባችን ማክበርና ማድነቅ እንደሚኖርበት ነው። እነዚህ ወገኖች በአገራቸው ለመኖር ወይም ወደ አገራቸው ለመመለስ የወደዱት ሌላ ምርጫ ስለሌላቸው የሚመሰላቸው፣ አገሪቱ ምርጫ ላላቸው ለሰዎችም የምትሰጠው እድል የላትም ብለው የሚያምኑ ሰዎች ሊኖሩ ይችላሉ። እነርሱ ሌሎችን ሳይሆን ራሳቸውን ዝቅ አድርገው የሚመለከቱና የሚዘልፉ መሆን አለባቸው ብዬ አምናለሁ።

በእርግጥ፣ ከፍ ብዬ አርበኞች መባል እንዳለባቸው የጠቀስኩባቸው ክፍሎች እንደማንኛውም ሰው ወይም ማህበራዊ ቡድን ድክመቶች አያጡም። እነዚህ እንከኖች ተለይተው ሊታወቁና ከተቻለም ሊታረሙ ይገባል። የአንዳንድ እንከኖች መኖር፣ የእነዚህን አርበኞች ዋጋ የሚያጣጥልና የታታሪና ቅን ዜጎችን ሞገስ ዝቅ አድርጎ ለመመልከት የሚያበቃ ምክንያት ሊሆን ግን ፈጽሞ አይገባም።

በኢኮኖሚ አመራር ላይ መደረግ ያለባቸው ለውጦች

በሲቪል ሰርቪስ

መልካም ውጤት ያላቸው የኢኮኖሚ ፖሊሲዎችን፣ ህጎችንና ድንጋጌዎችን ለማቀድና ለመተግበር ከፍተኛ ጥራት ያለው ሲቪል ሰርቪስ ያስፈልጋል። ጥራት ያለው ሲቪል ሰርቪስ ማህበራዊ አገልግሎቶችን ለማስፋፋትና በተቀላጠፈ ሁኔታ ለማዳረስም አስፈላጊ ነው። በአገራችን ጥራት ያለው ሲቪል ሰርቪስ አስፈላጊነት በተለይ የድህነት ቅንሳ ስትራቴጅ እና የምዕተ ዓመቱ የልማት ግቦች ተግባራዊ መሆን ከጀመሩ ወዲህ እያደገ መጥቷል። የሲቪል ሰርቪሱን ጥራት ለማሳደግ፣

የአሰራር ነጻነቱን ከፖለቲካ ተጽዕኖና ጣልቃ ገብነት ማላቀቅ፣ ማበረታቻዎችን ማሻሻል፣ በብቃትና በውጤት ላይ የተመሰረተ የቅጥርና የደረጃ እድገት ስርዓት መዘርጋት፣ ቅንነትን፣ ግልጽነትንና ተጠያቂነትን ማበረታቻት እንዲሁም የዘርፉን ልዩ ልዩ ክፍሎች ማቀናጀት ያስፈልጋል።

በሲቪል ሰርቪስ ውስጥ ሊደረጉ የሚችሉ ማበረታቻዎች ከጋላፊነት ስሜት፣ የሚመነጭ ለውጥ የማምጣት ፍላጎትንና ተሰሚነትን መሻትን እንደሚያካትት መገንዘብ አስፈላጊ ነው። የእኛን አገር በመሰሉ ድሃ አገሮች የሰራተኞችን ደመወዝና ምንዳ በከፍተኛ መጠን ማሳደግ በቅርብ ጊዜ የሚቻል ተግባር አይደለም። ስለዚህም ሌሎች የማበረታቻ አይነቶችን በስፋት ሥራ ላይ ማዋል አስፈላጊ ነው።

በዚህ ረገድ፣ በቅርቡ በተጀመረው የሲቪል ሰርቪስ ማሻሻያ አንዳንድ በጎ ጅምሮችን አመለክቷል ።

የኢኮኖሚ ጉዳዮች እውቀት

ፖሊሲዎች የሚያስገኙት ውጤትና ደረጃ የተመሰረቱባቸውን ተቃራኒዎች በጥልቀት መርምሮ በመረዳት፣ በሰፊ የኢኮኖሚክስ እውቀትና ጥራት ባለው መረጃ/ስታትስቲክስ መኖር ላይ ይመሰረታል። ስለዚህም፣ ፖሊሲ አውጭዎች ለእውቀትና ለስታትስቲክስ ተገቢውን ግምት ሊሰጡ ይገባቸዋል። ፖሊሲ አውጭዎች፣ ስታትስቲክስን የማጠናቀር አስቸጋሪነት፣ እንዲሁም እውቀት በብዙ ድካም እንደሚገኝ መገንዘብ ያስፈልጋቸዋል። ከኤክስፐርቶች ጋር አዘውትሮ መወያየት ጠቃሚ መሆኑን መገንዘብ ይኖራቸዋል።

ከውይይቶቹ የሚገኙ ፍሬ ነገሮችንም በተግባራቸው ውስጥ በገለገሉባቸው መልካም ይሆናል።

የእውቀትን ኃይልነት፣ ትርጉም ያለው ለውጥ ለማምጣት ፖለቲካዊ ፈቃደኝነት ጋር ሲቀናጅ የሚያስገኘውን ፋይዳ የዩጋንዳን ልምድ እንደ ምሳሌ በመውሰድ ማሳየት እወዳለሁ። የሙሴቤኒ መንግስት ስልጣን እንደያዘ ሰሞን በዩጋንዳ የምንዛሬ ተመን ማሻሻያ ማድረግ ግዴታ ነበር። ያኔም፣ የመንግስት ባለስልጣናት በኡጋንዳ ሽልንግ ላይ የምንዛሬ ተመን ቅነሳ ከተካሄደ የኢኮኖሚ ግሽበት ይጨምራል የሚል ስጋት ነበራቸው። በዚህም ምክንያት በ1986 የኡጋንዳ ሽልንግ የምንዛሬ ዋጋ መንግሥት ጨምሮ ነበር። ቢሆንም በለውጡ አስፈላጊ መሆንና አለመሆን ላይ ውይይቶችና ክርክሮች እንዳይካሄዱ አልከለከለም። የክርክሩን መቋጫ ለማበጀት የረዱት Stephen Morris የተባለ አንድ የፒ.ኤች.ዲ ተማሪ በ1989 ያዘጋጃቸው ሁለት ጥናታዊ ጽሁፎች ነበሩ። ወደ ዝርዝር ነጥቦች ሳንገባ፣ በአጭሩ የMorris ጥናታዊ ወረቀቶች፣ የምንዛሬ ማስተካከያውን ተገቢነትና የዋጋ ግሽበትም እንደማያስከትል የሚያመለክቱ ነበሩ። ይህ ጥናት፣ በመንግስት ባለስልጣናት ዘንድ ተቀባይነት በማግኘቱ ፖሊሲው በስራ ላይ ሊውል ችሏል። ከዚያን ዘመን ወዲህም፣ በኡጋንዳ በፖሊሲ አቀራረጽና በኢኮኖሚ ምርምር መካከል ያለው ትስስር ይበልጥ እየተጠናከረ መጥቷል። አንድ ጸሃፊ እንዳለውም፣ «የኡጋንዳ ልምድ፣ ከኤክስፐርቶችና ከአዋቂዎች ጠቃሚ ትምህርትና አዲስ ሀሳብ ሊገኝ እንደሚችል ግልጽ ምሳሌ ነው»። ዛሬ ኡጋንዳ የምትገኝበትን ደረጃ እንመልከት። ሞሪስ ዛሬ በየል የኒቨርሲቲ የኢኮኖሚክስ

ፕሮፌሰርና አሉ ከሚባሉ ዝነኛ ወጣት የኢኮኖሚክስ ተዋሪዎች (theoretician) አንዱ ነው።

አንዳንድ ማሳሰቢያዎች /ፕሮፖዛሎች

እስካሁን ባነሳሁባቸው ነጥቦች ላይ በመመርኮዝ መደረግ አለባቸው ብዬ በማምንባቸው አንዳንድ ጉዳዮች ላይ ማሳሰቢያዎችን አቀርባለሁ።

ነጻና ገለልተኛ አማካሪ ካውንስል መመስረት

በፖሊሲ ጉዳዮች ላይ መንግስትን የሚያማክርና በስራ ላይ የዋሉ ፖሊሲዎች ያመጧቸውን ውጤቶች የሚመረምር ነጻና ገለልተኛ የአማካሪዎች ቦርድ ማቋቋም ጠቃሚ ነው። ቦርዱ የሚኖሩት ኃላፊነቶችና ተግባሮች ወደፊት በጥናትና ምክክር ላይ ተመስርቶ ሊወሰን ይችላል። በአኔ አስተያየት፣ ከፖለቲካ ጋር ያለው ግንኙነት ሲቀር የዩናይትድ ስቴትስን የኢኮኖሚ አማካሪዎች ካውንስል እንደ ሞዴል ብንከተል መልካም ነው።

አንዳንዶች ይህን አይነቱ ሁኔታ የመንግስትን ስልጣን ያዳክማል ብለው ሲገምቱ ይሳሰባሉ። ይህ አመለካከት ስለመንግስት ስልጣን ካለ ጠባብ ግንዛቤና በእውነተኛ ስልጣንና (real authority) በይስሙላ ስልጣን (nominal authority) መካከል ያለውን ልዩነት ካለማወቅ የሚመነጭ ነው። እውነተኛ ስልጣን አንድ አካል ሌሎች አካላት የእርሱን እምነቶችና ተግባራት ወደውና ፈቅደው እንዲቀበሉና እንዲፈጽሙ ለማድረግ ባለው ብቃት ይገለጻል። መንግስት የኢኮኖሚ አማካሪዎች ካውንስልን በአግባቡ ሊገለገልበት ከቻለ የዜጎችን

እምነቶች፣ አመለካከቶችና ተግባራት ወዳሰበው አቅጣጫ መምራት ይረዳዋል። ይህንን ለማድረግም፣ የፖሊሲ ውሳኔዎች በርካታ ልዩ ልዩ ወገኖችን የሚያሳትፉ እንዲሆኑ (greater inclusiveness)፣ የሃሳብና የመረጃ ልውውጦችን ማሳደግና ማጎልበት፣ በእነዚህም አማካይነት የተሻሉ ፖሊሲዎችን እና ያተገባበር ስልቶችን ለመንደፍ አስተዋጽኦ ይኖረዋል።

የግምገማ ጥናት (Stock-taking)

ስለ ኢትዮጵያ ኢኮኖሚ እስካሁን ያለውን እውቀት አሰባስቦ ለማከማቸት መጣጣርና ለዚህም ተግባር ቅድሚያ መስጠት ሌላው ሊታሰብበት የሚገባ ብሄራዊ አጀንዳ ነው ብዬ አምናለሁ። በዚህም ጥረት ውስጥ የመንግስት መስሪያ ቤቶች፣ ምሁራን፣ የግሉ ዘርፍ፣ ሲቪል ማህበራትንና ለጋሽ ድርጅቶች (donors) እንዲካተቱ ማድረግ ጠቃሚ ውጤት ያስገኛል። በተለይም፣

- ባለፉት 5 እስከ 10 ዓመታት ጊዜ ውስጥ በኢትዮጵያ ኢኮኖሚ ላይ የተሰሩ ምርምሮችን ማሰባሰብ፣ መሰነድና ከምርምር ዘዴዎች፣ ከትንታኔና ከጠቀሜታ አንጻር መገምገም፤
 - የኢትዮጵያን ኢኮኖሚያዊ ምርምር አቅምና ይዞታ ከሰው ኃይል፣ ከተቋማዊ አደረጃጀት፣ ከመረጃ አቅርቦት፣ ከቅልጥፍና እና ከፋይናንስ አቅም አንጻር መገምገም፤
- አስፈላጊ ነው። እነዚህን ተግባራት ለማከናወንም የኢትዮጵያ ኢኮኖሚክስ ባለሙያዎች ማህበርንና የኢትዮጵያ ልማት ምርምር

ልሳነ ኢኮኖሚክስ

ተቋምን (EDRI) ልምዶች መነሻ ማድረግ ጠቃሚ ይሆናል። ይህን መሰሉ ጥረት በተጓዳኝም፤

- ዋና ዋና ገበያዎችንና ከገበያ ውጭ ያሉ ተቋማዊ ስምምነቶችን (non-market institutional arrangements) ለይቶ ለማወቅና ምን ያህል ውጤታማ እንደሆኑ ለመገምገም፤
- የልማት እንቅስቃሴ ውጤት የሚወሰነው በነጠላ ፖሊሲዎች ሳይሆን በሁሉም ፖሊሲዎች ድምር ውጤት በመሆኑ የመንግስትን ፖሊሲዎችና የማሻሻያ እርምጃዎችን በአንድ ላይ ለመገምገም፤

የታለመ መሆን ይኖርበታል። የኢትዮጵያ መንግስት ከቅርብ ጊዜ ወዲህ ከነዚህ ተግባራት ጋር ተዛማጅነት ያላቸው አንዳንድ ሙከራዎችን በማድረግ ላይ ነው።

ብሄራዊ ፋውንዴሽን መመስረት

በአገሪቱ ውስጥ የሚሰሩ ምርምሮችን የሚያስተባብር፣ ለምርምርና ለተመራማሪዎች ማበረታቻ የሚውል የገንዘብ ድጋፍ የሚያፈላልግ ራሱን ችሎ የሚንቀሳቀስ ብሄራዊ ፋውንዴሽን መመስረት አስፈላጊ ነው። በዚህ አንጻር የኢትዮጵያ ሳይንስና ቴክኖሎጂ ኮሚሽን ልምድ በመነሻነት ሊያገለግል የሚችል ነው።

ማጠቃለያ

ለንግግራ መቋጫ ይሆኑኝ ዘንድ አንድ ሁለት ፍሬ ሃሳቦችን ለመጨመር እወዳለሁ። ከዚህ ቀደም ፕሮፌሰር መስፍን

እንዳሉት ሁሉ እኔም፤ የለውጥና የመሻሻል ፍላጎት ከተማሩና ባለጸጋ ከሆኑ ዜጎች መምጣት አለበት ብዬ አምናለሁ። ከታሪክ እንደምንማረው በብዙ አገሮች የመሰረታዊ ማህበራዊ ኢኮኖሚያዊ ለውጥ ሃሳብ አመንጭዎችና ጀማሪዎች እነዚህ የማህበረሰብ ክፍሎች ናቸው። በተለይ የእኛን አገር በመሳሰሉ ድሃ አገሮች፣ እንዲህ አይነቱን የተወሳሰበ ጉዳይ ለማሰብና ለማሰላሰል ምቹቱ፣ ችሎታውና መሳሪያው ያላቸው፣ እንዲሁም ማህበረሰቡ የሚሻሻልባቸውን መንገዶች ፈልጎ የማግኘት የስነምግባርና የዜግነት ግዴታ የወደቀባቸው፣ እውቀታዊ በሆነ መንገድ ማሰብና መተግበር የሚችሉ የህብረተሰብ ክፍሎች የተማሩትን ባለሃብቶች ናቸው። በተጨማሪ ምንም እንኳን የመሻሻል ሀሳብ ከነዚህ ወገኖች ቢነሳም፣ ውጤታማ ለመሆኑ የተቀረውን የህብረተሰብ ክፍል ማሳተፍ የግድ ነው። ስለዚህ ከዚህ በመነሳት ነገን ለማሻሻል የሚበጅ ብሄራዊ ስምምነት መገንባት ("a national consensus to inverse in the future") አማራጭ የለውም እላለሁ።

የመረጥኩት የምርምር ርዕሰ ጉዳይ ራስን በማወቅ (self-discovery) ላይ ያተኮረ ነው። ይህም ራስን የማወቅ ጥረት፣ በአንድ በኩል፣ የአገራችንን ህዝብ ማህበራዊና ኢኮኖሚያዊ ታሪክ፣ ልማዶችና እምነቶች፣ የህዝቦችን ምኞታቸውንና ችሎታቸውን፣ ተስፋ የሚሆኗቸውን ነገሮችና የሚያሰናክሏቸውን ችግሮች አጥንቶና መርምሮ መድረስን፣ በሌላ በኩል እኛን ራሳችንን (የተማረውንና ባለሃብቶችን) እንደ ሰው ልጅና እንደ ኢትዮጵያዊ ማወቅን ያካትታል። ከዚህ አይነቱ ጥረት የሚወጣው ግኝት፣ ህብረተሰባችንን ለመለወጥ ቁልፍ

ጉዳይ ነው ብዬ አምናለሁ።

በእርግጥ ለንግግር ቀላል ነው። ሆኖም «ህልም አለ ተብሎ ሳይተኛ አይታደርምና» የለውጥን አስቸጋሪነት በመፍራት ከተግባር ልናፈገፍግ አይገባም። ስለዚህም፣ ለችግሮቻችን መፍትሄ ለማግኘት ያለን ብቸኛና ትክክለኛ አማራጭ፣ ማሰብ፣ መመርመር፣ መወያየትና መመካከር መወሰንና መተግበር ውጤት በየጊዜው መገምገምና መሻሻል ያለበትን ማሻሻል ይህንንም ልናደርግ የምንችለው እኛ ኢትዮጵያውያን ብቻ ነን።

ስለህብረተሰባችን ችግሮች መፍትሄ ለመሻትም ይሁን በጉዳዩ ላይ ለመምከርና ለመወያየት ባሰብን ቁጥር፣ በሺዲዮው የተመለከትነው ልጅ ንግግር ይዘኑን አይመስለኝም። ብዙም መልካም ነገሮች ሰራን ወይም ምንም ሳንሰራ እስካሁን ቀረን፣ እያንዳንዳችን እንደ ግለሰብ፣ ሁላችንም ደግሞ እንደ ህብረተሰብ፣ ስለዚያ ልጅና ስለትውልዱ ህይወት የተናጠልና የጋራ ተጠያቂነት አለብን፤ ስለ ልጆቻችንና ስለ ልጅ ልጆቻችን እጣ ፈንታም ከእኛ በስተቀር ኃላፊ ሊሆን የሚችል ክፍል አይኖርም።

አመሰግናለሁ!

ዋቢ መረጃዎችን (References) በእንግሊዝኛው ጽሁፍ ላይ ያገኛሉ።

ECONOMIC GOVERNANCE AND ETHIOPIA'S DEVELOPMENT – SOME REFLECTIONS*

Alemayehu Seyoum Taffesse

“But policy, as opposed to politics, is not (a) zero-sum (game). One of the hardest tasks of economists is to explain this – a task made all the more difficult by much of the political rhetoric.”

Joseph E. Stiglitz [Stiglitz (1998)]

I would like to begin by congratulating and thanking the Ethiopian Economic Association (EEA) for organising the Vision 2020 Ethiopia discussion series. A lot has been said about the nature and usefulness of this forum and I assume that these are by now well understood.

I would also like to thank the EEA for inviting me to speak at such a forum. I feel greatly honoured.

The title of my talk is “Economic Governance and Ethiopia’s Development – Some Reflections”. It has three main parts. The first part, after outlining my understanding of the notion of economic governance and its determinants (at least for the purpose of the talk), summarises the state of well-being and economic governance in Ethiopia. A statement of my vision makes-up the second section. The final section sketches some of the things I believe should happen in order to make that vision a reality.

Motivation

Before going any further, however, let me briefly explain what motivated me to tackle this issue and the things that I take for granted. I thought that would help set the right perspective and tone for the substance of my speech.

Recently, I watched a documentary about Ethiopian children produced by Save the Children UK. That documentary had a profound impact on me. I know many poor people; a lot of my relatives are poor. I myself come from a low middle-income family and have a first-hand experience of some of the economic difficulties such families face. As everyone else, I also have my share of daily encounters with street children. Until that day, however, my interaction with poor children was either person-to-person (usually mediated by some cash transfer), or in the abstract while doing research on poverty and well-being. For the first time, I watched children themselves talk about aspects of their own lives, their needs and hopes, in short, their poverty without directly asking for help.

Penetrating through my protective shields of charity and abstraction, their talk revealed to me what it really means to be a poor child.

Being a parent, my thoughts subsequently dwelt on my own children and the children they will hopefully have. I wondered whether there are reasonable safeguards to protect my grandchildren (if not my own children) from being in the same dismal state as the children in the documentary. Since, broadly speaking, the best guarantor of decent opportunities is a dynamic economy with sustainable growth, and since such an economy is yet to emerge in Ethiopia, I concluded that there is really no reason why my grandchildren will not face the same predicament as the poor children in the documentary.

I also realised, for the first time in a really meaningful way, that how we manage our economic affairs is critical to the emergence of a prosperous society in which such poverty is very rare. Each and every one of us should strive to substantially enhance economic management so as to ensure a better

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future for our children. What you will hear today are some of my reflections motivated by this realisation. These reflections are part of an ongoing thought process and thus are subject to further modifications as time goes.

Aims

My main aim in this talk is to motivate a systematic discussion about economic governance, focusing primarily on the 'process' of policy selection – i.e. on how economic management decisions are arrived at. Clearly, this process is political-economic and social in nature. However, being an economist, and recognising my limitations thereof, I focus largely on economic matters and highlight the role of economics and the economist. My hope is that what I say will be sufficient to stimulate some dialogue concerning the opportunities and obligations facing us as Ethiopians in the realm I chose to talk about.

The area of discourse I have chosen is rather wide in scope, thereby necessitating some selective treatment of themes. The themes I dwell on are, I believe, critical, but also reflect my knowledge and its limitations.

In short I will reflect, mostly informally and sometimes cursorily, on some of the key aspects of economic governance and provide some, hopefully useful, suggestion on the way forward.

At the end of the talk, I hope, rather immodestly, that each one of you will ask yourself the same questions about the future of your children, grandchildren, cousins and

nephews, as well as other members their generations. I also hope, again disregarding modesty, that, as a consequence, you will embark on a journey of thought and action.

Assumptions/Presumptions

Being an economist, I will start by stating my assumptions (or presumptions).

I assume that the pattern of economic governance, however defined, reflects not only the material resources of a country, but also the norms and beliefs associated with its citizens, their concerns and aspirations, their capabilities, their (current and past) choices; and the various institutional arrangements that have evolved over time conditioned by those resources, beliefs, norms and choices. The line of causation also goes in the other direction. The pattern of economic governance characterising a country influences the beliefs, norms and choices of its citizens and, ultimately, their well-being.

I also assume that we Ethiopians strive to improve our individual and collective well-being in the context of a common economic space. I believe the following quote from the current Ethiopian Constitution captures that desire quite well:

“Convinced that to live as one economic community is necessary in order to create sustainable and mutually supportive conditions for ensuring respect for our rights and freedoms and for the collective promotion of our interests; ... Have therefore adopted, ... this constitution as an instrument

that binds us in a mutual commitment to fulfil the objectives and the principles set forth above.”

Preamble to the Ethiopian Constitution;

Then it follows that:

1. in one form or another, all Ethiopians benefit from peace and prosperity in Ethiopia;
2. in one form or another, all Ethiopians can and should contribute to the attainment of these goals – in other words, such contributions are not the preserve and/or responsibility of one or another select group; and
3. to a varying degree, all Ethiopians are responsible for the current and future well-being outcomes in the country.

Finally, I assume that building a well-functioning market economy is a common vision. By that I mean that most Ethiopians do not desire their entire economic life to be run administratively by some central authority.

Economic Governance – A Conceptual Framework

For my purpose I consider economic governance to mean the process of policy formulation, the policies that are produced by that process, and the pattern of policy implementation. In other words, it encompasses the policy environment, and the related administrative and legal structure, under which an economy functions. In this sense, macroeconomic policies, microeconomic policies, and fiscal policies; government economic agencies, regulatory policies and bodies; and business

law and legal institutions all form parts of a nation's economic governance. Below I use economic policy formulation and implementation as my shorthand for economic governance.

Broadly, speaking, economic policy has three main components. Two of these – goals and instruments – are commonly explicitly stated, while the third – economic 'models' – are usually implicit or even unarticulated.

Goals represent the objectives or targets that are to be attained or promoted via policy intervention. In poor countries like Ethiopia, the standard set of goals include two broad categories:

1. *Macroeconomic stability:* which largely focus on certain balances in the economy, in particular, the balance of payments, the government accounts and the saving-investment balance. The important variables included are the government budget deficit, the money supply, the components of aggregate demand, the volume of credit, interest rates, nominal wages and profits, prices of commodities, and the exchange rate.¹⁰
2. *Growth and development:* which largely focus on factors that determine the nature of the development process in a country. The key variables include the structure and growth of production, employment, and investment. Factors such as capital accumulation, rural-urban migration, labour force growth,

changes in productivity, structure of trade, allocation of investment, and changes in the structure of demand.¹¹

The operational distinction between the two sets is not always straightforward, however. First, stability and growth/development are related, that the former is a necessary condition for the latter being a key aspect of that relationship. Second, some instruments of policy are aimed at affecting, or do affect, both stability and growth/development.

Instruments are the means deployed to achieve policy goals or targets. The specific instruments available to a government partly depend on the specific institutional setting. In a market economy, these may include: fiscal policy (types and levels of taxes, level and composition of government expenditure); monetary policy (money supply, reserve requirements, open market operations, discount window (rate), interest rate regulation (ceilings/floors)); exchange rate policy; sectoral policies; and laws and regulations.

Economic 'models' summarise the views of policy makers and/or their advisers about how the economy works (including its structure, constraints, and possibilities) and thus how policy instruments are linked with policy targets. Such views can be articulated in detail with an underlying economic theorising and empirical evidence. They can also be implicit or sketchy and with insufficient economic theoretic and empirical content.

Governments adopt and implement a wide variety of economic policies. On the one hand, such policies represent the key means at the disposal of governments in their effort to achieve interrelated economic objectives – primarily maintain macroeconomic stability and promote economic growth and development. On the other hand, these policies, and the process via which they are selected, constitute the pattern of economic governance in a country, and as such, a key element of the institutional environment within which a country's economy operates. Consequently, government policies form an integral part of an economy, as well as a critical determinant of its functioning and evolution.¹²

The ultimate aim of economic policy should be to improve the well-being of citizens, either directly, or indirectly by inducing economic actors (individuals, households, businesses) to modify their choices in desirable ways. The choices of these actors, and thus the effectiveness of government policies, depend not only on the explicit characteristics of such policies but also on these actors' perceptions about them.

In short, good or appropriate government policies enhance the economic performance of a country and, hence, the well-being of its citizens. The extent to which they can do so depends on three main attributes which makeup the quality

¹⁰ Dervis, Kemal, Jaime de Melo, and Sherman Robinson (1982). *General Equilibrium Models for Development Policy*, The World Bank, Washington D.C.

¹¹ Dervis, Kemal, Jaime de Melo, and Sherman Robinson (1982). *General Equilibrium Models for Development Policy*, The World Bank, Washington D.C.

¹² For a recent exploration of the impact of policies and, more broadly, governance see Ndulu and O'Connell (1999), Collier and Gunning (1999), and Kaufmann, Kraay, and Ziodo-Lobat (1999, 2002). The first two specifically analyze Africa.

of policies:¹³

- Policies need to be 'correct', i.e., policies should be consistent with the 'accepted' needs of the society and its economy and the appropriate economic role of the state, and should be feasible relative to the potentials of the economy including the capabilities of the government;
- Policies need to be 'credible', i.e., policies should be reasonably predictable and well coordinated across the various dimensions of their coverage; and
- Policies need to be 'effective', i.e., policies should be selected and implemented in an efficient manner and with a reasonable degree of accountability and transparency.

These attributes of policy interventions are clearly interdependent and constitute joint indicators of the quality of economic policy. Below, some of these attributes are combined with the elements of policy outlined earlier to describe aspects of economic governance in Ethiopia.

Economic Governance in Ethiopia

The First Five-Year Development Plan of the Imperial regime, that spanned the years 1957-1961¹⁴, represented the first genuinely systematic expression of nation-wide economic policy in modern Ethiopia.¹⁵ That Plan was followed by the second (1963-67) and third (1968-1973) development plans. I

¹³ On correctness see Stiglitz (1996), Tanzi (2000), and World Bank (1997). On credibility see, for instance, Brunetti, Kisunko, and Weder (1998).

¹⁴ All years are in Gregorian Calendar.

¹⁵ See Asfaw (1992) and Molla (1992).

will use the last one to briefly illustrate the type of economic policies pursued by the Imperial regime.

The Third Five-Year Development Plan was, perhaps, the most sophisticated planning exercise conducted up to that time. I, in fact, believe that it even compares fairly well with any of the plans or strategies prepared since then in terms of its logic, depth, and coverage.¹⁶ Reading through the Plan's document, I was also struck by how much its analysis is still valid. Indeed, its diagnosis and language are so much like more recent documents that I sometimes forgot it was prepared 35 years ago. I recommend it to anyone who desires to see, among other things, how slow our economic progress has been in the interim.

Goals: The Third Five-Year Plan identified the following main objective:

1. to achieve a per capita income growth of 3 percent per year;
2. to improve agriculture, the mainstay of the national economy and of the livelihood of the majority of the Ethiopian people, through an all-front, more concerted encouragement and assistance;
3. to extend economic and social development from urban centres to rural areas which not only sustain the majority of the Ethiopian people but also provide most of the nation's natural wealth.

These main goals were disaggregated into very detailed targets across a wide range of sectors and activities.

¹⁶ Imperial Ethiopian Government (1968). *Third Five Year Development Plan*, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.

Instruments: Towards achieving these goals, the Plan envisaged a variety of instruments including an impressive investment plan mainly in the form specific projects in different sectors. Roughly half of this investment plan was expected to be financed by the private sector. To encourage private investment, the Plan proposed financial incentives (such as tax exemption) the details of which were to be included in an Investment Law, which in turn, were to be administered by an Investment Committee and an Investment Promotion Office (located within the then Ministry of Commerce and Industry). As for public investment, the Plan develops annual plans which laid the basis for the preparation of the annual government budget.

Economic 'models': Essential premises of the Third Five-Year Plan were:

1. agricultural development was a priority since the Ethiopian economy was predominantly agrarian (by the way, the figures cited about the role of agriculture were roughly the same as the ones we cite today);
2. industrial development was indispensable and the preferred strategy to achieve it was import substitution (though the Plan also envisaged expansion in exports);
3. education and skills formation associated with it (in current terminology human capital) were critical for the country's development.

All these were broadly consistent with development thinking of the period.

It is also interesting to observe the

concern displayed by the planners of the day for the 'correctness' 'credibility' and 'effectiveness' of their policies. They explicitly

1. recognised the need to base the planning exercise on firm knowledge about the economy. They fully realised the indispensability of good quality statistics, the shortcomings of the data they had, and the need to further strengthen the Central Statistical Office;
2. acknowledged the institutional needs of the Plan and envisaged a corresponding reform process including coordination across government agencies;
3. appreciated the need for public understanding and support if the Plan were to succeed. I quote from the Preface of the Plan document:

"To succeed, a plan requires the solid support of the population at large. The primary condition for this support is an understanding by the people of what the plan is: its goals, its policies, and, above all, its relevance to their daily life. Such an understanding requires, in turn, full dissemination of the plan throughout the Empire in a format that is intelligible to the great masses of the people."

4. emphasised the need to use resources efficiently.

Despite these qualities most experts agree that the Third Five Year Plan did not succeed. A number of domestic and international reasons explain this failure. The Plan suffered from a number of, rather

technical, weaknesses. To mention two key ones:

1. It was not based on a systematic and empirical analysis of the inter-linkages between different sectors of the Ethiopian economy and the constraints associated with them.
2. The database underlying the Plan was rather weak and partly explains why empirical analysis was limited to descriptive statistics.

Absence of political reform and insufficient attention to land reform were two more important explanations, however. The Plan was a product of an autocratic regime with little accountability and transparency. Indeed, the pressures for political reform and land reform ultimately led to the downfall of the regime.

The Imperial regime was succeeded by the Derg regime. The Derg regime was characterised by brutal political repression and centralised administrative control over the economy. Most manufacturing enterprises, almost all big hotels, all financial institutions, all commercial farms, a lot of residential buildings, and all lands were nationalised. Central planning was introduced first in the form of what were referred to as National Revolutionary Development Campaigns or Zemecha (1978-1984) and subsequently in the form of a Ten-Year Perspective Plan (1984 onwards). I will use the latter to illustrate the form of economic governance during the period.¹⁷

Goals: The Derg regime aspired to

¹⁷ Provisional Military Government of Socialist Ethiopia (1984). *Ten-Year Perspective Plan*, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.

ultimately build a socialist economy. Within this broad aim, a number of specific targets were also set by the Ten-Year Perspective Plan, including:

1. to achieve an average per capita income growth of 3.5% per year with corresponding growth targets for agriculture (4.3%), industry (10.8%), and services (6.9%);
2. to improve food security and raise agricultural productivity through cooperativisation and expansion of irrigated farming;
3. to increase the share of industry to a quarter of national output, mainly through import substitution.

Instruments: Central planning was the preferred instrument of the Derg regime. Nationalised enterprises, which meant almost the entire modern sector, were directly run by the central government through ministries or agencies established for the purpose. Partly to discourage the private sector, other aspects of economic life were also subject to extensive controls. These include:

- barriers to the movement of people and goods enforced through travel paper requirements and numerous check points;
- prohibitive tariff rates, extensive quota restrictions, and long and complicated licensing procedures;
- complete ban on the sell and purchase of labour in agriculture;
- compulsory grain delivery (or 'quota') system under which farm households were forced to sell a part of their produce to the government at prices fixed

below those ruling in the 'free' market; and

- administrative distribution (or rationing) of goods.

Apart from highly restricting individual rights and considerably eroding incentives for legitimate private economic activity, these controls resulted in high and unwarranted administrative costs, considerable corruption, and smuggling. These costs were ultimately incurred by society in the form of slow growth and increased poverty.

Economic 'models': The Ten-Year Perspective Plan reflected the socialist orientation of the government of the day, and the corresponding pattern of centralised decision-making and resource control it advocated. Private property and the private sector were considered exploitative and actively discouraged. Despite these, the Ten-Year Perspective Plan was based on assessments that were remarkably similar to the five-year plans of the Imperial era. These include:

1. agriculture, as the largest contributor to national output and employment, should be given priority;
2. industrialisation, being critical for development, should be promoted mainly through import substitution;

It is not very difficult to pass judgement on the pattern of economic governance practiced during the Derg regime. The dismal state of the Ethiopian economy at the end of the period spoke for

itself. To some extent, we are still constrained by the legacy of that regime.

A large number of lessons need to be learnt from that disastrous episode in Ethiopian history. I will mention only two that are most relevant to my theme. The period clearly showed that:

- economic policies that are not consistent with individual incentives are unlikely to bring about enduring improvements; and
- centralised control and repression ultimately fail.

To be sure, both rake havoc to society and its members. In our case, such policies and brutal political repression generated disastrous economic outcomes and led to civil conflict. As a consequence the Derg regime collapsed in 1991 and the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) assumed power.

Since 1992 the EPRDF government has focused on reorienting the economy through market reforms, including a structural adjustment program. As a result the state's direct role in economic activity has declined. Tariffs have been cut, quota constraints relaxed, licensing procedures simplified, foreign exchange controls eased, compulsory cooperative membership and grain delivery discontinued, and privatisation begun, private banks authorised, and interest rates decontrolled and an inter-bank money market introduced.

These reforms, combined with peace and favourable weather conditions for most of the past

decade, produced economic recovery with faster average growth. The pace of economic growth has slowed down considerably in more recent years (indeed national output fell in 2002/2003), partly due to war, recurrent drought and the fall in international coffee prices. I also suspect that the economy might have exhausted the potential for recovery and growth induced by the reforms implemented so far.¹⁸

The government has also adopted agricultural development-led industrialization as a central plank of its development programme, with a focus on productivity growth on small farms and labour-intensive industrialization. An extensive extension program is being implemented as the preferred means of increasing agricultural productivity.

Until recently, one important departure from the past was the abandonment of planning, at least as an explicit mode of economic policy formulation and implementation. However, beginning 2002 the Ethiopian government has adopted a development strategy centred on the principal goal of poverty reduction. This strategy is officially known as Sustainable Development and Poverty Reduction Program.

This Program is a detailed statement of Ethiopia economic problems and the solutions thereof. Its main aims are summarised in the following paragraph:

¹⁸ See Easterly (2002) for some evidence on the growth impact of policy reforms and the limits thereof.

“Ethiopia's development strategy seeks to promote rapid broad-based and equitable growth by focusing on rural development and improvement in physical and human capital, and deepening the devolution process to empower the people and expand the choices and control that people have over their lives.”

In line with this Program, the government has launched deeper fiscal decentralisation, judicial and civil service reform, and public sector capacity building. All of these are arguably good beginnings at institution building. Being too recent, however, to what extent they will succeed remains to be seen. One thing is certain, however. Their success or failure ultimately depends on whether they succeed in modifying the beliefs and actions of individual economic actors through the right ‘incentives’ broadly defined.

The State of the Ethiopian Economy

The above reflects that the Ethiopian economy, and its society, have experienced different modes of economic governance over the last 40 years or so. So what difference did all these make - as the saying goes ‘the proof of the pudding is in the eating’. Are their substantial differences in the well-being of Ethiopians compared to 40 years ago?

Let us start with successes. Considerable progress has been made, and is being made, in increasing access to education and

health during the period. In contrast, food security and nutrition levels seem to have declined over the years.

Perhaps the best summary measure progress is the level of output per worker. The table below records the pattern of change in output per worker over the period in question.

The table clearly shows that we have made little headway in raising productivity and thus improving well-being. This failure is clearly illustrated by Ethiopia's:

- a. dependence on rain-fed and traditional-technology based agriculture;
- b. inadequate human capital;
- c. low capital stock - with Africa's lowest stock of capital per worker in 2000;
- d. undeveloped infrastructure that is improving but need to get a lot better;
- e. weak institutions including deficiencies in the civil service, judiciary, corruption, and property rights (for instance, bureaucratic quality recently received a score of 1 out of a maximum possible score of 4).

Implications

The evidence points to the fact that, as a society, we have so far failed to achieve sustained growth and development. It suggests that we were not making the right choices in terms of the pattern and level of investments, and, partly due to this, that we have yet to build the appropriate institutions. Our failure is likely to be related to many factors. Shocks of one sort or another (drought, war, international price fluctuations) and their long-

term effects as well as our historical legacy are very serious problems. Below I focus on another set of explanatory factors, namely, aspects of economic governance. I do so because that is the topic of my talk. More importantly, however, my focus is motivated by the belief that from among the variety of constraints we face these aspects are the ones we have most control over and thus with which we can make headway at some speed.

I like to emphasise that the concerns I raise do not relate to intentions. Rather I focus on why even well-intentioned government policies can and do fail to achieve their objectives and what can be done about that.

Sources of Policy Failures

Correctness

Correct policies are those which:

- are consistent with the ‘needs’ of the society and its economy;
- are consistent with the appropriate economic role of the state; and
- are feasible relative to the potentials of the economy including the capabilities of the government.

How do these requirements of correctness are satisfied?

First, the political process that selects governments need to be genuinely democratic such that elections reveal the broad preferences of society. Second, knowledge about the ‘needs’ of society, the potentials and constraints of the economy, and the capacities of the government has to be systematically generated and

continually upgraded. Third, mainly based on this knowledge, feasible priorities have to be debated and agreed upon.

One example illustrates my point. It is rather common to hear officials say that 'The policy is good but its implementation is bad.' 'This dichotomy between the formulation and the implementation of a policy is usually false.' If a policy is deemed feasible, then it must have been designed on the basis of realistic assumptions regarding the relevant circumstances including the expected response of economic actors. 'Difficulties regarding implementation should arise only from unanticipated exogenous shocks.' If implementation difficulties are substantial and frequent, it is wise to recheck the judgements made regarding the appropriateness and/or feasibility of the policy in question.

I am convinced that a lot of policy failures are related to our rather limited knowledge of the history and workings of our society and economy. In addition, even existing knowledge is scattered and difficult to access, and thus, not effectively deployed.

Credibility

Credible policies are those which are reasonably predictable and well coordinated (or consistent) across the various dimensions of their coverage

The problem of credibility arises from the inability of the state to irrevocably commit itself to a course of action. This inability is inherent in the nature of the state (or government). The 'government is

the primary enforcer of contracts. It uses its monopoly on the legal use of force to create the possibility of private commitment. There is no one, however, whose job it is to guard the guardian. The government cannot make commitments because it always has the possibility of changing its mind, and earlier "agreements" cannot be enforced.' As a consequence, it is always necessary for the government to convince economic actors that reversals of policy decisions are reasonably unlikely.

One common, and proven, way of doing so is to establish a variety of properly functioning credibility-enhancing mechanisms. Checks and balances built into constitutions are the best example of such mechanisms. Strong civil society is another. Such institutions raise the costs of some policy reversals such that they become unlikely. Building a good reputation in the relevant matters is another important way of gaining and sustaining credibility. Effective coordination across different parts and levels of government is also a key tool for enhancing credibility since it will reduce the possibility of inconsistent policy initiatives from within the same government and at the same time. Clear demarcation of jurisdiction over different policy areas or issues is essential for such coordination.

Secrecy, or lack of openness and transparency, in the policy making process aggravates the credibility problem. First, it hinders the 'consensus-building process and makes it more likely that outcomes will lead to a greater divergence between winners and losers.'

Second, 'by making information scarce, it contributes both to the perception and reality of asymmetrical information, and puts into play a dynamic which is more likely to lead to biased and unrealistic information.' Openness, transparency, and consensus-building can help reduce the credibility problem.

Increased reliance on consensus in the policy making process has a number of advantages. First, reaching consensus is a desirable outcome in its own right, and doing so in a democratic and transparent way is a process that should be cherished in its own right. Second, consensus-building promotes open dialogue aimed at achieving better-designed policies rather scoring victories in adversarial debate. Third, if done systematically, fairly, and regularly, it leads to the emergence of commonly shared beliefs and interests. Fourth, dialogue towards a consensus can also serve as an information-gathering device on needs, interests, and concerns, and as such it helps to overcome some of the information problems governments face in formulating and implementing policies. Therefore, the culture of building consensus around policy packages can enhance their correctness and credibility.

Credibility matters because; unless economic actors are convinced that policies are irreversible (unless circumstances clearly warrant change) they would not modify their beliefs and actions in a manner consistent with the policies. And, unless they do so, those policies will not succeed in achieving their objectives. In some sense policies

are like the horse in the Amharic saying 'the horse takes you to the battle field, but it will not fight.' A government may build modern schools and health clinics. Success, however, requires that families send their children to those schools or visit those clinics when sick instead of some 'traditional' substitute they are used to. This shift will occur not only if and when these families are convinced that doing so is good for them, but also if and when they are convinced that the new facilities are reasonably long-lasting (the schools and clinics will continue to operate).

Coming to the case of Ethiopia, I suspect that credibility problems may partly explain lacklustre responses to some policy initiatives. I will come back to some of these later on. Let me now describe aspects of my vision.

My Vision

Like everyone else who spoke before me, I like to see a peaceful, pluralistic, and prosperous Ethiopia in 2020. Believing that a key characteristic and foundation of such a society is its pattern of economic governance, I also like to see an open, flexible, accountable, and transparent system of policy formulation and implementation. More specifically, I would like to see an environment in which:

1. justifying policy actions and taking responsibility thereof are institutionalised and standard;
2. policy decisions and their rationale, the relevant data and other information, as well as the terms of accountability, are provided to the public in a comprehensive, accessible, and timely manner.

3. rational and constructive dialogue on economic policy is institutionalised and regular. Such dialogue should allow participation by all stakeholders in different forms; should occur before and after the adoption of policies; and should entertain proposals from all quarters. The recently established National Private-Public Forum is a good start.
4. economic knowledge and analysis are valued, effectively deployed, and continually upgraded through efficient investments;
5. capacity to provide early warning of adverse economic shocks, and thus that of appropriately responding to them, is well-developed.

Elements of What should be Done

The realisation of the vision I outlined may require many things. I believe, however, that changes in two related areas are critical. These areas are elements of the way we manage our economic affairs and, the latter's key determinants, our norms and beliefs (that is ourselves). I describe these below, in an order that does not necessarily reflect their relative importance.

Changes in norms and beliefs or perspectives

Self-interest

The legitimate pursuit of self-interest – be it in business, in the civil service, in academia, or in any other legal enterprise – should be appreciated and encouraged. I bring this up because we seem to be

somehow displeased about and frown upon individual success. Somebody (I forgot who, though I remember it is a he) described his own society as follows: "Our society dislikes two things most – success and failure." I think that our society suffers from the same prejudice. The end-result of such prejudice is glorified mediocrity.

In saying so, I am not trying to champion *Laissez Faire*. I fully recognise the need for collective action as well as the dangers that exclusive and unregulated pursuit of individual gain poses to society. The trick is to build an environment within which the incentives for the legitimate pursuit of self-interest are in place, flexible mechanisms for encouraging the coincidence of individual and common interests are designed, and misdemeanours are appropriately discouraged and punished. Otherwise, progress is quiet unlikely.

This of course is easier said than done. However, the only way we can go forward is by thinking about the problems, discussing the merits of alternative solutions, experimenting, and gradually developing such a system.

Government

We have to revise our, usually implicit, belief in the unlimited powers of the state. The required revision, I believe, has two parts. Simply put the government is too big and too small at the same time. Seen from the perspective of a single individual, the government is too big. Hence, the value we give to individual rights, particularly civil rights, should be much higher than they appear to get now.

Seen from the perspective of the requirements of socio-economic advancement needed in this country, the government is too small. To illustrate this rather crudely, consider government expenditure. In 2002 the Ethiopian government spent about 20 Billion Birr on the current and future needs of a country with 68 million people. A crudely analogous situation is: one person with an annual income of 30000 Birr managing a household of one hundred people providing for their education, health, and security needs during the year and invest some money for future needs as well. It is very likely that some needs of some people will not be met.

My point is that it is not easy to manage a poor economy such as ours (think of how much effort is required to manage our own households). I am not trying to excuse inefficiency and abuse – I simply want to emphasise that we have to adjust our expectations about what the government can do. What does that imply?

For *policy makers* this means that:

They need to genuinely realise that their power emanates from society via elections or appointments; that it is always power temporarily delegated to them; and, most importantly, **that they are human beings with all the fallibility which that entails**. These are very obvious and are usually proclaimed by policy makers. I mention them because our history makes me wonder how deeply rooted these beliefs are in our society.

They also need to fully appreciate the limits to the impact of their

policies in terms of rapidly changing our society's circumstances in and by themselves. Among other benefits, this would at least minimise the frustration that may be caused by the implicit but unwarranted belief in the great powers of the state and its policies. At the same time, policy makers should accept that the success of their policies is highly dependent on the responses of 'citizens' to those policies, which in turn are motivated by 'beliefs' and incentives.

For *citizens* the main implication is that, each of us should do his or her bit by taking our place in society seriously, otherwise things will not improve. We have to pay taxes, engage in constructive dialogue, perform our respective tasks with integrity, and genuinely appreciate the difficulties of policy-makers.

Responsibility

I think we suffer from what I may call the 'blame culture' (may be somebody else used this phrase before, but I do not remember). It is always something or someone else which is responsible for our difficulties. It is 'society at large', 'culture', 'the weather', 'wrong policies', 'the government', 'greedy businessmen', 'myopic peasants', 'globalisation', 'superiors', the list goes on. It is almost never 'I' or 'we'. I am not denying that many of these may be real problems with considerable impact. What I am objecting to is the manner in which they are used to side-step responsibility, and thus prevent speedier solution to problems.

It is really amazing how widespread this is. It ranges from mundane household affairs to weighty public discussions. Let me give you a rather light-hearted example from my daily life. Whenever something goes wrong in our household, for instance one of my books is misplaced, it is rather difficult to establish who is responsible. When asked everyone answers automatically 'It was not I', sometimes even before knowing what he or she is being asked about. The question is completed or repeated and after a while somebody says 'Oh that, it was I'. This is so common that it has become a kind of game we play. Of course this may be because my wife and I are bad household managers, though I doubt it very much. The main reason, I strongly suspect, is this mindset to pass on responsibility. Take another, more serious, example. How frequently have you got the answer 'This is how we work' or 'It is the rules or guidelines' when you ask **why** you are supposed to meet some (sometimes ridiculous) requirement to get what you wanted. By the way, this can happen both in public offices as well as private enterprises. For some reason we tend to confuse 'how' with 'why' or become worried and defensive when asked 'why' questions.

We need to develop a sense of purpose with well-thought out aims and instruments. Combined with this we should develop a sense of responsibility. Obviously, we live within a collective, and as a result we benefit from and are constrained by that collective. Nevertheless, the 'collective' – be it a society, a community, or a specific group – exists within and through each of us. Hence, we have considerable freedom to act independently and,

with some effort, change ourselves and our collective for the better. With that individual freedom comes individual responsibility.

Patriotism

For me patriotism is strong emotional link with one's society represented by positive beliefs about that society and expressed in actions which enhance the welfare of its members. I also believe that patriotism starts at home – with seriousness of one's purpose, its pursuit in a legitimate manner, as well as real care and concern about the current and future well-being of one's family, particularly children. It then extends, in one form or another, to the rest of society.

Who is a patriot according to this understanding? Obviously, high on the list are people (usually soldiers) who pay the ultimate sacrifice and fall on the battlefield in defence of their society. Fortunately the situations that demand such sacrifices are rare and hopefully getting even rarer. The list of patriots should include many others, as well. What about the businessmen who reinvest their profits within the country instead of sending it abroad; and those who return after studying abroad. What about those who are grappling with the country's problems in their various capacities – the teacher who strives to educate within inadequate schools, the civil servant who performs his/her duties with integrity and to the best of his/her abilities although the financial returns for doing so are not high, individuals who are fighting to combat HIV/AIDS (particularly those who have already tested positive) and other illnesses; scientists of one sort or another

researching and inventing; and farmers trying to improve their lot. The list goes on. To me all these are patriots and need to be acknowledged as such.

In contrast, thousands are trying to leave the country as evidenced by the roaring business DV centres had during the last months of 2003. I know of established people who applied and got DV. Do not get me wrong! I do not question these persons' right to do as they did and respect their choices. My point is that we have to appreciate the choices made by those staying or coming back. Those who may claim that these groups have no other choice are insulting not only others but also themselves that the country has nothing to offer for people with options. One wonders why they themselves are still living in this country – presumably for some altruistic reasons.

Obviously, the patriots I mentioned, like all patriots, have recognisable shortcomings. These shortcomings should be identified and, if possible, corrected. However, that should not be an excuse for not acknowledging their good choices and deeds.

Changes in Aspects of Economic Management

Civil service

A high-quality civil service is vital to the designing of good economic policies, including rules and regulations, and their effective implementation. It is also critical to the efficient provision of social services to the public. This importance has increased further with the onset of the PRSP process

and the centrality of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). Upgrading the quality of the civil service requires increasing its **autonomy from the political sphere and from supervised entities (independence)**. It also demands improving incentives; instituting meritocratic recruitment and promotion; enhancing integrity, transparency, accountability, and better coordination within the civil service.

In this regard it is important to understand incentives in the civil service broadly to include the perception of making a difference emanating from a sense of duty, professional independence, as well as power and influence. In a poor country like ours it may not be possible to substantially increase wages and salaries in the short-run. As a result these other types of incentives need to be employed more widely and more effectively. Some progress seems to be occurring in this direction through the recently initiated civil service reform.

Economic knowledge

The effectiveness of policies rises with the extent to which they are based on systematic explorations and use of the relevant body of economic knowledge and the best statistics available. As a result policy makers need to be more appreciative of the benefits of such knowledge and statistics. They should also better realise the difficulties in generating both and acquiring the former. Similarly, they need to be more prepared to regularly interact with experts and seriously consider the outcomes of

this interaction in making their decisions.

I like to relate a story from Uganda's experience to highlight the power of knowledge, particularly when it is combined with the political will to make a difference. After coming to power, the Museveni government, perhaps the president himself, feared that devaluation of the Ugandan shilling would increase inflation. As a result it actually revalued the currency in 1986. But it allowed debate on the issue to continue. What helped to resolve the Ugandan debate was a pair of papers written for the Permanent secretary in 1989 by Stephen Morris, then a young PhD student who had been attached to the Planning Ministry on a British government fellowship. Without going into details, let me say that Morris showed that devaluation was the correct policy. More importantly, his papers convinced the relevant policy makers, and the policy was adopted. This link between economic research and policy making has since become very strong in Uganda. As someone concluded 'the Ugandan story, ... gives as clear an example of learning and innovation by a protected technocracy as one can find'. Look where Uganda is today!! By the way Stephen Morris is now a full professor of economics at Yale University and one of the best young economic theoreticians around.

Some specific proposals

Let me make some specific proposals.

Independent advisory council

Establish an independent advisory council, which advises the government on key policy matters, and also assess the impact of

policies that are adopted. The exact form and responsibilities should be worked out in a systematic manner. My preferred model is the council of economic advisers in the US but without the political ties of that council.

Some may worry that such arrangements may dilute the authority of the government. This however reflects a narrow understanding of authority as 'formal' or 'nominal' rather than 'real'. Real authority is measured by the effectiveness of an agent to influence the relevant beliefs and actions of other agents. Indeed, efficient use of such arrangements will enhance the effectiveness of the government to nudge beliefs and actions of citizens in the desired direction. It does so by widening the 'constituency' of policy decisions through greater inclusiveness, better communication, and improved design and implementation.

National research foundation

Establish an autonomous national research foundation which coordinates research in the country, solicit funds, and award grants. The experience of the Ethiopian Science and Technology Commission could be built upon, in this regard.

Stock-taking

Launch a national effort in economic knowledge stock-taking and priority-setting. This effort should involve government agencies, academics, the private sector, civil society organisations and donors. The aim of such an effort would be to reach "... the stage at which we know that we do not know" via systematic:

- cataloguing and review of economic research conducted

about Ethiopia in the last 5-10 years (quality of methodology and analysis, relevance, effectiveness); and

- review of economic research capacity in Ethiopia (manpower, institutional set-up, data, other resources, efficiency, funding).

It would be useful to build on the experiences of EDRI, EEA, and EARO. Subsequently, or in parallel, the effort should initiate studies aimed at:

- identifying the type of dominant market and non-market institutional arrangements and assess how well they are functioning; and
- assessing government policies (including reform measures) as a package, since it is not only individual ingredients but also, perhaps more importantly, the combination of these ingredients which determine outcomes

There are some recent signs that the Ethiopian government may be thinking along similar lines.

Conclusion

Let me close with a couple of remarks.

I believe, like Professor Mesfin before me, that the initiative should come, and usually does come from, the educated and the relatively rich citizens of Ethiopia. This is so because they are the only groups in a poor society like ours that have the necessary degree of comfort and the requisite analytical tools, and hence the responsibility, to systematically reason and act. Though the initiative comes from these groups, enduring success occurs only through and with the participation of the rest of society.

Hence, on the basis of such initiative, let us build “a national consensus to invest in the future.”

In the spirit of the responsibility described above, I have made some specific proposals including a research agenda. To a large extent the research agenda I outlined envisages a journey of self-discovery – the systematic discovery of our country's people (their history, particularly economic history; their norms and beliefs; their aspirations and potentials; and the incentives and constraints they face) and ourselves (the educated and the well-off) as human beings and as Ethiopians. That discovery, I believe is a key ingredient of the effort to transform our society.

This, of course, is easier said than done. However, as the Amharic saying goes ‘Fear of dreams will not stop us from sleeping.’ The **only option** we have is to continue to think, investigate, constructively discuss, and come up with some workable solutions – a process that needs to be continuous, dynamic, and consonant with the changing world we live in. **No one else, however well-intentioned, can do this for us. We have to do it ourselves.**

Whenever each of us think about our society's problems, whatever possible solutions we come up with, and whatever decisions we make, let us remember the dreams of the poor boy in the video clip we watched. Whatever we do or do not do, we are, individually and collectively, accountable to him and his generation – that is our children and grandchildren.

Thank you.



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መልካም የኢኮኖሚያዊ አስተዳደር

ወልዳይ አምላ*

በቅድሚያ የኢኮኖሚ መልካም አስተዳደርን በሚመለከት በአገራችን የነበረውንና ያለውን ሁኔታ መሠረት በማድረግ ሞያዊ ትንተና በማቅረብ ርዕያቸውን እንድንጋራ ላደረጉን ለዶ/ር አለማየሁ ሥዩም ያለኝን አድናቆት ከምስጋና ጋር ለማቅረብ እወዳለሁ።

በእኔ እምነት የዶ/ር አለማየሁ አቀራረብ የተዋጣለት ነው። እንደ ኢኮኖሚ መልካም አስተዳደርን ያለ በእጅጉ ሰፊ ርዕስ ላይ ተመስርቶ ርዕይን ማጋራት ፈታኝ እንደሆነ ለማናገጥም ስውር አይደለም። ምክንያቱም የተለያዩ ፅንሰ-ሀሳቦችና ስልቶችን ከመጠየቅም ባሻገር በርዕይ ደረጃ እንዲገለፅ አድርጎ ማስቀመጡ ሌላ ውስብስብ ተግባር በመሆኑ ነው።

ዶ/ር አለማየሁ በግልፅ እንዳስቀመጡት ባለፉት አስርት አመታት የኢትዮጵያን ኢኮኖሚ የሚመለከቱ የተለያዩ ፅንሰ ሀሳባዊ ትንተናዎች፣ የመፍትሄ አቅጣጫዎችና ፖሊሲዎች እየተቀየሱ ተግባራዊ ቢደረጉም ውጤታማ ባለመሆናቸው አሁንም ኢኮኖሚያችን እጅግ አሳሳቢ ደረጃ ላይ ይገኛል። በመሠረቱ ድህነት የደካማ መዋቅራዊ፣ ኢኮኖሚያዊ አስተዳደርና ማህበራዊ ሥርዓት ውጤት ነው። ይህ ውጤት ወይም ድህነት ራሱ እድገትን በመግታት ያለመረጋጋትን በመፍጠር ዘላቂና አስተማማኝ ብልፅግናን እያነቀ ችግሩን ያባብሰዋል። ስለዚህም ነው የኢኮኖሚ መልካም አስተዳደር ድህነትን ለማስወገድም ሆነ እድገትን ለማፋጠን ወሳኝ የሚሆነው።

ወደ አጠቃላይ የአጅንዳው ነጥቦች ከመግባቱ በፊት ስለኢኮኖሚ መልካም አስተዳደር ጠቅለል ያሉ መሠረተ ሀሳቦችን ለማስቀመጥ እወዳለሁ።

ስለ ኢኮኖሚ መልካም አስተዳደር ስንነጋገር ስለ ዘላቂና አስተማማኝነት ያለው የኢኮኖሚ ሥርዓት አመራርና አፈፃፀም ላይ ማተኮር ይኖርብናል። ይህ ፅንሰ ሀሳብ የሚከተሉትን ቁምነገሮች ይመለከታል።

- 1 ለኢኮኖሚያዊ እንቅስቃሴ ምቹ ሁኔታ ሊፈጥሩ የሚችሉ በማክሮ ደረጃ የሚወጡ የኢኮኖሚ ፖሊሲዎችን፤
- 2 የኢኮኖሚ እንቅስቃሴን የሚያበረታቱ የንብረት ባለቤቶችን መብት ማረጋገጥና ዋስትና መስጠትን፤
- 3 ብቃት ያለው የቁጥጥር ሥርዓት (regulatory)፤
- 4 የሙስና ያለመኖር፤
- 5 ወጥና ዘላቂነት ያላቸው ድህነትን የሚቀርፉ ፖሊሲዎች፤
- 6 የሚወጡ የኢኮኖሚ ፖሊሲዎችና ተዛማጅ መሪዎችን ለማስፈፀም የሚችሉ ብቃት ያላቸው ተቋሞች ወዘተ... መኖሩን ይጨምራል።

በማንኛውም ወቅት ፖለቲካዊና ኢኮኖሚያዊ መልካም አስተዳደር ተነጣጥለው የሚታዩ አይደሉም። ስለዚህም መሪዎችና ፖሊሲ አውጭዎች በኢኮኖሚ ጉዳዮች ላይ በሚወስዷቸው እርምጃዎች ግልፅነትና ተጠያቂነት ያለው አሰራር መከተል ይጠበቅባቸዋል። ከዚህም በላይ በኢኮኖሚ ውስጥ ቁልፍ ሚና ከሚጫወቱ መንግሥታዊ ያልሆኑ አካሎች ጋር በጥምረትና በቅንጅት መስራት ይኖርባቸዋል።

የኢኮኖሚ መልካም አስተዳደር በሌሎች ዘርፎች ከሚኖሩ መልካም አስተዳደሮች ተነጥሎ ህልውና ሊኖረውም ሆነ ውጤታማ ሊሆን አይችልም። እርግጥ ከመልካም አስተዳደርና ከዲሞክራሲ ጋር በተያያዙ የሚነሱ አከራካሪ ነጥቦች አሉ።

የዶ/ር አለማየሁን ፅሁፍ ሳነብ በእጅግ ከሳቡኝ ጉዳዮች አንዱ የመንግሥት ፖሊሲዎችን ትክክለኛነት ተቀባይነትና ውጤታማነት ለመለካት የተጠቀሙበት ስልት ነው። በዚህ ፅሁፍቸው ከኢኮኖሚ ጋር በተያያዙ ያሉትን የመልካም አስተዳደር የተጠያቂነት፣ የግልጽነት፣ የተቋሞች ያለመጠናከር የህግ ሥርዓቱ ድክመትና የመንግሥት ሚናና የአቅም ውስንነት ችግሮች አሳይተዋል።

ከዚህ በተጨማሪ ለታሪክና ለባህል የሚሰጠው አነስተኛ ግምት፣ የፖሊሲዎች ወጥነትና ዘላቂነት ላይ ያለውን ጥርጣሬ፣ የህግ አስገዳጅነት፣ በአስፈፃሚነትና በተጠያቂነት ያለ የቁጥጥር ሥርዓት ሚዛን እንዲሁም ሁሉንም ዘርፎች የሚዳስሱ የኢኮኖሚያዊ እውቀት ማነስ መኖራቸውን አብራርተዋል። እስካሁን በተጠቀሱት ነጥቦች ሙሉ በሙሉ የምስማማ ብሆንም ምንጊዜም ቢሆን አማራጭ ሀሳቦችን በማቅረብ እንዴት ከአሁኑ በተሻለ መልኩ ሊተገበር ይችላል የሚለው ለውይይታችን መነሻ ዋነኛው ርዕስ መሆን ይኖርበታል እላለሁ።

ዶ/ር አለማየሁ ኢኮኖሚያዊ ጉዳዮች ላይ መደረግ ስላለባቸው ውይይቶችና የፖሊሲ ምርጫዎች በሚመለከት ያነሷቸው መሠረታዊ ቁምነገሮች አሉ። ይህ መሠረታዊ ጉዳይ እንዳለ ሆኖ ግን በእኔ እምነት በማንኛውም አገርና በየትኛውም ማህበራዊና ባህላዊ ሁኔታ ተቀባይነት ያላቸው አድማሳዊ ባህሪ ያላቸው (generic) የኢኮኖሚ ፖሊሲዎች አሉ። እነዚህ ፖሊሲዎች ከግንዛቤ በማስገባት ከአገራችን ተጨባጭ ሁኔታ ጋር የሚጣጣሙ ፖሊሲዎችን መንደፍና ማስፈፀም ያስፈልጋል።

* የኢትዮጵያ አነስተኛ ብድርና ቁጠባ ተቋማት ማህበር ዋና ዳይሬክተር።

PROMOTING STABILITY IN THE HORN OF AFRICA

David H. Shinn*

A Conflicted Corner of Africa

The Horn of Africa has been the most conflicted part of the African continent during the past half century. Defined here as Ethiopia, Sudan, Eritrea, Djibouti, Somalia, Somaliland, Kenya and Uganda, the root causes of conflict in the Horn are numerous and sometimes complex even within a single dispute. They include ethnic, language, regional and cultural differences, arbitrary boundaries, religion, ideology, competition for scarce resources such as pasturage and water, unequal sharing of resources controlled by the state and the sheer desire for power. The importance of conflict on regional economic development should be obvious to everyone.

Except for peace between 1972 and 1983, Sudan experienced civil war from 1955 until 2002 when the Sudan People's Liberation Front and the government reached a cease fire agreement. Even today, however, Sudan faces serious problems in Darfur region on the border with Chad and the dispute with Egypt over the Halaib Triangle is not resolved. Ethiopia confronted an Eritrean secessionist movement that began in 1961 and lasted until the overthrow of the Derg

government in 1991 by the Tigrayan People's Liberation Front, its allied organizations and several Eritrean groups, especially the Eritrean People's Liberation Front. An agreement to give Eritrea independence resulted in cordial relations between Ethiopia and Eritrea until 1998 when Eritrean troops entered Badme, a small piece of territory administered by Ethiopia. This led to major hostilities until Ethiopia won a military victory in 2000. Eritrea has had less important differences with Yemen (Hanish Islands), Sudan (tit for tat support of opposition groups) and Djibouti (border issues). Djibouti experienced periodic attacks by a dissident Afar organization until the mid-1990s.

Problems between Somalia and its neighbors began soon after Somali independence in 1960 when it began to press irredentist claims against Djibouti and parts of Ethiopia and Kenya. There was periodic conflict along the Somalia-Kenya border, a conflict with Ethiopia in 1964 and a major war and occupation of most of Ethiopia's Ogaden by Somalia in 1977-78. Somalia experienced its own civil war beginning in the late 1980s. This led to the collapse of

Somalia in 1991 and the declaration of an independent state by authorities in Somaliland. Even today there are occasional conflicts between Ethiopia and groups in Somalia, which remains a failed state. Kenya has been relatively free of strife but experienced periodic ethnic conflict in its Rift Valley region until the mid-1990s. Tanzania invaded Uganda in 1978-79 in a successful effort to overthrow the Idi Amin regime. A number of dissident groups have operated in Uganda, the most troublesome being the Lord's Resistance Army, which has received support from Sudan. For their part, Uganda, Ethiopia and Eritrea for many years supported the Sudan People's Liberation Movement against the government in Khartoum. Uganda provided a base of operation for the Rwandan Patriotic Front that gained power in Rwanda after the 1994 genocide. Uganda also sent troops into the eastern Congo in the mid-1990s. All of these countries, except Somalia, Somaliland and Djibouti, are Nile Basin riparian states and, therefore, part of the solution or problem in reaching an agreement on the sharing of Nile water before there is a new regional conflict.

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The following remarks on promoting stability in the Horn of Africa, although sometimes critical, are intended as constructive criticism. They come from a friend of the Horn of Africa. They do not necessarily reflect the position of the U.S. government; rather they are those of a private American citizen now working as a university professor and writer on developments in Africa. The factors promoting stability discussed below usually do not apply in equal measure to all countries in the Horn.

Build Democracy and Transparency

The sooner that all of the countries of the Horn of Africa develop stronger democratic institutions and establish an environment where opposing ideas can be debated freely in these institutions, the less likely there will be new conflicts. Democratic countries are simply less threatening to their neighbors. Democracies rarely attack or undermine other democracies. This does not mean that the countries of the Horn should replicate precisely the political systems existing today in North America or among the members of the European Union. But some basic concepts must be put in place without which there will be no real democracy.

The political environment must allow a responsible opposition to compete for power on an equitable basis. A responsible opposition is one that operates within the framework of a nation's constitution and seeks power through legal means. It is irresponsible if it tries to achieve power through the use of force or other extra-legal methods. The opposition will also become

irresponsible if it succeeds in reaching power through the democratic process only to disregard democratic principles after that point.

An important part of this democratic political environment is regular, free and fair elections. But elections alone are not the solution. A vigorous, independent and professional press must be allowed to operate freely. There are, of course, responsibilities that accompany the private media. Of all the countries in the Horn, Kenya has the most open and professional independent press. Ethiopia has made noticeable progress in recent years. The independent press is increasingly outspoken, critical and professional. On the other hand, the perception of press freedom in Ethiopia has been damaged as a result of the draft press law and the dispute between the government and the Ethiopia Free Press Journalists' Association. Eritrea does not even have a viable independent press while the situation in Sudan has been regressing recently and, in any event, there is a long way to go before it can be said to have a free press.

Independent and professional judicial systems are weak throughout the region. Kenya and Uganda, perhaps for historical reasons, appear to have the best developed judiciaries. In some countries, such as Ethiopia, the judicial system remains woefully understaffed; this contributes enormously to caseload backlogs. As important as adequate staffing of the institution is, there is an equivalent need to inculcate within the government and citizenry respect for independence of the

judiciary. There must also be a commitment by the government and the population to abide by the spirit and letter of the nation's constitution.

All countries in the Horn are subject to criticism on their human rights practices, some much more than others. This is an area where all elements of society, led by the government, must make a commitment to reduce and eventually eliminate human rights abuses. Although human rights organizations do not always get the facts right, they should be applauded for their efforts rather than just vilified when governments perceive that they are being overly critical. Human rights should be a matter of national policy. Ethiopia, for example, passed legislation in 1999 to establish a national Human Rights Commission and Office of the Ombudsman. This was an excellent initiative. Unfortunately, the legislation has not yet been implemented.

A critical element in the development of democracy is the strengthening of civil society organizations. This includes independent trade unions, chambers of commerce, women's groups, teacher's and lawyer's organizations, student groups, human rights councils, etc. Eventually, these organizations can make a major contribution to creating an environment that encourages democratic practices. Except for Kenya and to some extent Uganda, civil society is not well developed in the Horn. The sooner that civil society groups take root throughout the Horn of Africa, the greater the likelihood that real democracy will follow.

All the good that can come from the

building of these democratic institutions and processes will be destroyed if one insidious practice—corruption—accompanies them. To some extent, every society, including the United States, faces this problem. Corruption will never disappear entirely, but governments and the private sector must remain vigilant constantly to minimize the damage done by both petty and grand corruption. Much of Kenya's success with democratization has been undone by the pervasiveness of corruption in the country. If Kenya does not control this problem, its prospects will not be good. Other countries in the Horn need to take every legal effort possible in their battle to contain this disease.

There is often pressure, particularly in the international donor community and among opposition political parties, to push for instant democracy. There is no such thing as instant democracy. But the trend in any particular country must be in a positive direction. If there is constant, visible improvement in a variety of areas, the international community should be patient and supportive. If the process stalls or goes backwards, the international partners should be outspoken in their criticism. In any event, they should aid the process by helping to build democratic institutions such as an independent judiciary and parliament and help in the creation of a pervasive and influential civil society. They should also engage governments—sometimes privately and sometimes publicly—in a policy dialogue on those issues where they do not see eye to eye.

Reduce Ethnic Tension

One of the most difficult problems to solve in the Horn is the question of ethnic tension. Ethnic issues often lead to, or at least contribute to, conflict in the region. There are as many reasons for conflict between groups as there are solutions to reducing tension. Some of these differences are historical in nature. Often they involve disagreement over scarce resources, especially land and water. Actual or perceived lack of political power by certain ethnic groups is also a frequent reason for opposing established governments. Sometimes the conflict occurs entirely within the borders of a country such as the Kikuyu-Kalenjin disputes over land in Kenya's Rift Valley. Other ethnic difficulties cross national boundaries as historically has been the case with Somalis from Somalia agitating inside Ethiopia and Kenya.

It is not within the purview of this paper to suggest solutions to these numerous ethnic conflicts, whether they are internal or cross border disputes. Each case is to some extent sui generis in any event. But it is important to take whatever steps a country can to reduce the level of ethnic tension. For the internal problems, equitable sharing of political power and state resources is probably the most important measure a government can take. For those ethnic conflicts that cross international boundaries, regional economic integration and improved communication at the local and national level are useful ways to mitigate conflict. In this connection, Ethiopia and Sudan have put in place procedures and institutions to improve communication along the border.

The two countries have ambitious plans to improve economic integration along the northern part of their border. At some point, this would seem to be the most effective way to repair the relationship between Ethiopia and Eritrea.

End Support for Opposition Groups

There is a long history in the Horn of Africa whereby one country supports an opposition group in one or more of the neighboring countries. This is a destabilizing and self-defeating policy. It inevitably leads to retribution by the targeted country, which then supports an opposition group in the country that initiated the problem. There is no question that this tit for tat tactic only increases instability throughout the region and that it continues up to the present day.

Sudan and its neighbors offer a case in point. Since the resumption in 1983 of the civil war in Sudan, three of its neighbors—Uganda, Ethiopia and Eritrea—have on various occasions supported the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) and/or the National Democratic Alliance. For its part, Sudan has periodically supported the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) in Uganda, the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) in Ethiopia and Eritrean Islamic Jihad (EIJ) in Eritrea. Ultimately, all of this reciprocal support for another country's opposition group resulted in more conflict and increased regional instability.

Joseph Kony's LRA in northern Uganda graphically makes the argument. For the past 17 years Kony has opposed the Ugandan government believing that he has

spiritual powers to save the Acholi people. He draws much of his military support from several thousand abducted child soldiers and a couple hundred adult commanders. Sudan began supporting the LRA with small quantities of arms in 1994 in response to Uganda's assistance to the SPLA. Sudan's goal was to destabilize Uganda on its northern border in order to obstruct the flow of arms to the SPLA, which was fighting Sudan's army. Following efforts by the SPLA and the government of Sudan to end the civil war, both Sudan and Uganda claim they have ended military support respectively for the LRA and SPLA. By 2003 Uganda and Sudan were cooperating in tracking down LRA forces operating out of southern Sudan. This is a positive development, but should the effort to end the civil war in Sudan fail, the tit for tat support of these two groups would probably resume soon thereafter.

The outbreak of conflict in 1998 between Eritrea and Ethiopia changed alliances in the Horn. Ethiopia, Uganda and Eritrea were until that event aligned against Sudan. Ethiopia fully normalized relations with Sudan within a year or two. Both Uganda and Eritrea reestablished diplomatic relations with Khartoum, although Eritrean-Sudanese ties continue to be strained. While the Ethiopian-Eritrean conflict ended much of the tit for tat support of opposition groups involving Sudan, it set in motion a new round of support for opposition groups in Eritrea and Ethiopia. Eritrea befriended the OLF while Ethiopia began to support opponents of the government in Asmara. Until it became a failed state in

1991, Somalia backed or permitted the operation within its borders of groups hostile to the government in Addis Ababa. These groups included the militant wing of the Ogadeni National Liberation Front and the Western Somali Liberation Front. After the fall of the Siad Barre government, the political vacuum in Somalia resulted in new threats. Due to the absence of a national government and sometimes with the connivance of certain Somali factions, the fundamentalist al-Ittihad al-Islami launched attacks in the mid-1990s from Somalia against Ethiopia. For a brief period in the late 1990s, one of the Somali political factions helped the OLF to establish a base in Somalia. For its part, Ethiopia attacked its enemies across the Somali border and continues to support its favorite factions inside the country.

The solution, albeit difficult to achieve, to ending these debilitating and unproductive games is the full normalization of relations among all countries in the Horn followed by greater political and economic integration. Until there are sufficient incentives at the leadership level of countries in the Horn to move in this direction, nothing will happen. Through the use of tangible incentives and tough, frank discussions, the international community can encourage such a trend. Sudan and the SPLM/A are well advanced in achieving reconciliation and bringing to an end one of the most destructive civil wars on the continent. Although the unity agreement signed in late January in Nairobi by Somali factional leaders is encouraging, Somalia is still a long way from achieving peace. Continuing problems between Ethiopia and Eritrea also seem far from resolution.

Encourage Harmony among People of Different Religions

The Horn of Africa is located on a religious fault line. The populations of Ethiopia and Eritrea are divided about equally between Muslims and Christians. Historically, internal relations between the two religious groups in both countries have been cordial. On the other hand, Islamic invasions from outside have left a residue of ill feeling. There is a significant non-Muslim minority in Sudan, a factor that has contributed to instability in that country. There are significant Muslim minorities in largely Christian Kenya and Uganda that increasingly lead to tension in society. Somalia, Somaliland and Djibouti are almost entirely Muslim.

It is imperative that governments pursue policies that encourage religious harmony in all countries of the Horn. They can not afford to add to their list of problems growing hostility between Muslims and Christians. It is also becoming increasingly common for outside extremist groups to manipulate small numbers of indigenous Muslims to support activities aimed at harming established governments or Western interests. So far, Kenya has been the primary focus of these efforts as evidenced by the 1998 bombing of the American embassy in Nairobi and the 2002 attacks against Israeli interests near Mombasa. The increased use of terrorism by radical Islamic groups as a tactic to achieve political goals is a real threat to the countries of the Horn. An influx of extreme Islamic influence from outside is not in the interest of the region. At the same time, it is important that Christian groups not be overzealous as they proselytize. It is not in anyone's

long term interest if these efforts result in serious disagreements with Muslims or, for that matter, other Christian groups.

Ethiopia, Eritrea, Uganda and, especially Kenya, need to reach out more to their Muslim communities and ensure proportionate sharing of power and resources. Radicalization of these Islamic communities will only undermine stability. Somalia, Somaliland, Djibouti and, especially Sudan, need to be equally attentive to their non-Muslim minorities. They also should be alert to and take steps to prevent the rise of radical Islam, particularly where the agenda is to encourage instability in the region. This is a special problem for Somalia, which still does not have a government that controls all of the country. It is one more reason why the various political factions in Somalia need to put their differences behind them and make compromises that will lead to a national government. Finally, if all the countries in the Horn become more democratic there will tend to be a tendency toward greater harmony among people of different religions.

There is also a role for the international community. Individual partner countries, most of which are Christian, need to improve their own understanding about and outreach to Muslims in countries where Islam is a minority religion (Kenya and Uganda) or where the leadership is predominantly Christian (Ethiopia and Eritrea) in a religiously divided country. This should include development assistance that is targeted for areas largely inhabited by Muslims. The international community should also increase its

support for the Intergovernmental Authority on Development's efforts to achieve peace in Sudan and Somalia. In the case of Somalia, it may well require a different approach than the one underway in Kenya and tried on so many previous occasions at conferences outside Somalia. Whatever the partner countries can do to enhance religious tolerance in the Horn of Africa will be time and money well spent. It is in the interest of both the countries in the Horn and the wider international community.

Achieve Equitable Nile Water Sharing

Equitable sharing of water in the Nile basin is a critical element in the long term stability of the region. There are ten riparian states in the Nile basin, but the most important ones are Ethiopia, Sudan, Egypt and Uganda. Ninety-five percent of Egypt's population depends on Nile water. The Nile effectively is Egypt's lifeline. All of the water reaching Egypt flows through Sudan, which also depends heavily on it for irrigated agriculture. Eighty-six percent of the water reaching the Aswan Dam originates, however, in Ethiopia. Most of it comes from the Blue Nile and Ethiopian tributaries that flow into the Blue Nile; the remainder originates from Ethiopian tributaries that flow into Sudan's Atbara and Sobat Rivers. Egypt and Sudan signed agreements in 1929 and 1959 that divided the water between the two countries. Ethiopia was not even a signatory.

Agreement among the ten riparian states on the use of this water system has the potential to improve significantly wider cooperation in the region. Conversely, failure to

reach agreement will substantially increase the prospect for instability and regional conflict. Fortunately, there are a number of positive initiatives underway that give hope for an agreement by the riparian states on sharing of Nile water. Potentially the two most important adversaries over use of the water are Ethiopia and Egypt. There appears, however, to be a growing understanding by both countries of the need to resolve this issue. The Egyptian Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, Fayza Abounaga, during a visit to Addis Ababa at the end of 2003 described the bilateral relationship as "moving towards a new era of mutual understanding, mutual confidence and trust."

It is in the interest of the ten riparian states to make the necessary compromises so that equitable Nile water sharing can take place. The wider international community should also provide strong political support and reasonable financial resources to ensure a successful outcome. A peaceful resolution of this potentially serious dispute would constitute one of the most important instances of conflict prevention ever witnessed on the African continent.

Reverse the HIV/AIDS Pandemic

One of the major challenges to stability and economic development in the region is the HIV/AIDS pandemic. According to UNAIDS, the HIV prevalence rate for persons in the 15 to 49 age group in Kenya is 9.4 percent, Ethiopia 7.3 percent, Uganda 5 percent and Eritrea 2.4 percent. Uganda, out of all African countries, has had the greatest success at lowering the national prevalence rate from a much higher

level. Nevertheless, Kampala residents last year still faced 17 percent HIV prevalence, a sharp decrease from its peak but an unacceptably high rate. Although the percentage of persons in Ethiopia with HIV is not among the highest on the continent, Ethiopia has the third highest number of HIV positive persons in the world after India and South Africa. This is due to Ethiopia's large population of 70 million. The prevalence rate in Somalia, Somaliland and northern Sudan is thought to be low but growing. No one knows the prevalence rate in southern Sudan, but it is believed to be very high. Djibouti is also thought to have a high rate because its population is concentrated in an urban port city.

In relative terms, Kenya may be the most threatened country in the Horn. Out of a total population of about 30 million, more than two million are thought to be HIV positive. An estimated 1.5 million Kenyans have already died from AIDS. Life expectancy has dropped by at least 13 years to approximately 50 years. HIV/AIDS reduced GDP by three-tenths of a percent in 2000 and is expected to have an even larger negative impact in the future. More women than men are HIV positive and increasingly the epidemic is becoming a serious gender and development issue. Although the Kibaki government has begun to treat HIV as a major threat to the economy, the implications for Kenya's economic development still could be horrendous. In Malawi, for example, where the problem is more severe, the World Bank recently estimated that up to half of the country's professional workforce could die of AIDS by 2005.

In the Horn of Africa, the impact of HIV/AIDS on the economy has already been significant and has the potential for being catastrophic if HIV prevalence rates are not reversed. The Ethiopian Economic Association's Second Annual Report on the Ethiopian Economy appropriately emphasized this issue. It noted that HIV/AIDS retards growth, weakens human capital, discourages investment and exacerbates poverty and inequality. In short, it increases instability while a significant reduction in the HIV rate would enhance stability.

The social, personal and economic aspects of HIV/AIDS are now generally appreciated throughout the region. Only recently, however, has the negative impact on security forces become a consideration. There is a high incidence of HIV/AIDS in African armies. According to UNAIDS, between 60 and 70 percent of the personnel in South Africa's military are HIV positive versus about 20 percent for the entire adult population. Eleven percent of Nigeria's peacekeepers returning from Liberia and Sierra Leone tested positive as compared to about 5 percent in Nigeria's adult population. An estimated 66 percent of Ugandan soldiers who went to the Democratic Republic of the Congo came back positive. The International Crisis Group reports that about 10 percent of Eritrean soldiers are HIV positive. In southern Africa, the prevalence rates are already at the point where they may destroy the security force. A study of Ethiopia's army suggests that the presence of HIV is about 6 percent or slightly below the rate for the adult population. Ethiopia has done a generally good job in dealing with HIV in the armed forces and is certainly an exception in this regard.

But this is no time for complacency in Ethiopia and certainly not in the other countries of the Horn where the HIV rate in the military is probably higher than in the general population.

At least this is one problem where the international community is making a major effort to reverse the damage. The United Nations' Global Fund, the World Bank, European Union and bilateral donors like the United States are providing significant amounts of financial and technical assistance. Numerous non-governmental organizations, foundations such as Gates and Packard and even private companies like Pfizer are also doing their part.

Make Food Security a High Priority

Most countries in the Horn do not consistently grow enough food to feed their populations. They increasingly rely on imported food, usually at little or no cost from donor nations. This is not a sustainable situation. It has been said for decades that Sudan is a potential breadbasket that could feed much of the region. Yet Sudan in recent years has barely produced enough food for its own people. Ethiopia, Eritrea, Djibouti and Somalia have structural food deficits. Even in a normal crop year, there is a need to import food for five to six million Ethiopians. During years of severe drought, locusts and/or flooding they have huge food deficits. Uganda and Kenya usually grow enough food to feed their populations, but even they have had years when they had to import food to meet domestic requirements.

Improved food security contributes to political stability. Until conflict ends in countries like Somalia it will be difficult to achieve food self-sufficiency. Sudan will never be able to maximize agricultural production so long as the civil war continues. The entire region needs to liberalize trade so that crop surpluses in one country can flow more easily to a deficit country. Improved regional transportation links, for example the road between Moyale in Ethiopia and Isiolo in Kenya, would also facilitate the movement of agricultural goods. Some countries need to take a hard look at their agricultural policies. In this regard, it will be instructive to evaluate several years from now the impact of Ethiopia's land resettlement policy on food production. So long as this remains a voluntary program, minds should remain open until enough time has passed to assess its results. The debate should continue, however, on other aspects of land policy in Ethiopia.

Partner countries and international organizations have been highly responsive to meeting emergency food requirements in the Horn. They have been much less effective in helping to increase local food production. Technical assistance for the agricultural sector in the Horn, an evaluation of the impact of agricultural policies in developed countries on the economies of poor developing countries and a frank agricultural policy dialogue between the two are all in order.

Pay More Attention to Population Planning

Closely related to food security is the problem of high population growth rates. Fast growing

populations result in more people to feed. According to the Central Intelligence Agency *Factbook*, the estimated population growth rates in 2003 for countries in the Horn range from a low of 1.27 percent in Kenya to a high of 3.43 percent in Somalia. The only country other than Kenya with a low rate is Eritrea at 1.28 percent. The *Factbook* puts Ethiopia's growth rate at 1.96 percent, although Ethiopia's National Population Affairs Office recently indicated that the growth rate is 2.7 percent. *Factbook* figures for Djibouti are 2.13 percent, Sudan 2.71 percent and Uganda 2.96 percent.

Most countries in the Horn have little unused arable land; these high population growth rates are not sustainable and they add to political instability. The UNFPA, the United Nations Population Fund, projects, for example, that Ethiopia's population will reach 170 million in 30 years. If this calculation is correct, it would appear almost impossible for Ethiopia to grow enough additional food to support that population. It is imperative that governments, partner countries and international and non-governmental organizations work to reduce these high growth rates in order to diminish pressure on the land and to provide a higher quality of services for the existing population. This, in turn, will promote stability in the Horn.

Curb Production and Use of Chat

Readers may be surprised to find in an analysis of factors that promote political stability a discussion of chat. An amphetamine-like stimulant banned in the United States and much of Europe, chat is

chewed throughout the Horn and is a scourge that has done irreparable harm to most families and the economy in Djibouti, Somalia and Somaliland. An addictive substance, its use is increasing elsewhere, especially in Ethiopia. Chat reduces economic productivity, results in lost time, consumes a disproportionate amount of disposable income from those who have little and results in health problems.

Chat is a particular dilemma for Ethiopia and Kenya, which grow it in highland areas as an important cash crop. Because of the sharp drop in the price of coffee, increasingly farmers are uprooting their coffee bushes and replacing them with chat. As a result, chat accounted for 12 percent of all Ethiopian export income in 2002. Today you can find significant quantities of chat in the hills around Harar, Hararge, Bahir Dar, Butajira and even Addis Ababa. Until Ethiopian and Kenyan farmers can be convinced to plant alternative crops, it will be difficult to eliminate production of this harmful product. It may be even more difficult to stop people from using it. No one has found a way to end alcoholism and cocaine use in industrialized societies, but there are serious programs to limit the damage they do.

In the meantime, chat production tends to lead to increasing usage in those areas where it is grown. What may appear as a boon for Ethiopian and Kenyan farmers is already returning to haunt Ethiopian and Kenyan society. There should be no doubt about chat's direct contribution to conflict. It contributes to the on-going violence in Somalia where the combination of a young militia member with an AK-47 and a night of chat chewing can be deadly.

Although there are other more pressing problems in the region, the sooner the countries of the Horn work together to curb this practice, the greater will be the prospects for stability.

Attack Poverty

The leadership throughout the Horn of Africa seems to appreciate the need to alleviate poverty and probably understands that high levels of poverty contribute to conflict. As a region, the Horn is poor. According to the CIA *Factbook*, the percent of the population that falls below the poverty line in Ethiopia is 45 percent, in Djibouti and Kenya 50 percent and Eritrea 53 percent. There are no statistics for Somalia and Sudan, although it is safe to assume that they would be high. Only Uganda at 35 percent scores reasonably well on this scale.

The World Bank has taken the lead on this issue with its Poverty Reduction Strategy model. The Bank encourages donors to coordinate in support of a strong government-driven strategy with wide civil society participation. This strategy becomes very difficult, however, where freedom of speech and participation are constrained and where the capacity to implement poverty reduction programs is weak. The Bank also observes that civil war and interstate conflict lead to a political impasse and breakdown in decision making that bring well intentioned programs to a halt.

By their nature, poverty reduction programs are long term. They

require the sustained support of the international community and intelligent national policies. If they are to maximize prospects for improving stability, they must also have as their goal a reduction in the gap between the rich and the poor.

And Finally There Are Special Situations in the Horn

Much of the region will remain subject to turmoil until there is an end to Somalia's failed state status. There have been numerous attempts, most of them supported to some extent by the international community, to reestablish a national government in Somalia. They all failed and the current effort in Kenya appears headed toward a similar result. It is time to return to a bottom up approach rather than one which operates from the top down, i.e. persuading Somali faction leaders to accept a power sharing formula. A bottom up strategy that relies more heavily on elders, clan leaders and civil society organizations will take a long time. But the top down approach has not shown permanent success after a dozen years of conferences outside Somalia.

Ending the civil war in Sudan is another major priority for stability in the region. In spite of recent setbacks in the reconciliation process, the prospects remain good in the coming weeks for signing a peace agreement between the government of Sudan and the SPLA. The hard part will begin with implementation of the agreement. It is important to include political groups in the implementation phase that were not signatories to the agreement. In order to help insure

success, Khartoum must also find a way to end the conflict in Darfur. All of this will require enormous international support and follow through.

Ethiopia is the key to stability in the Horn of Africa. With some 70 million people, it has by far the largest population. It is the only country that shares a border with all the other countries except Uganda. If Ethiopia is unstable, neighboring countries will almost certainly be impacted in a negative way. It is also inevitable that there will be continuing pressure for this land-locked country with such a large population to obtain improved access to the sea. To some extent, access can be expanded through greater use of Port Sudan and Berbera. But as long as the Ethiopia-Eritrea border issue remains unresolved, it will be difficult to solve this problem. Eritrea's Red Sea port of Assab is the obvious outlet and a restoration of cordial relations with Eritrea would also bring the port of Massawa back into the picture. It is none too soon to consider the possibilities. One could envisage, for example, an internationally guaranteed corridor from the Ethiopian border to Assab and long term use of Assab port by Ethiopia in exchange for appropriate compensation to Eritrea for use of the corridor and port. In the grand scheme of things, guaranteed access to Assab for Ethiopia will play a major role in helping to assure stability in the Horn of Africa.
